The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)[1], based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly conducts analyses of events spanning the Middle East, the Balkans, and global affairs. Ahead of the local elections in Kosovo, to be held on 12 October 2025, IFIMES has prepared an in-depth analysis of the current political situation. From the comprehensive study, “Local elections in Kosovo 2025: Between institutional deadlock and a test of democracy”, we highlight the most relevant and insightful findings, offering an overview of political trends, the challenges and opportunities for dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade, and the integration of ethnic communities into Kosovo’s institutional framework.
The 2025 local elections in Kosovo will be the fifth since the country declared independence in 2008. The first round of voting is set for 12 October, with a second round scheduled for 2 November. Voters will elect mayors and members of municipal assemblies across all 38 municipalities.
The previous regular local elections were held on 17 October 2021, while the extraordinary elections on 23 April 2023 were limited to four northern municipalities (North Mitrovica, Zubin Potok, Leposavić and Zvečan), after representatives of the Serb community collectively withdrew from Kosovo’s institutions in November 2022. The Serb community boycotted those elections, with turnout below 3.5 per cent, and as a result Albanian candidates assumed the mayoral posts in Serb-majority municipalities.
The February 2025 parliamentary elections failed to deliver stability. The Self-Determination Movement (LVV) secured a relative majority but fell short of an absolute one, preventing the formation of a government. This has raised a constitutional issue: can the Kosovo Assembly be constituted without a deputy speaker from the Serbian community? The Constitutional Court of Kosovo will be required to rule with particular caution, as its decision will have a direct bearing on the protection of community rights and the implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan.
If the Constitutional Court confirms that the Assembly has not been constituted, Kosovo would face a deeper political crisis, with the local elections taking on additional importance as a barometer of political stability and citizens’ attitudes towards the current political forces.
The Central Election Commission of Kosovo (CEC) has confirmed the participation of 93 political entities: 32 parties, 2 coalitions, 32 citizens’ initiatives and 27 independent candidates. These include 12 Serbian parties and initiatives. Voting will take place in 938 polling centres at 2,625 polling stations.
The total number of eligible voters is 2,069,098, while 43,993 are registered to vote by mail from abroad. The diaspora has the potential to play a decisive role in some municipalities, which further complicates the electoral process, opening the way for procedural disputes and manipulation.
Mayors and municipal assembly members are elected through a proportional system with open lists. The number of seats in each municipality is determined by population size, while seats for national minorities, including Serbs, are reserved in every municipal assembly.
Heightened ethnic tensions remain possible, particularly in Kosovo’s northern municipalities. Disputes over competences, symbols, education and public services risk becoming flashpoints for conflict. Disinformation and hate speech may further erode public trust, especially if the media lack transparency or show bias.
If the elections are judged to be unfair, or if institutions are perceived as using resources to favour certain candidates, this could spark protests or lead to voter abstention.
Kosovo’s 2025 local elections constitute an important test of democracy and an opportunity to strengthen the institutional position of the Serb community. Voters will choose mayors and municipal assembly members, offering the Serb community the chance to regain control of municipalities where they hold an absolute majority (North Mitrovica, Zubin Potok, Leposavić and Zvečan).
The principal legal framework for the integration of the Serbian community is the 2013 Brussels Agreement, which provides for the establishment of the Association/Community of Serb Municipalities (ASM). Although the ASM operates outside Kosovo’s standard legal system, it forms part of the constitutional and legal order. Its implementation has yet to be completed, partly because of a ruling by the Constitutional Court of Kosovo, which found elements inconsistent with the Constitution.
The establishment of the ASM carries strategic importance as it:
As previously explained, implementing the ASM would reinforce the institutional legitimacy of Serb-majority municipalities and serve as a gauge of the central government’s capacity to respect the competences of local communities. The international community, including the EU and the US, should closely monitor both the electoral process and implementation in order to safeguard democracy and the rule of law.
Experience to date has shown that political–criminal structures in Kosovo have hindered the development of strong and stable institutions. The prolonged political crisis has often been exploited to maintain the grip of entrenched power structures, eroding institutional stability and the rule of law.
With the Self-Determination Movement (LVV) coming to power, regional efforts to curb organised crime — as in the case of Montenegro, with Dritan Abazović’s campaign against criminal networks — point to the transnational dimension of criminal structures. Previous governments repeatedly pledged reforms and institutional strengthening, but most promises remained unfulfilled. According to analysts, this has undermined public confidence and created fertile ground for clientelism and corruption.
The origins of these criminal structures can be traced back to the period of the government in exile, where Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA/UÇK) commanders and the Kosovo para-intelligence service (ShIK) played a pivotal role. Although ShIK was formally dissolved in 2008 and replaced by the Kosovo Intelligence Agency (AKI/KIA) in 2009, its legacy continues to shape Kosovo’s political–criminal landscape.
Analysts emphasise that the fundamental response lies in confronting the past with transparency and prosecuting those responsible. Only then can Kosovo, and the wider region, achieve institutional sustainability, stability and prosperity. In the absence of such steps, reforms and European integration remain at risk, while political and security risks continue to linger beneath the surface.
The European Charter of Local Self-Government underscores a core democratic principle: local authorities must embody the will of citizens expressed through free elections. This means that the majority takes decisions in line with democratic rules, while minorities retain the right to participate and protect their interests, subject to respect for majority decisions. The Charter seeks to strike a balance – the majority governs, while minorities enjoy guaranteed rights to representation, consultation and the preservation of cultural and linguistic identity, for example through proportional representation in councils, special committees or other mechanisms designed to safeguard specific interests.
In northern Kosovo’s Serb-majority municipalities (North Mitrovica, Zubin Potok, Leposavić and Zvečan), the application of the Charter has been effectively suspended, further complicating the application of democratic principles.
The Constitutional Court of Kosovo is soon expected to rule that the Assembly cannot be constituted without a deputy speaker from the Serb community. Such a decision could seriously hinder the formation of a government and lead to institutional deadlock. The frontrunner in the forthcoming local elections among the Albanian electorate remains the Self-Determination Movement (LVV), while among the Serb electorate it is the Serb List (SL). LVV, however, has made significant gains and is further consolidating its standing on the political stage.
Kosovo’s local elections, scheduled for 12 October 2025, represent a critical turning point. They will demonstrate the extent of support for the Government and the Self-Determination Movement (LVV) at the grassroots level, not only nationally but also within local communities. The elections have the potential to reshape local governance in municipalities with a large diaspora population, provided that voters actively participate. LVV is the favourite for mayoral posts in Pristina, Prizren, Peja, Gjakova and Gjilan, while in the Serb communities the Serb List (SL) is the undisputed leader, with strong backing from Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić. In Serb-majority municipalities, the participation of the Serb List in government may ease local tensions, but at the same time raises questions over the integration of these communities into Kosovo’s institutional framework.
This year’s election campaign has assumed a different dynamic: large rallies are rare, with the focus shifting to social media. Voters are cautious and weary, frustrated that previous promises have not been fulfilled. Candidates often campaign discreetly, taking care not to expose their activities to rivals within the same party.
Analysts and local political figures point out that the Serb List remains a key factor for political stability and a barrier to potential changes in the status of the northern municipalities.
For LVV, it is essential to preserve visibility and effectiveness at the local level, while the opposition must coordinate its activities, build credibility and advance concrete local programmes. The most recent parliamentary elections confirmed the dominance of LVV and Prime Minister Albin Kurti, yet the local elections provide an opportunity to move away from centralised control and foster the development of local communities.
The elections are expected to contribute to greater political stability and support the normalisation of relations in municipalities across Kosovo. It is particularly important for LVV to demonstrate political sensitivity towards minority communities, especially the Serb community, in order to ensure inclusiveness and inter-ethnic stability.
A breakdown in the strategic dialogue between the United States and Kosovo could carry serious consequences for the country’s political and economic stability, ranging from reduced international support and impeded reform implementation to a slowdown in European integration. In this context, the local elections assume particular significance as a means of reinforcing the government’s domestic legitimacy, consolidating institutions and demonstrating political accountability to international partners. They serve both as a response to institutional deadlock and as a test of democracy amid the political impasse in which Kosovo currently finds itself.
Equally important is the strategic dialogue within Kosovo, between the central authorities and local communities. This dialogue allows for the participation of all ethnic and political actors, together with civil society, in the decision-making process, thereby fostering internal stability, easing tensions and strengthening citizens’ trust in institutions – a key prerequisite for the country’s long-term political and socio-economic consolidation.
Analysts caution that the local elections are increasingly assuming a security dimension, as evidenced by the deployment of additional troops to NATO’s KFOR mission. Ongoing attacks on the Serb List and its candidates during the campaign highlight the risk of marginalising Serbs from Kosovo’s political life, as well as the potential for electoral manipulation intended to undermine the Serb List’s performance at the polls.
Ljubljana/Washington/Brussels/Pristina, 30 September 2025
[1] IFIMES - International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has a special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council ECOSOC/UN in New York since 2018, and it is the publisher of the international scientific journal "European Perspectives." Available at: https://www.europeanperspectives.org/en
