The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)[1], based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly monitors and analyses key developments in the Middle East, the Balkans and the broader international context. In its latest research, entitled “The Western Balkans and the European Union: Group enlargement as a strategic response to the crisis of credibility and geopolitical uncertainty”, particular attention is devoted to the initiative of the President of the Republic of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, advocating that the Western Balkan countries pursue accession to the European Union as a group. Presented at a recent meeting with Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, and António Costa, President of the European Council, the initiative has reopened a key question about the future of the European project in Southeast Europe. The excerpts presented below highlight the most relevant and compelling geopolitical, strategic and societal implications of the proposal.
The initiative put forward by the President of the Republic of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, proposing the group accession of Western Balkan countries to the EU, and presented at a recent meeting with Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, and António Costa, President of the European Council, has reopened a fundamental question at the heart of European policy: does the EU have a clear and consistent strategy for the Western Balkans?
This initiative is neither a political experiment nor an attempt to bypass European criteria. Instead, it seeks to restore the strategic rationale of enlargement, which has yielded stable and long-term results at pivotal moments in the Union’s history. The core of the proposal is not about “easing” membership, but about acknowledging that a fragmented, bilateral and indefinitely protracted process is losing credibility – both among the citizens of the Western Balkans and within the broader geopolitical context.
Group enlargement is not a historical anomaly, but a well-established practice applied at decisive strategic junctures. The most prominent example is the 2004 enlargement round, when the EU admitted ten states simultaneously, predominantly from Central and Eastern Europe. In effect, this amounted to “9.5 states”, as the northern, Turkish-administered part of Cyprus lay outside the scope of the acquis communautaire. That round of enlargement brought approximately 70 million people into the Union, while the Western Balkans today comprise around 16 million inhabitants, underscoring that the region’s demographic scale cannot reasonably be considered a barrier to integration.
In 2025, migration from the Balkans reached an estimated 500,000 young people annually, driven primarily by economic pressures and security concerns. Group enlargement offers a potential avenue to address this trend by advancing economic integration and opening access to the EU labour market.
Under a negotiated group enlargement scenario (2028–2030), all candidate countries would join the EU in a single wave. This would bolster the Union’s credibility in the region, increase public support for membership by 20–25%, stabilise local economies by generating estimated annual GDP growth of 2–3%, and improve the effectiveness of regional cooperation by 30–50% through joint infrastructure and trade projects.
The 2004 enlargement decision was guided by strategic considerations rather than by the pursuit of perfect institutional solutions. In retrospect, that move is widely regarded as one of the most successful in the history of the European Union: it stabilised the post-socialist space, accelerated the economic development of the new member states, reduced security risks, and permanently integrated them into the Western political, legal and value-based framework. Amid today’s geopolitical volatility, including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it is difficult to overstate how much more vulnerable the EU would be without that landmark enlargement.
Viewed through this lens, the initiative for the group accession of Western Balkan countries is not an experiment, but rather a natural extension of an established European practice, recalibrated to meet the demands of the current geopolitical and strategic environment.
In contrast to Central and Eastern European countries in the early 2000s, the Western Balkans today remain trapped in a prolonged candidacy without a clearly defined outcome. The enlargement process increasingly resembles an end in itself, while the genuine prospect of membership has been supplanted by complex technical phases, provisional mechanisms and political conditionalities.
Such an approach reduces the region from an active participant to a passive recipient of policy, weakening political motivation and public support for reforms. A group-based EU approach could generate a powerful psychological, political and institutional impact by restoring a clear connection between reform implementation and a tangible reward — the core principle underpinning any effective enlargement policy.
Lessons from previous enlargement rounds provide important insights:
Lessons for the Western Balkans: At present, the region is affected by prolonged uncertainty, fragmented criteria and limited regional consensus. Unlike earlier enlargement waves, which offered a clear and credible path to membership, the Western Balkans continue to be “trapped” within the process.
A group-based EU approach could help restore the credibility of enlargement, provide clearer timelines and re-establish the principle of rewards linked to reform implementation. Such a model would transform the region from a passive recipient of policies into an active participant in European integration.
The European Union’s current enlargement policy is marked by a serious problem of double standards. Many existing member states do not meet the criteria demanded of Western Balkan countries, particularly in the areas of the rule of law, media freedom, anti-corruption efforts and the independence of the judiciary. Such asymmetry generates a sense of political unfairness and reinforces perceptions of selective political pressure. Moreover, the practice of ad hoc changes to requirements and the absence of clear timelines erode trust among both citizens and institutions in EU decision-making mechanisms, making the enlargement process appear politically instrumentalised rather than merit-based, and significantly undermining the EU’s credibility in the eyes of the Western Balkans.
Against this backdrop, regional cooperation emerges as a crucial driver of a stronger European perspective. In 2025, the Western Balkans generated a combined GDP of around EUR 130 billion, with trade with the European Union accounting for approximately 65–70% of the region’s total external trade, demonstrating a high degree of economic interdependence and the need for a coordinated approach to integration.
The experience of the Visegrád Group confirms that joint political action, experience-sharing and mutual support can substantially accelerate the accession trajectory. At present, the Western Balkans are engaged in several regional initiatives that foster connectivity and a sense of shared destiny—including CEFTA, the Berlin Process, the Open Balkan and the Adriatic–Ionian Initiative. A group-based EU approach could further catalyse these efforts, transitioning the region from a passive policy-recipient to a proactive stakeholder in the integration process, while enhancing its negotiating leverage and strategic significance within the broader European framework.
Throughout its history, EU enlargement has served as a response to internal crises within the Union. Today’s challenges are particularly acute: the war in Ukraine, a reshaped European security architecture, energy insecurity, migration pressures, the rise of populism and declining global competitiveness. The integration of the Western Balkans is not merely an act of solidarity, but a strategic investment in the security, stability and geopolitical cohesion of the continent. The exclusion of the region from the Union would generate a persistent source of instability along the EU’s borders and further erode the Union’s internal stability.
The prolonged stalling of the enlargement process is already having significant social and political repercussions. Public trust in the EU has been steadily declining: in Serbia, it has fallen from 70% in 2010 to approximately 40% in 2025; in Montenegro, from 65% to 45%; while North Macedonia and Albania have seen a decline from around 60% to 35–40%. The EU is increasingly viewed as an inconsistent and unpredictable partner, opening space for competing geopolitical narratives and the expanding influence of other global actors. Sustained uncertainty weakens the appeal of the European idea and fuels the search for alternative political, economic and security anchors. In the absence of a clear timeline for membership, the geopolitical reorientation of the region is becoming a realistic option, carrying the risk of fragmentation, waning European soft power and increased security threats in Southeast Europe.
Support for the initiative of the President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, in favour of group membership does not imply abandoning reforms, but rather acknowledges that the current model has been exhausted and that a new dynamic is needed. A group-based approach can help restore the credibility of enlargement policy, stabilise the Western Balkans, narrow the existing geopolitical vacuum and reinforce the EU’s internal cohesion. To deliver meaningful results, countries in the region must continue profound reforms in the area of the rule of law, intensify regional cooperation, address bilateral disputes and present a coordinated approach towards Brussels.
Conversely, the European Union needs to articulate a credible accession date or timeframe, put an end to ad hoc adjustments of criteria, and reposition enlargement as a strategic policy choice rather than a purely technical and bureaucratic procedure.
Only such an approach can make the group model an effective tool for stabilising the region, solidifying the Western Balkans' European perspective while safeguarding security, public trust and the continent’s geopolitical resilience.
The Western Balkans today stand at a crossroads, caught between European integration and escalating global geopolitical competition. Prolonged uncertainty surrounding the region’s European perspective has opened space for a stronger presence of the United States, Russia and China.
The United States remains a key security actor, focused on stability through NATO, bilateral arrangements and diplomatic presence, but without prioritising the institutional integration of the region into the EU. The continued postponement of EU membership deepens the Western Balkans’ dependence on American engagement, ultimately diminishing the European Union’s strategic autonomy.
Russia treats the Western Balkans as an arena for geopolitical competition and as an instrument of destabilisation. Its strategy includes energy ties, political support for selected political actors, cultural and historical narratives, and information operations. The absence of a clear European perspective further strengthens Russia’s position and amplifies narratives about the EU’s “closed doors”.
China’s engagement is primarily economic and infrastructural, driven by initiatives such as the Belt and Road, without attaching political conditions. Such a model appeals to segments of political elites but does not offer long-term institutional integration nor a value-based framework. China’s economic footprint thus represents an alternative, but not a substitute, for the European perspective.
The impact of external actors is also reflected in financial terms: Russia invests approximately EUR 10 billion annually, while China channels between EUR 8 and 10 billion through its infrastructure projects. Analyses suggest that a clear European perspective could curb their political and security influence by as much as 20–30%.
Against this background, the EU enlargement policy cannot be treated as a standalone process; it needs to be integrated into a broader transatlantic and global strategy. A clear and viable accession perspective is crucial for safeguarding the Union’s credibility, reducing the influence of external actors and reinforcing long-term regional stability. Prolonged uncertainty not only expands the scope for such actors to operate, but also undermines the EU’s own strategic posture.
EU enlargement to the Western Balkans should be viewed not as a form of rivalry with the United States, Russia or China, but as an act of the Union’s strategic self-defence. Integrating the region into Europe’s institutional, political and security structures reduces the scope for destabilising influences and strengthens the long-term geopolitical credibility and stability of Southeast Europe.
The Western Balkans today stand at a critical crossroads between European integration and geopolitical fragmentation. Persistent uncertainty in the enlargement process increases the reach of external actors that neither subscribe to European values nor offer durable stability, thereby further exacerbating the region’s strategic vulnerability.
In this context, the initiative for group enlargement acquires particular geopolitical significance. It represents a strategic step aimed at firmly embedding the Western Balkans within Europe’s political, security and value-based frameworks. An individual approach to membership carries the risk of favouring certain countries, deepening regional tensions and limiting the effectiveness of European policy. By contrast, a group-based model enhances the EU’s credibility, contributes to regional stability and narrows the existing geopolitical vacuum.
Prolonged reliance on an individual accession approach leads to declining public support, the consolidation of Russian and Chinese influence, and the fragmentation of reform efforts. Should the EU fail to meet its historical responsibility, other actors will move to fill the vacuum, albeit under non-European rules. Extended uncertainty seriously undermines the Western Balkans’ European perspective, weakens the Union’s strategic position and increases the risk of the geopolitical reorientation of individual countries in the region.
The initiative for group membership represents a realistic, politically rational and historically grounded way out of the current stalemate. If the EU intends to preserve a relevant geopolitical role on the continent, the Western Balkans must cease to be a “permanent candidate” and become an integral part of the European project.
Ljubljana/Washington/Brussels/Belgrade, 29 December 2025
[1] IFIMES - International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has a special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council ECOSOC/UN in New York since 2018, and it is the publisher of the international scientific journal "European Perspectives." Available at: https://www.europeanperspectives.org/en
