International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)[1] from Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly conducts analyses of political, security, and strategic developments in the Middle East, the Balkans, and across the globe. In his research paper titled “Pak-Saudi Strategic Pact to Pioneer a Global South Nuclear Extended Deterrence,” Dr. Driss Larafi, Professor of Political Science and International Studies at Ibn Tofail University (Morocco) and lecturer in Military Strategy, offers an in-depth analysis of the emerging Pakistani–Saudi strategic nuclear partnership and its implications for the evolving security architecture of the Global South.
On September 17, 2025, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan reached a mutual strategic defence pact, considering any aggression on one is an aggression on both». What is most important to mention is that Pakistan is the only Islamic nuclear-armed country[2] and the adoption of this agreement occurs in a timely, specific context for a Mideast, sprinkled with turbulent periods of crisis and notably the Israeli airstrike on Doha, Capitale of Qatar.
Unless Pakistan is a nuclear power, the pact could have been labelled as a classic mutual defence accord. Even if the issue of a nuclear umbrella has not been formally stipulated, it is an obvious assessment that Pakistan could not help adjust the regional balance of power without its nuclear arsenal. It is out of question that the target is primarily Israel, a nuclear-armed entity[3] with, furthermore, a powerful conventional army in the region[4]. Void of any mention of nuclear security guarantees from Islamabad, certainly, the pact could have secretly addressed this complex issue, as, according to analysts, this Pak-Saudi deal formalizes longstanding arrangements between the two countries, at least since the launch of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program in 1972.
However, the statements of the Pakistani officials and notably the Defence Minister, Khuwaja Asif are officially in a Pakistan Channel TV interview, which underlines that this agreement provides a nuclear shield to the kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), which overall could be intriguing. Allegations spark farther amongst observers, who argue that the nuclear factor could not be missing as to make sense of the Isreal, moving speculation to reality for two more relevant reasons: Pakistan is poised to defend with nukes the holy sites of Mecca and Medina, giving the other part some credibility for a country bound to be an existentially Muslim state[5].
Interestingly, if actually Pakistan extended its nuclear deterrent to secure the KSA, it would be the first time in the Nuclear Era that a ‘new nuclear nation’[6], indeed, from the Global South, that posture extended nuclear deterrence to an ally in the region after the two superpowers, USA and Russia, a probability not excluded for many reasons. First, altogether with Libya, the KSA had largely funded the Pakistani nuclear program at the outset in the 1970’s, which yielded what two American journalists named in the 1980’s the ‘Islamic bomb’[7]. Yet, still unclear whether Pakistanis have pledged to move nukes completely to KSA’s territory or keep them at home or simply, in return, decided to benefit the Saudis from a nuclear umbrella? In this respect, some open sources convey that as gratitude for their financing of the Pakistani nuclear program, the Saudis might have been considered an actual nuclear-armed state.
Republican Marjorie Greene from the intelligence subcommittee of the Congress testified in 2013 that ‘Saudi Arabia has nuclear weapons’, even if until now no confirmation from the US government nor from Saudi officials. Moreover, a Senior NATO official recognized that he learned from intelligence reports that some Pakistan -made nuclear weapons were bound to be delivered to Riyadh. Also, the former head of Israeli military intelligence Amos Yaldin told a conference in Sweden in October 2013 that ‘Saudis will not wait one month. They already paid for the bomb. They’ll go to Pakistan and bring what they need to bring’.
Most strikingly, the US nuclear expert, Gary Samore, former President Barack Obama’s counterproliferation adviser, stated plainly the following: ‘I do think that the Saudis believe they’ve some understanding with Pakistan that, in extremis, they have claimed to acquire nuclear weapons from Pakistan’. Convincer, the Saudis have acquired already in 1987 from China several MRBM-medium-range ballistic missiles-the DF-3A (CSS-2 for NATO’S standard), regarded as nuclear-capable delivery systems, paraded for the first time in 2014 and recently modernized. Additionally, as a gratitude, according to retired Pakistani General Feroz Hassan Khan, who stated in his book ’Eating grass[8]‘ that Saudi funds helped Pakistan sustain its nuclear program under international sanctions. For their part, a Saudi official declared that ‘this is a comprehensive agreement that encompasses all means’[9].
During the last few decades, when Pakistan was facing turmoil and domestic instability, some observers hinted at the possibility that Pakistani authorities were eyeing to hand over nukes to Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the Saudis might have a strong incentive to welcome Pakistani nuclear warheads, being threatened beyond Israel by Iran and Iraq in the 1980’s. Anyway, as the leader of the GCC-Gulf Cooperation Council-the KSA might have been heavily humiliated, both as it couldn’t defend its small partners and neighbours and even its airspace being outrageously violated by Israel during the airstrike. Consequently, this Doha airstrike SHOULD be considered as a watershed and a milestone, ushering in a game changer and harbouring a new regional order; an actual dynamic shift in the balance of power in the Middle East, creating what some observers have called a new regional order.
Until now, the world, and notably the UN and its watchdog, the IAEA has been constantly tackling only one ‘strategic ambiguity‘[10] in connection with the Israeli nuclear program, to be suddenly flooded, facing the emergence of another ‘strategic fog’ with the pak-Saudi pact, spurring a nuclear arms race and ‘Killing’ the longstanding perspective of a nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the Mideast[11]. Notwithstanding, the U-turn associated with this nuclear umbrella as was the case in the 1950s in Europe when the USA deployed 7,000 nuclear weapons-a fresh impetus is giving with the re-emergence of nuclear dissemination (vertical proliferation) in the Middle East, enabling Riyadh to have full command of the nuclear fuel cycle, ending up at least in ‘a threshold country ‘or ambitiously eyeing the possession of a ‘token nuclear force’, a ‘bomb in the basement’[12] or more ostensibly a ‘credible nuclear arsenal’.
In the end, the result could certainly be positive for the nuclear world order, compelling Israel either to uncover its possession of its nuclear arsenal and establish an NWFZ in the area[13] continuously called for by the UNGA or lesser opening up a MAD-style with a balance of terror. This new security environment will assuredly deter Israel from its behaviour and state of nature policy. After all, si vis pacem para bellum; the Cold War Era was more stabilizing and peaceful despite some ‘seismic’ nuclear crisis. If we draw the lesson from the Ukraine conflict, particularly the nuclear dimension, Israel couldn’t dare dream any more, showing its muscles relentlessly throughout the zone, but merely found itself confined to operate in its tiny, crowded area, along the western coast of Mandatary Palestine, particularly with the awesome worldwide diplomatic victory of Palestine statehood at UNGA.
About the author:
Dr. Driss Larafi is Professor of Political Science and International Studies at Ibn Tofail University (Morocco) and lecturer in Military Strategy. His research is specialized in strategic studies, particularly in the nuclear proliferation and deterrence policy. He is a member of the Arms Control Association, the IISS.
The article presents the stance of the author and does not necessarily reflect the stance of IFIMES.
Ljubljana/ Kenitra, 20 October 2025
[1] IFIMES – International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has Special Consultative status at ECOSOC/UN, New York, since 2018 and it’s publisher of the international scientific journal “European Perspectives”.
[2] Nuclear weapons in the Third World 1982.
[3] For a thorough and in-depth analysis of the Israeli nuclear program, see F. Jabber Adelphi Paper 1982.
[4] IISS Military Balance and SIPRI Annual Report Disarmament and Arms control Stockholm. Sweden.
[5] IISS Military Balance and SIPRI Annual Report Disarmament and Arms control Stockholm. Sweden.
[6] New Nuclear Nations L.S.Spector 1985.
[7] See the Islamic bomb 1984 written by two US journalists P.Krosney and Steve Weisman, who gave an amazing analysis of the Pakistani nuclear program from its inception.
[8] The term is an allusion from the statement of Pakistani then-PM, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, to show Islamabad’s determination to make bombs despite its worse economy.
[9] The French newspaper Le Monde September 23.2025.
[10] Strategic ambiguity ‘refers, in fact, to the phrase the Israelis reiterated since 1966 that ‘they will not be the first to introduce the nuclear bombs in the Middle East ‘under the diplomatic pressure of their Big Ally.
[11] For a comprehensive view of the establishment of an NWFZ please see the publications of the United Nations and specifically the reports to the Secretary-General of the UN
[12] Nuclear experts refer to a bomb in the basement or A-bomb on the shelf to signify an A-bomb which could be quickly assembled in weeks or days.
[13] This call has constantly been urged by the UNGA since 1974 and reminded by Egypt during the renewal of the NPT-the Nuclear non-proliferation Treaty in spring 1995.
