The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)[1] based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly conducts analyses of events spanning the Middle East, the Balkans, and global affairs. FIMES examines the current situation in the Republic of Serbia and offers specific solutions for overcoming the existing impasse. From the analysis “Serbia 2025: Serbia wants a return to normal life”, we present the key points and most compelling excerpts, which provide insight into the current challenges, prospects for political stabilisation, the consolidation of democracy, and the improvement of the quality of life for citizens in Serbia.
Politically, the collapse of the canopy in Novi Sad on 1 November 2024 served as a catalyst for debate over the accountability of both local and national authorities. The opposition sought to exploit the incident as evidence of government inefficiency and the opacity of the public procurement system, even pushing for early elections. Meanwhile, the ruling establishment sought to downplay the political implications of the accident, stressing instead “individual errors”. This once again underscored the deep-rooted mistrust between citizens and institutions, deepened further by the absence of clear and timely responses.
Socially, the accident underscored a sense of insecurity and vulnerability among citizens in their daily lives in Serbia and the wider region. Concerns over the safety of public spaces have come to symbolise the absence of systemic care for people’s well-being, reinforcing the prevailing perception that the state prioritises political and economic interests above those of its citizens.
Institutionally, the incident exposed weaknesses in oversight, regulation, and the enforcement of standards. It highlights the need for a thorough reform of quality control mechanisms in construction and urban planning. At the same time, the crisis may also serve as an opportunity for the authorities to demonstrate their resolve through a transparent investigation, holding those responsible to account and strengthening procedures—steps that could help to restore some of the public’s eroded trust.
Although the European Parliament and the EU do not formally call for a change of government in Serbia, their resolutions and criticisms concerning the rule of law, media freedom, and the transparency of public procurement are perceived in different ways by the public. These perceptions directly affect the EU’s reputation in Serbia and its (in)ability to act as a credible partner in the European integration process.
The current perception of the EU among Serbian citizens is one of distrust and a sense of strong external pressure. A considerable share of the population believes that the EU is seeking, whether directly or indirectly, to influence domestic politics by favouring particular political options. Such an interpretation fuels scepticism and fears of interference with national sovereignty, especially when public discourse is already marked by rhetoric about a “hostile EU.”
Perceptions of the EU in Serbia are divided. Pro-European citizens view the EU as a partner in advancing reforms, safeguarding democratic standards, and combating corruption. By contrast, Eurosceptic citizens, who make up the majority, see the EU as a source of external pressure and a threat to national independence and sovereignty. Such perceptions provide fertile ground for anti-EU propaganda and lend weight to alternative geopolitical narratives (Russia, China).
The EU’s reputation in Serbia is highly polarised. Pro-European citizens see the EU as a protector of European standards and reforms, while Eurosceptics regard it primarily as an external imposition. The European Parliament’s stance on reforms, although technically and procedurally not calling for a change of government, is nonetheless perceived as such owing to the lack of direct communication and the political rhetoric of the authorities. In the long term, the EU can improve its reputation through clear communication, greater visibility for its technical assistance, and sustained engagement with citizens and civil society, without appearing to favour particular political options.
The EU must focus on strategies that strengthen transparency, active citizenship, legitimacy and citizen participation, rather than political intervention in Serbia’s internal affairs.
The EU needs a clear strategy to enhance its reputation in Serbia, which should also include:
The EU’s main mistake is that its formal criticisms and recommendations are not accompanied by a sufficiently visible and clear communication strategy that would reassure Serbian citizens that the EU supports reforms rather than regime change through street protests. As a result, the EU’s reputation has suffered, while the Eurosceptic narrative has gained strength, reinforced by the inconsistent and at times ambiguous statements of some European officials.
The establishment of a Croatia–Albania–Kosovo military alliance and the reinforcement of the Slovenia–Croatia defence agreement create a new security framework and pose a challenge for the Western Balkans. These developments have both direct and indirect effects on Serbia, in military, political, and reputational terms.
Such regional alliances and agreements heighten Serbia’s sense of strategic isolation and shift the regional balance. In the short term, they foster greater security vigilance and political mobilisation, while in the long term, they may prompt an expansion of Serbia’s military and diplomatic capacities, yet also make it more difficult to maintain its policy of military neutrality.
Recommendations for Serbia:
The specialised international exhibition EXPO 2027 in Belgrade marks a pivotal moment for Serbia and the wider Western Balkans. This event is not only an opportunity to showcase innovation but also a chance to strengthen regional cooperation, attract foreign direct investment (FDI), and raise global visibility.
EXPO 2027 Belgrade, under the theme “Play for Humanity – Sport and Music for All”, will be held from 15 May to 15 August 2027. During the 93 days of the exhibition, the Serbian capital is expected to welcome more than four million visitors. This will be the first time such an event will be held in the former Yugoslavia, positioning Serbia as the first host of a specialised exhibition in the Western Balkans and offering the world a window into the region. With more than 150 countries expected to participate, EXPO 2027 is set to be among the most significant global events of the year.
Economic development: EXPO 2027 is set to boost the economy by attracting investment and expanding Serbia’s tourism industry. The event is expected to generate substantial revenue for the domestic economy.
Infrastructure transformation: The construction of a new multifunctional complex in Surčin—including exhibition halls and related commercial and accommodation facilities—will modernise Belgrade’s infrastructure.
Education and cooperation: EXPO 2027 offers a platform for the exchange of knowledge and expertise, with the potential to improve the education system and strengthen international cooperation and exchange.
EXPO 2027 in Belgrade is an opportunity to showcase the region. Participating countries come to get acquainted with the entire Western Balkans, helping to strengthen regional ties and cooperation.
Once EXPO 2027 concludes, its legacy will be reflected in upgraded infrastructure, stronger international relations, and greater recognition of Serbia and the Western Balkans on the global stage. The event is set to leave a lasting impact on the region’s social and economic development.
EXPO 2027 in Belgrade is more than just an event; it is an opportunity for recognition and a catalyst for the lasting transformation of Serbia and the Western Balkans into global players in innovation, culture, and cooperation.
The current situation in Serbia is characterised by sharp political polarisation and deep divisions between the government and the opposition, which hamper efforts to reach consensus on the country’s future.
At the same time, regional pressures are mounting. New military and political alliances are emerging in the region (e.g. Croatia–Albania–Kosovo, Croatia–Slovenia), fuelling a sense of insecurity and underscoring the need for a clear foreign policy.
The EU’s reputation in Serbia is steadily declining. The European Parliament and the European Commission regularly criticise the lack of reforms, while contradictory statements that offer no clear prospect of EU membership further heighten uncertainty and complicate domestic political processes.
Dialogue as an instrument for overcoming the current impasse requires open and structured communication between different political actors, civil society, and international partners, with the aim of reaching common solutions. Dialogue remains an open avenue for all key stakeholders committed to moving beyond the present deadlock.
The goals of dialogue in Serbia are political stabilisation – reducing tensions between the government and the opposition – and institutional reform, aimed at strengthening the rule of law, transparency, and the fight against organised crime and corruption. Regional cooperation is reflected in enhancing Serbia’s position through partnerships, compromises with neighbouring states, and joint initiatives for the benefit of all.
Improving relations with the EU means demonstrating a commitment to constructive reforms and dialogue as a prerequisite for European integration, together with the urgently needed opening of a new negotiation cluster with the EU.
The advantages of dialogue include reducing tensions, preventing conflict, building trust, and preparing for the future by seeking long-term solutions rather than temporary compromises.
According to analysts, dialogue is the key mechanism for resolving Serbia’s current crisis. Only through patient negotiations, involving all relevant stakeholders and supported by the international community, can internal stability be achieved, relations with neighbours strengthened, Serbia’s European perspective enhanced, and the country set on a path back to normal life. It is indisputable that the constitutional right of citizens to protest is guaranteed, while at the same time, the constitution also guarantees freedom of movement, and the state must ensure the protection and exercise of both rights.
Ljubljana/Washington/Brussels/Beograd, 11 September 2025
[1] IFIMES - International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has a special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council ECOSOC/UN in New York since 2018, and it is the publisher of the international scientific journal "European Perspectives." Available at: https://www.europeanperspectives.org/en
