International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)[1] from Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly analyses developments in the Middle East, the Balkans, and around the world. In the article “Show or Reality?: Hitting Moscow – Between Strategic Desperation and Balance by Force (Part II),” Dr. Cătălin Balog, an analyst and trainer with extensive expertise in intelligence, information security, and strategic communication, continues his exploration of whether peace can be preserved without resorting to force. He offers comprehensive analysis of global reactions, European ambivalence, non-Western opportunism, and Romania’s vulnerabilities.
This is the central dilemma of the second part of the analysis of the current multipolar confrontation. Beyond the visible demonstrations – American submarines and Russian bombers – and bellicose declarations, an unseen battle is being waged for the control of perceptions, where power is also defined by narratives and emotions, not just by weapons. The paper introduces concepts such as emotional deterrence, controlled spectacle and normative truth to explain the distinct registers of the great actors: American poker, Russian chess, Chinese go and European normativity. The analysis ends with three scenarios – negotiation, accident or unilateral imposition – and with the conclusion that the wars of the future will be won through the ability to impose one's own version of reality.
In the current era, strategic confrontations are not reduced to troop movements, military exercises or official statements. More and more often, reality is played out on two simultaneous planes: the visible one, intended for public opinion, and the invisible one, of perceptions, illusions and manipulations. The central dilemma is whether we are facing solid facts or a directed show, designed to convey messages and condition behaviours. “Spectacle or reality?” thus becomes the key question through which contemporary multipolarity is deciphered.
Since ancient times, thinkers such as Sun Tzu observed that “the art of war is the art of deception”, [2]emphasizing the primacy of illusion over direct confrontation. In modernity, Niccolò Machiavelli recommended that leaders manipulate perceptions in order to consolidate their authority[3], and Otto von Bismarck demonstrated that the balance of great powers depended not only on the ratio of the armed forces, but also on the perception of political will[4]. In the nuclear age, the Nixon administration refined these intuitions through the “Madman Theory”, the stake being the projection of a calculated unpredictability to coerce the adversary[5].
This ambivalence – between reality and spectacle – can be understood through three distinct paradigms: “Madman Theory” in the case of the United States, “Deep Control” in the case of Russia, and “Silence Power” in the case of China. Each represents a different way of orchestrating perceptions, manipulating emotions, and imposing one's own strategic pace.
The tools by which perceptions are shaped are not new, but they have acquired an unprecedented sophistication. Moral framing, the deliberate selection or omission of information, and the multiplication of competing narratives have become cognitive weapons[6]. As Thomas Schelling observed, “the threat that works is the one that psychologically conditions the behaviour of the adversary”.[7] In today's world, war is not won just by destroying infrastructure or economic sanctions, but by eroding trust, manipulating collective emotions, and inducing a sense of inevitability.
Multipolarity does not bring stability, but a competition between different registers of power: the American spectacle, Russian ambiguity, Chinese patience and European normativity. These registers confront each other on the global stage in a “visible theatre”, dominated by gestures and symbols, but also in “invisible backstage”, where the real struggle is for the control of perceptions. In such a world, the question “spectacle or reality?” does not have a single answer: the two dimensions coexist, and the victory belongs to the one who manages to make them confuse.
Today, international relations are marked by a structural tension: power is not only expressed through facts, but also through the way they are presented, interpreted and internalized. In a world dominated by accelerated information flows, the spectacle becomes an integral part of political reality. Public gestures, provocative statements and demonstrations of force are no longer mere manifestations of prestige, but tools for shaping strategic perceptions.
This logic is not new. In The Republic, Plato observed that people often confuse shadows with reality itself (the myth of the cave).[8] In the contemporary world, shadows are generated by global media and social networks, where the image of an event can have a stronger impact than the event itself. In the same line of reflection, in Thoughts to Himself, Marcus Aurelius drew attention to the fact that perceptions and emotions distort judgment if they are not controlled[9]. The lesson is current: between spectacle and reality, international politics is often played out in the grey area of perceptions.
Strategically, the show becomes a resource when it is used to transmit multiple signals simultaneously. Donald Trump deliberately cultivates this logic through theatrical gestures, sudden changes of tone and contradictory statements. His statements on the limits of support for Ukraine should not be read only as political opinions, but as negotiating tools: they convey to Moscow the readiness to raise the stakes and to Europe the warning that American protection has some costs, is not unlimited and can be stratified[10]. In this sense, the spectacle becomes part of the calculation, and unpredictability is transformed into a diplomatic weapon.
Vladimir Putin, on the other hand, prefers to alternate between periods of silence and gestures of force. Symbolic strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure do not decisively change the military balance, but they send a message of control and keep the adversary in a state of [11]uncertainty. The show, in this case, is not the constant noise, but the creation of an imposed rhythm: Russia decides when and how to raise the tension, maintaining the illusion that it has the initiative.
This tension between spectacle and reality is also visible in the case of China. Unlike the United States and Russia, Xi Jinping cultivates strategic silence. China's absence from the scene of direct confrontations does not reflect neutrality, but a strategy of patience: by letting others exhaust themselves in costly conflicts, Beijing is quietly capitalizing economically and diplomatically[12]. In this register, the spectacle is replaced by discretion, and reality is constructed through slow and inevitable accumulation.
Instead, the EU and NATO face a structural problem: although the leaders of these organizations talk about collective guarantees and accelerating rearmament, the lack of an autonomous capacity and internal divisions reduce the credibility of the message. Normativity – the appeal to values, rules and institutions – remains the main Euro-Atlantic resource, but in a global game dominated by the American spectacle, Russian ambiguity and Chinese patience, the EU's attitude risks being perceived as moralism without material force[13].
Thus, “spectacle or reality?” is not just a rhetorical question, but a structural dilemma of the multipolar order. In a world where perceptions are as important as facts, power is no longer measured only by resources, but by the ability to control the narrative.
In contemporary international politics, truth is no longer a neutral category, but a weapon used to shape perceptions and legitimize actions. Each major actor tries to impose their own version of reality, turning facts into narratives and narratives into instruments of power. In this sense, truth is no longer universal, but multiple, fragmented and negotiable.
Throughout history, the control of truth has been associated with the exercise of authority. Machiavelli, in The Prince, emphasized that the leader must manipulate appearances in order to maintain his power[14]. In modernity, totalitarian regimes have perfected this practice by monopolizing information and rewriting history. Today, digital technologies have opened up a new battlefield: truth is disseminated, challenged and reconfigured in real time, through official channels, social platforms and psychological operations.
The United States uses truth as an instrument of pressure and legitimization. Donald Trump's statements, even when they seem contradictory, have the role of fixing cognitive frameworks for the American public and for allies. The “truth” conveyed by Washington is not necessarily faithful to reality, but it is credible enough to condition perceptions. Truth here becomes an ideology: a construction adapted to the context, meant to produce strategic effects.
Vladimir Putin's Russia practices a different model, which researchers have called “Active Measures”: truth is fragmented, relativized and multiplied[15]. Instead of a single, coherent version, Moscow simultaneously launches divergent narratives to cause confusion. The goal is not to convince the public of a one-size-fits-all version, but to erode trust in the existence of any truth. Thus, the opponent is pushed into a field of permanent uncertainty.
China prefers the strategy of silence. Instead of competing directly in terms of narratives, Xi Jinping gives the impression that Chinese truth is defined by economic facts and social stability. Silence does not mean neutrality, but a form of power: the refusal to enter into the immediate competition of narratives and the placement of the conflict in a longer time horizon[16].
If Russia and China use the truth as a tool through direct methods – brutal propaganda and systematic censorship – the West instrumentalizes it in a more subtle, but no less effective manner. The United States, at least at the current stage, has partially detached itself from the constraints of political correctness, relying on a direct and often provocative discourse. Europe, on the other hand, continues to clothe its narratives in normative language – democracy, solidarity, climate – turning the truth into a “soft” weapon that it uses treacherously, blocking alternatives not through explicit prohibition, but through moral stigmatization. Thus, the EU invokes the “normative truth” – the rule of law, democracy and solidarity – while NATO offers the collective military arm to give weight to these values. The problem is that, without material support and internal cohesion, normativity remains vulnerable and risks being perceived as moralism.
Consequently, the transformation of truth into ideology and weapon becomes one of the central concerns of the current multipolar confrontation. In this competition, the winner is not the one who controls objective reality, but the one who manages to impose his own version on the public and make it impossible to prove the opposite.
If spectacle and truth can be directed, human vulnerabilities remain the ground on which these tools become effective. Modern warfare is not won only by force of arms, but by the ability to shape collective emotions, to exploit the inner cracks of societies and to condition the behaviours of decision-makers. Emotional deterrence thus becomes a central component of the multipolar confrontation.
At the strategic level, emotional deterrence aims to shape the affective states of the public. Fear, guilt, euphoria or resignation become political resources. Two techniques predominate: moral framing, whereby conflict is defined in ethical terms, blocking compromises by stigmatizing them as “guilt”; and controlled ambiguity, which deliberately maintains uncertainty in order to force the adversary to disperse its resources. Decision psychology confirms the effectiveness of these mechanisms: loss aversion causes actors to react disproportionately to the prospect of ceding territories or symbols[17].
At the operational level, history shows that systems can be destabilized by seemingly minor human cracks. The Simple Sabotage Field Manual, developed by the Office of Strategic Services – OSS in 1944, recommended the exploitation of bureaucracy, internal conflicts and suspicion to paralyze organizations without direct violence[18]. Currently, these techniques are adapted by:
At the tactical level, the arsenal is granular and diversified: rumours, leaks, deepfakes, institutional “windows of silence”, kompromat, digital micro-targeting, coordinated disinformation campaigns and amplification operations in the online environment. They all aim to activate affective tribalism – the instinctive opposition between “us” and “them” – a modern psychological adaptation of the old maxim “divide et impera”. Society is no longer fragmented by political decisions, but by the exploitation of primary emotions that instinctively separate groups, reducing the space for intermediate solutions. In such a context, emotions become not only tools, but also the battlefield on which victory is decided.
Emotional deterrence turns modern warfare into a lasting psychological confrontation. Brute force matters, but decisive are the ability to manage perceptions, manipulate emotions and exploit the opponent's internal vulnerabilities. In a multipolar world, whoever manages to control collective emotions wins the battle even before the first shot is fired – as the annexation of Crimea in 2014 demonstrated.
Multipolarity is not just a description of global equilibrium, but the expression of a competition between different registers of power exercise. In the absence of clear hegemony, states act not only to achieve their immediate goals, but also to direct the way they are perceived. From this perspective, multipolarity does not generate stability, but a continuous confrontation between styles of power, each with its own strategic code.
The United States cultivates the controlled spectacle: “Madman Theory”. Donald Trump is turning up the volume, using unpredictability, and turning escalation into bargaining resources. His statements on the limits of support for Ukraine are not mere political opinions, but tactical tools: a signal to Moscow that Washington is willing to risk it, and a warning to Europe that American protection has costs, security levels, and time span[20]. In this logic, the show is not rhetoric, but calculation.
Russia practices “Deep Control”. Vladimir Putin avoids constant shows of force and alternates symbolic strikes with periods of strategic calm. Attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure do not decisively change the military balance, but they maintain uncertainty and erode the morale of the adversary[21]. The refusal to accept a summit without preconditions confirms this strategy: Russia conveys that it does not allow itself to be drawn into a game directed by others, but prefers to maintain its initiative.
China adopts “Silence Power”. Xi Jinping avoids open confrontation and quietly accumulates economic and diplomatic capital. The visible absence from the negotiation scene does not express neutrality, but a strategy of time: by letting others erode into costly conflicts, Beijing wins through persistence and inevitability[22]. In this register, silence is not passivity, but a lasting weapon.
The EU and NATO are in a structurally fragile position. Ursula von der Leyen and Mark Rutte talk about collective guarantees and accelerated rearmament, but the lack of autonomous military capabilities and internal divisions reduce the credibility of these statements. As I have said before, the European Union relies on normativity – rule of law, solidarity, democracy – but without its own military support these values risk being perceived as moralism. And if NATO provides a security umbrella, the EU still does not have a strategic game of its own[23].
The Great Powers and Their Games
The lesson of the four games
These registers do not only reflect cultural expressions, but define the current multipolar dynamics. American poker creates immediate tension and psychological pressure. Russian chess aims for medium-term positioning, with tactical sacrifices for strategic advantages. Chinese Go amplifies time, turning patience into a weapon. Instead, Europe remains caught between the role of arbitrator and the lack of its own strategy.
Current multipolarity does not equate, therefore, to a stable equilibrium between centres of power, but to a confrontation between divergent styles of the exercise of force. Washington escalates to obtain concessions, Moscow cultivates ambiguity to paralyze the decision, Beijing turns time into a strategic resource, and Europe compensates by appealing to the rules. In such a world, whoever manages to impose his own register becomes, even temporarily, the architect of the global order.
Current multipolarity does not equate to a stable equilibrium, but to a continuous confrontation between divergent registers of power that try to impose their own rhythm, their own narrative and their own rules of the game. In this context, the near future can be understood through three major scenarios – negotiation, accident or unilateral imposition – which are not exclusive, but can overlap, succeed or contaminate each other.
Negotiation – unlikely, for now; possible under extreme conditions. Negotiation implies reciprocity in the recognition of limits and the willingness of the great powers to make concessions. The central problem, however, is the asymmetry of objectives: for the United States, the absolute priority remains to maintain the credibility of the alliances and the nuclear umbrella, without which the entire Western architecture would be compromised; for Russia, the stake is the recognition of a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, a recognition that the West cannot officially accept without contradicting its own principles; for China, The goal is not to immediately resolve the conflict itself, but to extend strategic time, leaving rivals to consume themselves in costly confrontations while Beijing accumulates power.
Negotiations only become possible when certain conditions reach a critical threshold. In the United States, these are economic and political—budget deficits and ideological polarization. In the European Union, they combine security, economic, demographic and regulatory vulnerabilities: energy dependence, declining birth rates, migration pressure and the climate agenda. In Russia, the pressures are economic, social and demographic – sanctions, technological isolation and population decline. In China, they are structural – the aging of the population, economic imbalances and the rigidity of the political system. Only in the face of such cumulative constraints can leaders be forced to seek a controlled way out. In their absence, dialogue remains a rhetorical exercise: in the West, soft narratives, presented as inevitable in the logic of values; in Russia and China, speeches aimed at projecting resilience. In all cases, the result is the same: the absence of readiness for a real compromise.
An additional element that can influence the probability of negotiations in the medium term (3-5 years) is the change of leaders. In the United States, democratic elections can alter the tone and pace of foreign policy, but not the underlying direction, constrained by deficit and polarization. In Russia, where the leader is the very embodiment of the regime, a forced transition would bring about a factional struggle rather than a strategic change, with possible temporary openings to negotiation from a position of weakness. In China, the concentration of power around Xi Jinping means that an eventual change signals an internal crisis, but the continuity of the party would ensure the persistence of the strategy of patience and gradual accumulation. In all cases, leaders can speed up or slow down processes, but structural pressures remain the determining factor.
Unilateral imposition – tempting, but with an increased risk of destabilization. This scenario is the most dangerous, but also the most attractive for actors who believe they have a temporary advantage. The United States could try to force a deal through a combination of military pressure, sanctions and diplomatic spectacle. Russia, feeling the pressure of time and economic fragility, could be counting on a symbolic victory to force international recognition. China could continue by gradual imposition: the inevitable expansion of its economic and technological influence, doubled by strategic silence.
Each of these trajectories risks destabilizing the global order and triggering chain reactions. Deterrence is not a static mechanism, but a fragile process, dependent on perceptions and signals[24]. Any imbalance can make a gesture meant to intimidate to be perceived as aggression, pushing the conflict into an irreversible zone.
The accident – the most likely catalyst for a crisis. In an environment saturated with demonstrations of force, cyber operations and contradictory rhetoric, the risk of an accident is high. A stray missile, a naval incident in the Black Sea, or a hacking operation out of control can trigger an escalation spiral that no actor initially wants. The lesson of history confirms this pattern: the outbreak of World War I[25] or the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 show how easily accidents and misinterpretations can ignite a global conflagration.
Today, the military density on NATO's eastern flank and the proximity of opposing forces can make the risk of such an accident even higher. The danger comes not only from the direct clash, but also from the ambiguity of intentions: when the spectacle becomes a strategy, a calculated signal can be interpreted as aggression. And the real danger is not the accident itself, but the way it is politically exploited.
Probabilistic appreciation. Of the three scenarios, the accident is the most likely: the density of military forces and the volatility of the information space increase the chances of miscalculations. Unilateral imposition is possible, but in the short term it remains limited by the huge costs for the actor initiating it. Negotiation is the least likely now, but it may become feasible again if internal tensions – economic, social, political – become unbearable for leaders.
Referring strictly to Ukraine: if we were to look at the situation realistically, the best chances are for entering a phase of attrition with pressure for a truce, not a phase of “peace” – and with a battle of perceptions at least as intense as on the front line.
Romania: between geography and resilience
For Romania, each scenario brings major challenges. In the case of negotiation, the country risks being treated marginally, as an object and not as a subject of the decision, as already happened when, after the cancellation of the second round of the 2024 presidential elections, Romania was viewed through different lenses in Washington and Brussels, being reduced to the status of a textbook case on institutional fragility. In the accident scenario, Romania becomes a direct risk terrain, given its proximity to the Ukrainian theatre and the role of host state of NATO's infrastructure. In the case of unilateral imposition, vulnerability increases through hybrid pressures that exploit economic weaknesses, social fractures and a real political indifference to strengthening national resilience.
In each of these scenarios, Romania's structural problem is the political class, which continues to rely almost exclusively on its geographical position as a guarantee of security, while internal resilience is treated with nonchalance, improvisation and lack of strategic vision. Romania needs systematic investments in defence, energy, critical infrastructure, technological education and social cohesion – areas where reforms are often delayed or fragmented. Without this effort, geographical advantage inevitably turns into strategic vulnerability.
Since ancient times, philosophy has shown that reality is not what it is, but what people think it is. Plato described in The Republic (the myth of the cave) prisoners who confused shadows with truth[26]. Marcus Aurelius warned in Thoughts to Himself that “life is what our thoughts make it to be”, focusing on the discipline of perception and inner resilience[27]. This line of reflection has been adapted by politics: Niccolò Machiavelli recommended the manipulation of appearances in order to maintain power[28], Otto von Bismarck demonstrated that the European balance depended on the impression of political will[29], and Richard Nixon, in the midst of the Cold War, refined these intuitions through the theory of the madman, cultivating the impression of unpredictability to constrain opponents[30].
Today, these lessons take on an unprecedented technological dimension. The shadows in Plato's cave are no longer mere metaphors, but digital simulations. Algorithms filter information, artificial intelligence produces credible images and voices, and fabricated narratives spread at the speed of global networks. The Matrix no longer seems just a cultural fiction, but a description of the environment in which strategic decisions are made[31].
Power is exercised simultaneously on several levels. First of all, through material force – armies, resources, nuclear weapons. Secondly, through ideological narratives, which weaponize truth, mobilizing support and blocking compromises. Thirdly, by modelling perceptions on an algorithmic basis, redefining what we see, what we know and what we think is possible. But deeper than all this, power is “playing” in the inner space of the human mind. The mind is the ground, emotions are the weapons. Whoever manages to shape fear, hope or resignation controls the political decision before the opponent enters the battlefield.
For border states, such as Romania, this reality raises the stakes. In the past, survival depended on geography and alliances; Today, it also depends on the ability to resist manipulation, to distinguish between reality and simulation, to cultivate lucidity as a strategic resource. Even if Romania does not have the luxury of dictating the rules of the global game, it can decide whether it remains the terrain of confrontation with others or assumes the role of actor through internal resilience and strategic clarity.
Thus, the dialogue “Can you hit Moscow?” – “Absolutely!” is not only about the military possibility of attacking a centre of power, but also about the ability to control the perception of such a strike. Because, in a fluid world order, it is not the one who has the most weapons who wins, but the one who manages to convince the world that the reality is the one he presents.
Instead of conclusion, an exercise in imagination: America plays poker, Russia plays chess, China plays go, and Europe simply plays the rules. The difference is not only in style, but also in time: poker is played in minutes, chess in hours, go in days. If we were to take a psycho-behavioural look at the players at the table, we could say that the poker player is most likely to get up suddenly, even flipping the table. But the game does not end there: the others will continue to move the pieces or place the stones in the logic of poker, adapting to the tensions and stakes imposed, with the hope of a future in which the game will change and will be favourable to them.
In multipolarity, the winner is the one who manages to impose not only his own pace and narrative in front of the global audience, but also his own game in relation to the other players at the table – before they have agreed on the stakes and compromises. After all, multipolarity does not offer tranquillity, but only the continuity of a game in which the rules are always rewritten. In other words, in a world of multipolarity, stability is not the goal, but only the interlude between two crises.
Selective bibliography
Books and volumes
Journals (scientific articles)
Documents (manuals, reports, guides)
About the author:
Col. (ret.) Dr. Cătălin Balog is an analyst and trainer with extensive experience in intelligence, information security, and strategic communication. He holds a PhD in Military Sciences, with a dissertation focused on security risk management in cyberspace, and has served for over two decades in structures of the Romanian Ministry of National Defence.
Currently, he is an associate professor at the University of Bucharest, where he teaches courses in information management. His research interests include the analysis of contemporary social and political mechanisms, with particular attention to the relationship between ideology, technology, and the simulation of democracy.
The article presents the stance of the author and does not necessarily reflect the stance of IFIMES.
Ljubljana/ Bucharest, 7 September 2025
[1] IFIMES – International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has Special Consultative status at ECOSOC/UN, New York, since 2018 and it’s publisher of the international scientific journal “European Perspectives”.
[2] Sun Tzu, The Art of War. Trad. Maria Magdalena Cristea (Bucharest: Antet, 2008).
[3] Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1998).
[4] Otto von Bismarck, Gedanken und Erinnerungen (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1898).
[5] Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978).
[6] Robert M. Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,” Journal of Communication 43, no. 4 (1993): 51–58.
[7] Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), chap. 2.
[8] Platon, Republica. Trad. Andrei Cornea (Bucharest: Polirom, 2004).
[9] Marcus Aurelius, Thoughts to Himself. Trad. Constantin Noica (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1993).
[10] “Trump Says Ukraine Has No Chance of Winning War Without Striking Russia,” Wall Street Journal, August 19, 2025.
[11] “Russia Rules Out European Troops in Ukraine as Trump Makes Veiled Threats,” The Guardian, August 21, 2025.
[12] Rush Doshi, The Long Game: China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021).
[13] Ivan Krastev, Mark Leonard, The Crisis of European Foreign Policy (London: ECFR, 2023).
[14] Machiavelli, op.cit.
[15] Thomas Rid, Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2020).
[16] Doshi, op.cit.
[17] Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,” Econometrica 47, nr. 2 (1979): 263–291.
[18] Office of Strategic Services, Simple Sabotage Field Manual (1944; declassified by the CIA, 2008).
[19] Andrew P. Moore et al., The CERT Guide to Insider Threats (Boston: Addison-Wesley, 2012).
[20] Wall Street Journal, ibid.
[21] The Guardian, ibid.
[22] Doshi, op.cit.
[23] Krastev, Leonard, op.cit.
[24] Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004).
[25] Christopher Clark, Sleepwalkers. How Europe entered the war in 1914 (Bucharest: Humanitas, 2014).
[26] Plato, op.cit.
[27] Marcus Aurelius, op.cit.
[28] Machiavelli, op.cit.
[29] Bismarck, op.cit.
[30] Nixon, op.cit.
[31] Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, Trans. Ciprian Mihali (Cluj-Napoca: Idea Design & Print, 2008).
