The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)[1], based in Ljubljana, regularly monitors and analyses political, economic and geopolitical developments in the Middle East, the Balkans, Europe and across the world. In its research, IFIMES assesses that the recent visit by the President of the Republic of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, to China signals the beginning of a new phase in the Serbia-China strategic partnership, in which technology, robotics and artificial intelligence are becoming the main drivers of relations, surpassing the importance of traditional infrastructure projects. At the same time, by intensifying its cooperation with China, Serbia is seeking to strengthen its regional geopolitical position further and establish itself as a technological and logistics hub of the Western Balkans. Against this backdrop, the following key findings from the comprehensive analysis, “Serbia – China 2026: Technological partnership, geopolitical positioning and a new phase of the Chinese presence in the Western Balkans”, underscore the strategic significance and long-term implications of the evolving Serbia-China relationship.
The multi-day official visit by the President of the Republic of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, to China, which took place from 24 to 28 May 2026, is among Serbia’s most politically and economically significant bilateral engagements in recent years. The fact that it is the longest bilateral visit Vučić has made during his presidency points to a high degree of political trust between Belgrade and Beijing, as well as to Serbia’s increasingly assertive strategic positioning within China’s global economic, technological and geopolitical architecture.
The visit comes at a time of rapid transformation in the international system, marked by a gradual shift in the global balance of power towards Asia and the growing momentum of multipolar trends. Simultaneously, China is continuing its transition from a global manufacturing hub to a leading centre for high technologies, artificial intelligence, robotics, digital infrastructure and advanced industrial capacity, further consolidating its status as one of the key actors in the contemporary international order.
Vučić’s visit to Beijing carries particular geopolitical weight because it followed immediately after highly symbolic meetings between the Chinese leadership and US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin. These meetings largely signalled a new phase in the redefinition of global power relations and in the shaping of the future architecture of the international system. Within this broader context, Serbia, although a medium-sized country by international standards, is indirectly entering a diplomatic arena in which the key parameters of the emerging multipolar order are taking shape. The fact that Beijing devoted considerable attention to the Serbian President so soon after meeting the leaders of the world's two pre-eminent military powers underscores Belgrade's growing strategic value within China's policy towards Europe and the Western Balkans.
In these circumstances, Serbia is seeking to establish itself as a regional technology, logistics and investment hub, and as China’s foremost partner in the Western Balkans. The visit therefore extends beyond the confines of a conventional diplomatic event. It sends a clear signal of Serbia’s ambition to move gradually from being primarily a beneficiary of Chinese capital for infrastructure projects to becoming a technology partner, production base and regional platform for the new industrial era.
China is currently Serbia’s most important trade and financial partner outside Europe, as further confirmed by the entry into force of the Free Trade Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Serbia on 1 July 2024. The Agreement provides for the gradual elimination or reduction of customs duties on around 20,000 products traded between the two countries, creating far more favourable conditions for the further expansion of trade, investment and industrial cooperation.
Annual trade in goods between Serbia and China is currently estimated at between USD 6.5 and 7.5 billion. Serbia’s exports to China exceed USD 1 billion, while imports from China stand at more than USD 5.5 billion, indicating a significant trade imbalance but also confirming Serbia’s growing integration into Chinese production and distribution chains. China has been among the five largest foreign investors in Serbia for several years, while the estimated cumulative value of Chinese foreign direct investment ranges from three to five billion euros, depending on the methodology used.
The largest Chinese investments are concentrated in mining, industry, energy and infrastructure. Particularly notable are Zijin Mining’s investments in Bor and Majdanpek, Linglong Tire’s investment in Zrenjanin and the infrastructure and digital projects implemented by Huawei and China Road and Bridge Corporation. According to available estimates, mining and metallurgy account for between 35 and 45 per cent of Chinese investment, infrastructure projects for 25 to 30 per cent and industrial production for 20 to 25 per cent, while information and communications technology and digital innovation still represent less than ten per cent of total investment.
For this very reason, one of the strategic priorities for future cooperation should be to significantly increase Chinese investment in research and development, artificial intelligence centres, digital innovation and advanced technologies. The long-term sustainability of the Serbia-China partnership will depend not only on the volume of trade and investment, but also on its capacity to evolve from a model driven by capital investment and infrastructure into one centred on knowledge transfer, technological development and the joint creation of innovation capabilities.
Following this visit, an ambitious target was set to raise total trade in goods to USD 10 billion a year. This projection reflects the clear political will of both sides to continue deepening economic ties and to build a new phase of strategic partnership, in which technological cooperation, digital transformation and innovation-led development could become as vital as the traditional infrastructure and industrial projects that have so far dominated Serbia-China relations.
Until now, Serbia-China cooperation has been built primarily around infrastructure projects, energy, mining and heavy industry. The latest visit, however, points to a clear pivot towards technology, digitalisation and robotics.
Vučić’s remarks about the future of robotics and artificial intelligence should not be seen merely as political messages aimed at the domestic public, but also as a reflection of the Chinese development model that Serbia is seeking to adopt in part and tailor to its own circumstances. Of particular note is the announcement that robot production is set to begin in Šabac in July 2026—a move the authorities are framing as Serbia’s strategic technological leap ahead of the region.
The critical question will not be merely whether the first robot leaves the factory floor, but to what extent it will incorporate domestic expertise, Serbian engineers, local suppliers and national intellectual property. Should Serbia remain solely a site for the assembly of foreign technologies, the effects will be limited. If Serbia can harness Chinese investments to foster research centres, educational programmes and a local supply chain, this cooperation could evolve into genuine industrial modernisation and a long-term technological advance.
At the symbolic level, Vučić’s statement that “Serbia will soar to the skies once the first robot leaves the factory” shows that the authorities are seeking to present technological modernisation as the country’s new development paradigm.
The meetings with Chinese technology giants such as AVIC, CASIC, CASC, CETC and NORINCO should also be seen in this context. Although some of these companies operate in the civilian sector, many belong to China’s military-industrial and dual-use technology complex.
This suggests that Serbia-China cooperation is increasingly transcending the boundaries of conventional economic exchange, taking on a broader technological, security and geostrategic dimension.
China’s interest in Serbia is driven by several strategic considerations.
First, Serbia is China’s most important economic foothold in the Western Balkans.
Second, it has relatively well-developed transport infrastructure and a central geographical location that allows Chinese capital to be channelled towards the European market.
Third, Belgrade pursues a distinctly pragmatic foreign policy, allowing China to maintain a long-term institutional presence without the political constraints that apply in some European Union member states.
In this context, it is particularly important that Chinese companies increasingly see Serbia as a production, logistics and technology base, rather than merely as a market or infrastructure corridor. Announcements of fresh investments in Šid and Zrenjanin, together with potential investments worth several hundred million euros, point to the continued long-term economic consolidation of the Chinese presence in Serbia.
For China, Serbia is more than a market of several million people; its strategic value lies primarily in its geopolitical location. It is politically open to Beijing, geographically situated at the gateway to Europe and institutionally flexible enough to accommodate projects that many European Union member states now approach with increased caution. This is further reinforced by the 23 bilateral agreements across various fields signed during President Vučić’s visit.
Meetings with corporations such as Zijin, Linglong, TBEA and Guannan Group confirm continued Chinese interest in strategic sectors, including mining, energy, industrial parks, logistics and advanced technologies.
The concept of a "steel friendship" between Serbia and China was a central theme throughout the visit, serving a strong political purpose as part of China’s broader diplomatic strategy to cultivate long-term partnership networks.
Vučić’s emphasis on his personal rapport with Chinese President Xi Jinping, coupled with the symbolism of the Chinese state honour awarded to him, is intended to confirm Serbia’s special status within China’s regional policy. During the Beijing visit, President Vučić received the Friendship Medal of the People’s Republic of China from Chinese President Xi Jinping, one of the highest state honours bestowed upon foreign statesmen and international figures in recognition of their contribution to fostering relations with China.
At the same time, through such relationships, China demonstrates its ability to forge stable partnerships outside formal Western alliances and institutional frameworks. In geopolitical terms, China views Serbia as a prime example of a state that successfully navigates a balance between European integration, cooperation with the United States, relations with Russia, and an increasingly intensive partnership with Beijing.
The deepening of Serbia-China relations is drawing increasing attention from Brussels and Western power centres, primarily due to China’s growing presence in digital infrastructure, energy, surveillance technologies and strategic industries. In these circumstances, it is crucial that Serbia is not perceived as a country geopolitically choosing between China and Europe, but as an actor developing the capacity for a balanced and multi-layered foreign policy.
In this context, Serbia’s position cannot be reduced to the simplistic dilemma of “China or Europe”. The fundamental question is whether Serbia can effectively use Chinese capital, technology and market opportunities while preserving its European orientation, regulatory alignment, institutional transparency and strategic autonomy. This is the essence of Serbia’s contemporary foreign policy: not to distance itself from Europe, but to diversify its sources of development and secure greater strategic flexibility in an increasingly fragmented global environment.
In recent years, the European Union has worked to reduce its dependence on Chinese technological and industrial value chains, while Serbia has simultaneously intensified collaboration precisely in those sectors. In doing so, Belgrade is attempting to capitalise on great-power competition in order to expand its own development and political room for manoeuvre.
Nevertheless, such an approach also entails certain structural risks. Questions concerning potential dependency on Chinese capital, technological asymmetry, transparency standards, as well as long-term fiscal and environmental implications, remain insufficiently addressed. Long-term reliance on Chinese investment and technologies could deepen Serbia’s economic dependence, while cooperation with Chinese military-technological firms could trigger additional political pressure from the EU and NATO.
The issue of transparency regarding specific investment and infrastructure arrangements, Transparency regarding specific investment and infrastructure arrangements, alongside the potential environmental impact of certain Chinese industrial projects in Serbia, remains a particularly sensitive issue.
President Aleksandar Vučić's visit to China confirms that Serbia is consistently pursuing a strategy grounded in a multipolar approach to international relations. Belgrade is simultaneously striving to preserve its European integration path, deepen its strategic partnership with China, maintain energy ties with Russia and keep relations with the United States open and functional. This approach aligns with President Vučić’s foreign policy doctrine, which rests on the dispersion of geopolitical and economic risks and deliberately avoids dependence on a single dominant partner, a strategy widely seen in contemporary international relations as potentially vulnerable and unsustainable in the long term.
Against this backdrop, China is increasingly becoming as one of Serbia’s key partners in industrial modernisation, digital transformation and technological development. Vučić’s emphasis on robotics, artificial intelligence, automation and advanced technologies clearly reflects an effort by the state leadership to redefine the country’s economic future through the concept of a technologically advanced and innovation-oriented state.
Yet the question remains to what extent Serbia will succeed in transforming Chinese investment into sustainable domestic technological and industrial progress, or whether it will remain primarily a platform for the expansion of Chinese economic, technological and geopolitical influence across the Western Balkans and Southeast Europe.
What is already clear is that Serbia-China relations are entering a new phase, one in which technology, geostrategy, innovation and industrial transformation are taking precedence over traditional infrastructure and investment projects. Serbia therefore faces a challenge that is developmental rather than ideological in nature: whether it will remain a conduit for foreign capital, technologies and interests, or whether it will be able to build its own capacities, upgrade its domestic industrial base and strengthen its negotiating position in international relations?
This is where the true scope and long-term significance of the Serbia-China partnership lies. In the new global order, the deciding factor will not merely be who finances and builds infrastructure, but who develops, possesses and controls the technologies that shape economic processes, security capabilities and the international competitiveness of states.
Vučić’s multi-day visit to Beijing in May 2026, which carried considerable symbolic weight, further strengthened the perception of Serbia as China’s foremost strategic partner in the Western Balkans. At the same time, it highlighted Belgrade’s ambition to act as a bridge between East and West, rather than as a geopolitical actor permanently aligned with either side. As the multipolar international order takes shape at an accelerating pace, Serbia is increasingly positioning itself as a country guided by a doctrine of strategic balancing, with economic pragmatism, infrastructure connectivity, technological cooperation and diplomatic flexibility serving as the vital instruments of its foreign policy.
This proactive approach allows Serbia to maximise the development opportunities arising from engagement with different power centres. At the same time, it also demands a high degree of political acumen and institutional resilience to preserve strategic autonomy and ensure that economic partnerships do not turn into instruments of political dependency. Ultimately, the capacity to strike a balance between competing global actors will prove to be one of the most significant tests for Serbian foreign policy over the coming decade.
Ljubljana/Washington/Beijing/Belgrade, 1 June 2026
[1] IFIMES - International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has a special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council ECOSOC/UN in New York since 2018, and it is the publisher of the international scientific journal “European Perspectives.” Available at: https://www.europeanperspectives.org/en
