International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)[1], based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly analyzes developments in the Middle East, the Balkans, and other regions worldwide. In his analysis entitled “Europe Rearms: The End of Strategic Comfort,” General (Retd.) Corneliu Pivariu examines the profound strategic transformation currently taking place in Europe, where the continent is moving away from a model of externally guaranteed peace toward one in which security, military power, and strategic autonomy are becoming central pillars of political and economic development. At the heart of this transformation stands Germany, whose rearmament symbolizes not only the end of the postwar European order, but also the emergence of a new multipolar era in which Europe is increasingly compelled to assume responsibility for its own security and geopolitical role.
“Peace is not the absence of conflict, but the balance of forces that makes it unlikely.”
In recent months, Europe has been undergoing a profound strategic transformation, comparable in significance to the major turning points of the 20th century. For more than seven decades, the European project was built on the premise of externally guaranteed peace and a relative demilitarization. Today, however, we are witnessing a paradigm shift: security is returning to the center of political construction, and military force is regaining its status as a legitimate instrument of power—and becoming, once again, a direct responsibility of European states.
This shift in paradigm is also reflected in the discourse of European leaders. Recent statements by French President Emmanuel Macron indicate a transformation in strategic perception at the level of the European Union. His warning that Europe is experiencing a “unique moment” in which major global centers of power—including traditional allies—are acting in ways increasingly misaligned with European interests suggests the end of an era of strategic comfort.
This positioning marks a significant conceptual rupture in European strategic thinking. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, a major European leader implicitly suggests that Europe no longer operates within a stable security framework defined by a clear opposition between allies and adversaries, but rather within a far more complex environment in which it is caught between multiple global power centers.
This configuration includes not only strategic adversaries but also traditional partners whose choices are becoming less predictable. Under these conditions, what is eroding is not only the balance of power, but the very premise of European strategic comfort, based on the certainty of external guarantees.
In this context, the call to assume a “European moment” and to strengthen strategic autonomy no longer represents merely a political ambition, but a response to a reality in which security can no longer be outsourced. For Europe, this means the transition from an era of implicitly assumed security to one in which security must be explicitly built.
At the center of this transformation stands Germany—the state that, more than any other, symbolized the postwar order based on strategic restraint and economic primacy. Its shift toward rearmament is not merely an adjustment of security policy, but a signal of a systemic transformation in the European and global architecture.
This transformation did not emerge spontaneously. It is the result of the convergence of two major factors that have fundamentally altered Europe’s perception of security. The first is the war in Ukraine, which has brought high-intensity conventional conflict back into the immediate proximity of the European Union and exposed the limits of a security model based predominantly on indirect deterrence and dependence on external guarantees[2]. The second factor lies in developments in transatlantic relations, where signals coming from the United States of America indicate a recalibration of global priorities and a reduction in the predictability of strategic engagement toward Europe[3].
At the intersection of these two developments—direct external pressure and uncertainty regarding the traditional strategic partner—Europe is compelled to fundamentally rethink its security architecture.
For decades, Germany deliberately cultivated a limited strategic identity, avoiding the assumption of a military role commensurate with its economic potential. This option was made possible by the dual guarantee provided by the post-1990 international order: security ensured by the United States and European economic integration.
Today, both premises are in accelerated erosion. On the one hand, U.S. strategic engagement is becoming more volatile, and political signals from Washington indicate a trend toward recalibrating global priorities. On the other hand, the European security environment has significantly deteriorated, and the war in Ukraine has brought conventional warfare back into the immediate proximity of the European Union.
In this context, Germany is explicitly assuming the objective of becoming Europe’s leading conventional military power[4]. The rapid increase in defense budgets, modernization of capabilities, and expansion of force structures are not temporary measures, but components of a long-term strategy.
This reorientation of Germany must not be interpreted in isolation, but as part of a broader European trend. Significantly, the strategic discourse promoted by France—particularly through the positions expressed by Emmanuel Macron—converges toward the same conclusion: Europe can no longer function exclusively as an economic actor in a world where military power is returning to the forefront.
The difference lies in the fact that, while Germany represents the pivot of industrial and conventional capacity, France brings into the equation the strategic and nuclear dimension, together outlining a possible European security architecture in the process of definition.
A key element of this transformation is its systemic character. Germany’s rearmament is not limited to the military dimension, but involves a profound restructuring of the economy and industry.
The conversion of segments of civilian industry toward armaments production, investments in dual-use technologies, and the integration of military production chains at the European level indicate a clear trend: security is becoming a central vector of economic development and strategic competitiveness.
This evolution reflects a broader logic specific to the current era: under conditions of intensified global competition, states can no longer separate economics from security. Industrial capacity once again becomes an element of strategic power.
The current process of rearmament does not arise in a vacuum. It has deeper roots in Europe’s repeated attempts to build its own defense dimension. Initiatives such as military cooperation projects, structures associated with the EURODEFENCE concept, and recent programs such as SAFE and Readiness 2030[5] reflect a continuity of concern for strategic autonomy.
However, the essential difference compared to previous stages lies in the context. If in the past these initiatives had a more technical or declarative character, today they are driven by the pressure of geopolitical reality.
In this sense, the statements of Emmanuel Macron acquire particular significance. The idea that Europe must assume its own security is no longer a strategic option, but a necessity derived from the uncertainty of the international environment, including in relation to its own alliances.
Germany’s rearmament is part of a broader process of European militarization. Rising defense budgets, the revival of the military industry, and intensified security cooperation reflect a general trend: the European Union is attempting to build a real strategic autonomy.
However, this process also generates tensions. On the one hand, Eastern European states support the strengthening of military capabilities, perceiving it as an additional security guarantee. On the other hand, there are concerns regarding the possible emergence of German hegemony within the Union.
Thus, Europe faces a structural paradox: the need for strategic unity coexists with the risk of internal fragmentation—a characteristic feature of all major strategic transition periods.
This dilemma is further amplified by a fundamental question regarding the future architecture of European security: to what extent will this construction include or exclude actors such as the United Kingdom and other European states outside the European Union.
In practice, the security of the continent cannot be conceived strictly within the institutional boundaries of the Union. Relevant military capabilities, interoperability, and command structures remain deeply connected to NATO[6], while the role of states such as the United Kingdom or Norway remains essential.
Thus, Europe faces not only the problem of rearmament, but also that of defining a functional model for integrating security—one that transcends the institutional boundaries of the Union and avoids strategic fragmentation.
Current transformations cannot be understood outside the global context. Germany’s rearmament, alongside similar developments in other regions (including Asia), signals the end of the international order built after the Second World War.
That order rested on three main pillars:
Today, each of these pillars is being challenged. The world is progressively reconfiguring into a multipolar system[7], characterized by strategic competition, uncertainty, and the return of classical geopolitics.
The rearmament of Europe—and especially of Germany—has multiple implications.
At the internal level, it redefines the relationship between economy, politics, and security, accelerating the transformation of the state into a fully-fledged strategic actor.
At the regional level, it alters the balance of power within the European Union, with the potential to generate both consolidation and tensions.
At the global level, it contributes to the intensification of competition among major powers, fueling a security dynamic based on deterrence and the accumulation of capabilities.
Europe is not rearming merely in response to immediate threats, but as a reaction to a structural transformation of the international system. In a world where external guarantees are becoming uncertain, security can no longer be delegated—it must be assumed.
Germany stands at the center of this transformation. Its strategic reorientation marks not only a policy shift, but a redefinition of its historical role.
In this sense, Europe’s rearmament must be understood not merely as a response to threats, but as a process of redefining its strategic identity.
In essence, we are witnessing the end of one era and the beginning of another. An era in which peace is no longer assumed, but must be built—and maintained—through a balance of power, strategic will, and real capacity for action.
About the author:
Corneliu Pivariu is a highly decorated two-star general of the Romanian army (Rtd). He has founded and led one of the most influential magazines on geopolitics and international relations in Eastern Europe, the bilingual journal Geostrategic Pulse, for two decades. General Pivariu is a member of IFIMES Advisory Board.
The article presents the stance of the author and does not necessarily reflect the stance of IFIMES.
Ljubljana/Brașov, 23 May 2026
[1] IFIMES - International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has a special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council ECOSOC/UN in New York since 2018, and it is the publisher of the international scientific journal "European Perspectives." Available at: https://www.europeanperspectives.org/en
[2] International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2026, London, 2026; see also analyses by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on the attritional nature of the Russia–Ukraine war.
[3] See recent strategic debates and official statements regarding the recalibration of U.S. engagement in Europe, including analyses by the Brookings Institution and the Atlantic Council (2024–2026).
[4] German Federal Ministry of Defence (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung), modernization programs and defense budget increases (2022–2026); see also developments related to the Zeitenwende policy shift.
[5] European defense cooperation initiatives include projects developed under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), as well as recent programs aimed at strengthening industrial and operational capabilities (SAFE, Readiness 2030).
[6] NATO, strategic documents and official statements regarding the strengthening of the eastern flank and increased defense spending (2024–2025).
[7] See recent analyses on the transition toward a multipolar world order in publications such as Foreign Affairs, The Economist, and reports by the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) (2024–2026).
