Security Cooperation and Misperceptions in the Western Balkans

The International Institute for Middle-East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)[1], based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, is internationally recognized for its in-depth analyses of global political, security, and economic developments, with a particular focus on the Middle East, the Balkans, and other strategically significant regions. In this context, IFIMES presents an article by Genci Mucaj, Former Ambassador of the Republic of Albania to the Republic of Azerbaijan, entitled “Security Cooperation and Misperceptions in the Western Balkans.” In this analysis, Ambassador Mucaj offers a critical and balanced assessment of contemporary security narratives in the Western Balkans. He argues that much of the prevailing discourse is driven by political manipulation rather than genuine strategic transformations, and that escalating narratives and symbolic polarization represent a greater threat to regional stability than actual military developments.

 Genci Mucaj, Former Ambassador of the Republic of Albania to the Republic of Azerbaijan

 

Security cooperation and misperceptions in the Western Balkans

 

Much of the current discourse on security cooperation in the Western Balkans offers little that is genuinely new or analytically original. Instead, certain narratives, particularly those emerging from Serbian political and media circles, serve as instruments of domestic political manipulation. 

These narratives portray Serbia as a victim of an alleged Albania–Kosovo–Croatia alignment, while systematically obscuring Serbia’s historical and contemporary role as a destabilizing factor in the region. Responsibility is reversed by emphasizing perceived threats rather than engaging with documented historical realities.

A critical weakness of these narratives is the absence of credible historical context. Serbian nationalist movements, from the Balkan Wars through the Yugoslav conflicts of the 1990s, played a central role in initiating instability and violence across the region. Ignoring this record undermines any claim to objective analysis. 

Similarly, contemporary Serbian leadership is often presented without sufficient critical framing, despite clear ideological and political continuities with the late Slobodan Milošević, whose nationalist policies resulted in mass bloodshed and some of the most destructive conflicts in modern Balkan history.

Within this context, attention has increasingly focused on emerging defense cooperation frameworks in the Western Balkans, most notably, cooperation between Serbia and Hungary, and the Tripartite Declaration on Military Cooperation among Albania, Croatia, and Kosovo.

A balanced assessment must recognize that neither arrangement constitutes rigid bloc formation nor fundamentally alters the regional military balance. These frameworks are best understood as pragmatic, interest-based alignments rather than preparations for military confrontation.

Agreements of this kind are driven less by military doctrine and more by short-term political calculations, particularly by leaders seeking to consolidate domestic support. Both Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and President Aleksandar Vučić face sustained political pressure. Serbia, in particular, has experienced over a year of protests against what many consider one of the most corrupt governments in its recent history. 

As its EU accession prospects stagnate, Belgrade increasingly presents itself as isolated, turning toward Russia for political backing, despite Russia’s own deep economic and political isolation following its invasion of Ukraine.

Serbia’s opposition to the Tripartite Declaration centers primarily on the fact that it treats Kosovo as a sovereign state, an argument frequently grounded in UN Security Council Resolution 1244. This position is inherently inconsistent, given that Hungary, Serbia’s strategic partner, recognizes Kosovo as an independent state. The selective invocation of international law in this context is therefore more political than principled.

The Tripartite Declaration explicitly supports Kosovo’s Euro-Atlantic integration and the transformation of its security forces. Some interpret this as an attempt to “contain” Serbia through NATO’s influence, framing it as a form of regional grip rooted in historical tensions with Croatia and Albania. However, such interpretations rely more on perception and rhetoric than on concrete strategic realities.

In the short term, the regional security situation remains largely controllable. Restraint by regional leaders, combined with the stabilizing influence of the EU and NATO, makes direct military conflict highly unlikely. Over the long term, however, concerns persist. Symbolic polarization and confrontational narratives risk undermining regional trust and weakening economic integration initiatives such as the Open Balkan project, which has proven more propagandistic than operational. As long as deep mistrust persists among Balkan states, meaningful cooperation will remain limited until full EU membership becomes a shared reality.

The perceived polarization between Serbia–Hungary on one side and Albania–Croatia–Kosovo on the other must also be examined more carefully. The two arrangements differ fundamentally in nature. Hungary’s partnership with Serbia is largely pragmatic, driven by national interests such as minority issues related to the Hungarian population in Vojvodina, energy cooperation, and infrastructure projects. 

This alignment is unlikely to be durable and will probably last only as long as Viktor Orbán remains in power. Hungary’s recognition of Kosovo and its NATO membership, along with the inherent constraints that membership imposes on military cooperation, underscore the non-doctrinal and transactional character of this relationship.

By contrast, cooperation among Albania, Croatia, and Kosovo, two NATO members and one aspiring partner, represents a transparent, patronage-based framework aligned with NATO structures. Kosovo’s participation in joint NATO exercises and the presence of Camp Bondsteel, one of the largest U.S. military bases in the region, clearly demonstrate the strategic orientation and limits of this cooperation.

More broadly, prevailing narratives underestimate several critical factors: the resilience of regional economic integration; the EU’s strategic leverage over accession candidates; NATO’s command authority and constraints on unilateral military escalation; and the evolving international practice surrounding Resolution 1244, which is often invoked selectively and emotionally rather than analytically. This reliance on emotive language weakens claims of objectivity and raises concerns that such narratives serve political agendas rather than impartial analysis.

Looking ahead, regional actors are likely to pursue stronger economic engagement with China while attempting to preserve relations with the EU and the United States. For Kosovo, this balancing act remains particularly challenging, as China continues to regard it as part of Serbia.

Contrary to alarmist interpretations, the Western Balkans are not on the brink of war. The real danger lies not in tanks or troops, but in narrative escalation, symbolic security competition, and unresolved historical disputes left unmanaged. 

About the author: 

Ambassador Genci Muçaj is a distinguished Albanian diplomat and scholar with a career spanning diplomacy, international relations, and cultural advocacy. He served as Ambassador of the Republic of Albania to Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Iran, Pakistan, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan, playing a significant role in strengthening bilateral relations, advancing strategic cooperation, and deepening people-to-people ties.

With decades of experience in public service, Ambassador Muçaj has consistently promoted dialogue, mutual understanding, and regional stability, with a strong emphasis on cultural diplomacy, education, and historical awareness as foundations for sustainable cooperation. He is a founding member and CEO of the Council of Albanian Ambassadors, contributing to foreign policy discourse, strategic analysis, and the mentorship of younger diplomats.

An accomplished author and researcher, he works on major biographical and historical projects focused on leadership, political legacy, and the human dimensions of statecraft. Fluent in multiple languages, Ambassador Muçaj remains an influential voice in diplomacy and public discourse.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect IFIMES official position.

Ljubljana/Tirana, 18 February 2026


[1] IFIMES - International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has a special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council ECOSOC/UN in New York since 2018, and it is the publisher of the international scientific journal “European Perspectives”, link: www.europeanperspectives.org/en .