International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)[1], based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly analyzes developments in the Middle East, the Balkans, and other regions worldwide. In his analysis titled “An Incomplete Picture of the Emerging Multipolar World – Trump, Putin and Xi in Beijing: The Geometry of the New Global Distribution of Power,” General (Retd.) Corneliu Pivariu examines a key symbolic geopolitical moment of 2026, focusing on the successive visits of Presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin to Beijing as a starting point for assessing the broader transformation of the international system. The analysis concludes that the emerging multipolar order is shaped not only by the United States, China, and Russia, but also by India, Europe, regional powers, and technological and informational actors, evolving toward a form of managed competitive multipolarity characterized by sustained strategic rivalry alongside selective cooperation aimed at preserving global stability.
“The multipolar world is not born in a single capital, nor from the will of a single leader; it emerges from the simultaneous interaction of multiple centres of power.”
The successive visits to Beijing in May 2026 by U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, during events organized by China, produced one of the most suggestive geopolitical images of recent years[2]. For many observers, the presence, within the same period, of the leaders of the world’s three most important military powers symbolized a new stage in the transformation of the international order. Yet the resulting political photograph is better understood as a meaningful snapshot rather than a complete representation of the multipolar world currently taking shape. The three states concentrate a considerable share of global economic, military, technological and diplomatic power, but they do not encompass the full range of actors shaping international developments. This analysis examines the strategic significance of the Beijing 2026 moment, compares the resources and vulnerabilities of the three major powers, identifies their principal areas of divergence and common interest, and assesses the extent to which the relationship among Washington, Beijing and Moscow influences the configuration of a new global architecture.
In the history of international relations, there are moments that transcend the immediate significance of an event and acquire lasting symbolic value. The 1945 Yalta Conference, the Nixon–Mao meeting in 1972, and the Reagan–Gorbachev summit in Reykjavik in 1986 are examples of images that have become associated with profound transformations in the international system[3]. To a lesser, yet still significant extent, the successive visits of President Donald Trump and President Vladimir Putin to Beijing in May 2026 may be interpreted as such a symbolic moment.
For the first time in many years, China simultaneously found itself in the position of host and pivot of dialogue between the world’s two other major military powers. Whereas in the post–Cold War era Washington represented the principal centre of gravity of the international system, the image of Beijing as the meeting place for the leaders of the United States and Russia suggests a gradual redistribution of global influence. This does not signify a transfer of hegemony from Washington to Beijing, but rather the emergence of a more complex structure of global power in which no single actor is any longer capable of controlling systemic developments on its own.
The geopolitical significance of the moment is amplified by the international context. The war in Ukraine continues to shape Europe’s security architecture. The technological and commercial rivalry between the United States and China has evolved into a long-term systemic competition. The Middle East remains marked by instability, while the artificial intelligence revolution is beginning to alter economic, military and informational balances that have been built over recent decades. Within this framework, the mere presence of the three leaders in Beijing conveys an important message: regardless of the intensity of competition among the great powers, none of them can afford to ignore the other two.
The Beijing 2026 moment also reflects a deeper reality. Contemporary international relations can no longer be adequately described through simple bipolar or unipolar formulas. Global power is unevenly distributed among several centres of influence, each possessing distinct advantages and vulnerabilities. The United States retains global military supremacy and control over the principal international financial mechanisms. China represents the industrial and commercial centre of the world economy and Washington’s primary strategic competitor. Russia continues to exercise considerable geopolitical and military influence, supported by its status as a major nuclear power and its ability to project force throughout the Eurasian space.
From this perspective, the image of the three leaders should not be interpreted as the expression of an already consolidated tripolar world. Rather, it captures the strategic core of an international system undergoing a process of accelerated transformation. The photograph is relevant because it brings together the principal actors capable of directly influencing global strategic stability. Yet it remains incomplete because it does not include other rising centres of power, such as India, nor the non-state actors that exert growing influence over the economy, technology and the information domain.
Ultimately, the symbolic value of the Beijing 2026 moment derives not from what the photograph shows, but from what it suggests about the direction in which the world is evolving. The image neither represents the end of one era nor the beginning of an entirely new one. Rather, it captures an intermediate stage in a broader process of strategic rebalancing, in which old hierarchies are being challenged, new poles of power are asserting themselves, and the rules of the international game are being continuously renegotiated.
To understand the significance of the geopolitical image created by the meetings in Beijing in May 2026, it is necessary to examine the nature of the power represented by each of the three states. Although they are frequently grouped together under the category of “great powers,” the United States, China and Russia are not comparable in terms of the structure of their strategic resources. Each bases its global influence on a distinct combination of economic, military, technological, geographic and political advantages.
In reality, one of the defining characteristics of the current historical period is that global power is no longer concentrated in a single centre capable of simultaneously dominating all dimensions of the international system[4]. The United States continues to possess the most comprehensive combination of strategic resources, China is increasingly dominant in the economic and industrial spheres, while Russia remains an indispensable military and geopolitical actor in the global security equation. This differentiated distribution of power constitutes one of the fundamental explanations for the ongoing process of global rebalancing.
More than three decades after the end of the Cold War, the United States remains the principal benchmark of global power. Although numerous analyses speak of a decline in American influence, an objective assessment shows that no other state currently possesses a comparable combination of economic, financial, technological, military and diplomatic resources.
The American economy remains the largest in the world in nominal terms and the principal engine of the international financial system. The role of the U.S. dollar as the global reserve currency provides Washington with an instrument of influence unprecedented in the history of international relations[5]. Most international commercial transactions, foreign exchange reserves and global financial flows continue to revolve around the American financial system. This position gives the United States the ability to exert economic and financial pressure that no other international actor can presently match.
To this economic dimension must be added global naval superiority. The U.S. Navy is the only force capable of operating simultaneously and sustainably across all the world’s oceans, protecting the principal maritime routes and projecting military power thousands of kilometres from national territory. Aircraft carriers, carrier strike groups and a worldwide logistical infrastructure enable Washington to intervene rapidly in almost any strategic theatre.
Another essential advantage is the network of alliances built over the past eight decades. NATO in Europe, bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific region and strategic partnerships developed across all continents provide the United States with a geopolitical depth that neither China nor Russia can replicate. While Beijing and Moscow benefit from partnerships and privileged relations with various states, Washington possesses an institutionalized system of military and political alliances that significantly amplifies its global influence.
Perhaps the most important American advantage, however, remains its capacity for innovation. Elite universities, entrepreneurial ecosystems, major technology companies and sustained investments in research enable the United States to remain at the forefront of the digital revolution, artificial intelligence, biotechnology and the industries of the future. Despite China’s remarkable progress, the core of global innovation continues to be concentrated to a significant extent within the American sphere.
From this perspective, the United States remains the only power possessing dominant instruments across nearly all relevant dimensions of modern power simultaneously: economy, finance, technology, alliances and global military projection.
Nevertheless, American advantages coexist with significant vulnerabilities: domestic political polarization, rising public debt, the process of partial deindustrialization and the difficulty of sustaining simultaneous strategic commitments across multiple theatres of operation.
If the United States represents the most complete expression of contemporary global power, China is undoubtedly the actor that has produced the most spectacular strategic transformation of recent decades. The scale, speed and impact of its economic rise on the international system are without precedent in modern history.
At the same time, China faces important challenges, including population ageing, external energy dependence, the vulnerability of maritime routes and restrictions on access to certain advanced Western technologies.
Today, China is the world’s principal industrial centre. No other economy produces a comparable volume of manufactured goods or possesses such an extensive industrial capacity. From electronics and industrial equipment to energy infrastructure, electric vehicles and advanced technological components, Chinese industry occupies a central position within global supply chains.
This manufacturing capacity forms the foundation of Chinese economic power. While other states have transferred a significant share of their production abroad, China has built an integrated industrial ecosystem capable of ensuring both mass production and the development of advanced technologies. This combination of scale, efficiency and integration provides Beijing with a major competitive advantage in a world where economic resilience and control of supply chains are becoming increasingly important.
China’s commercial influence is equally impressive. For a very large number of countries, China is the principal trading partner, while initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative[6] have significantly expanded Chinese economic and infrastructural presence across Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. Trade has thus become one of the principal instruments of Beijing’s projection of influence.
In parallel, Beijing is investing heavily in technological development. Whereas two decades ago China was perceived primarily as a manufacturing platform, today it aspires to become a leader in fields such as artificial intelligence, next-generation communications, quantum computing, space exploration and energy technologies. The technological rivalry between Washington and Beijing reflects precisely the recognition that the future distribution of global power will depend decisively on control over strategic technologies.
This evolution is accompanied by a steady expansion of maritime capabilities. China is building one of the most impressive fleets in the world and is gradually extending its naval presence throughout the Indian Ocean, the Pacific and other areas of strategic interest. Although it does not yet possess the global force-projection capabilities characteristic of the United States, the direction of development is clear: Beijing seeks to transform its economic power into proportional strategic and military influence.
China thus represents the classic example of a power in transition: an economic and industrial superpower striving to convert that strength into a comparable geopolitical and military status.
Compared with the United States and China, Russia possesses more limited economic resources and a significantly smaller population. Yet reducing its importance to these criteria alone would lead to erroneous conclusions. Moscow’s influence derives from a combination of strategic factors that enable it to exercise an international role far greater than its economic indicators would suggest.
The first of these factors is military power. Russia remains one of the world’s two major nuclear superpowers and the only state capable of mutually destroying the United States in a full-scale strategic conflict[7]. This reality grants it a unique status within the international security architecture and explains why Moscow continues to be an indispensable actor in all major global strategic equations.
Its conventional military capabilities, operational experience accumulated over recent decades and sustained investments in hypersonic systems, air defence and strategic technologies allow it to maintain a high level of geopolitical relevance. Even under conditions of economic pressure and Western sanctions, Russia continues to influence developments in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Arctic region.
Russia is probably the most relevant contemporary example of the distinction between economic power and strategic power. Although its economic indicators are inferior to those of the United States and China, the combination of its nuclear arsenal, geographic position, natural resources and military capabilities enables it to influence global developments disproportionately to the size of its economy.
Each of the three states excels in different domains, and each possesses vulnerabilities that the others seek to exploit. It is precisely this uneven and differentiated distribution of resources that explains why none of them can alone claim the status of an uncontested global hegemon. The world currently taking shape is not dominated by a single power but by the permanent interaction among actors possessing different forms of power and pursuing strategic objectives that are often divergent. Within this reality lie both the complexity and the instability of the international order of the twenty-first century.
The fundamental question is not whether one of the three powers will dominate the other two, but how differences in resources, interests and strategic perceptions will influence the stability of the international system. It is precisely these asymmetries that constitute one of the defining characteristics of the emerging multipolar world.
One of the most common misinterpretations of the contemporary world is the assumption that the existence of multiple centres of power automatically implies equality among them. Geopolitical reality is far more complex. Multipolarity does not mean symmetry, just as the bipolarity of the Cold War never implied perfect equality between the United States and the Soviet Union. International power is distributed unevenly, and this unequal distribution generates both opportunities and tensions.
The image of the American, Chinese and Russian leaders gathered around the same global issues may create the impression of a world “directorate” composed of three comparable actors. In reality, each of the three states occupies a distinct position within the hierarchy of global power and derives its influence from different sources. The United States, China and Russia are all great powers, but they are not powers of the same kind.
Understanding these differences is essential for analysing the future world order.
Despite the numerous debates concerning American decline, the United States remains the only actor that simultaneously possesses superiority or a high degree of competitiveness across almost all relevant dimensions of modern power.
The American economy remains the largest in the world in nominal terms and the principal benchmark of the global financial system. The U.S. dollar continues to be the dominant currency in international trade and foreign exchange reserves, while American financial institutions exercise a disproportionate influence over global economic flows. Neither China, and even less Russia, possesses a comparable instrument.
In military terms, the United States is the only country capable of projecting power simultaneously across all continents and oceans. Its network of military bases, aircraft carriers, logistical infrastructure and strategic alliances provides Washington with a global reach unmatched by any other actor.
To this must be added its technological advantage. The world’s most important innovation ecosystems, its most influential universities, and a substantial portion of the digital and artificial intelligence revolution originate within the American sphere. Although the gap with China is narrowing in certain fields, the United States continues to set global standards across numerous strategic sectors.
This combination of economic, financial, military, technological and diplomatic power explains why Washington remains the principal reference point of the international system. No other country combines all of these components to a comparable degree.
Nevertheless, dominant-power status is no longer synonymous with absolute hegemony. The costs of maintaining an extensive global presence, domestic political polarization, technological competition with China and the emergence of regional centres of power limit Washington’s freedom of action compared with the period immediately following the end of the Cold War.
If the United States represents the established global power, China is the principal candidate for redefining the global balance in the twenty-first century.
Its fundamental strength lies in its economy and industry. No other state possesses a comparable manufacturing base or such extensive integration into global production chains. China has become the leading trading partner for dozens of countries and exercises an economic influence that few powers in history have ever achieved.
Its technological rise is equally impressive. From telecommunications and artificial intelligence to energy technologies and space exploration, Beijing is investing enormous resources to reduce dependence on Western technologies and to secure a competitive advantage in the industries of the future.
Nevertheless, China does not yet possess all the attributes of a fully comprehensive global power. Its currency does not play the international role of the U.S. dollar. Its alliance network is incomparably smaller than that of the United States. Its capacity for global military power projection is developing, but remains limited in comparison with that of the United States.
Moreover, Beijing faces significant structural challenges: an ageing population, dependence on imported energy, the vulnerability of maritime routes and the need to sustain sufficient economic growth in order to preserve domestic stability.
Consequently, China today represents an economic and industrial superpower, but not yet a fully-fledged superpower in the sense in which the United States is generally perceived.
Russia’s position is perhaps the most difficult for many Western observers to understand, because it often contradicts traditional economic logic.
Measured by GDP, Russia ranks below both the United States and China and even behind certain individual Western economies. If analysis were limited exclusively to economic indicators, Moscow would not appear to be an actor capable of decisively influencing global developments.
Strategic reality, however, is different.
Russia remains one of the world’s two major nuclear superpowers. Its strategic deterrence capability grants it a status that cannot be ignored in any assessment of international security. No major decision concerning global strategic stability can be made without taking Moscow’s position into account.
Its geographic position amplifies this influence. Russia occupies the geographic centre of Eurasia, borders Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia and the Asia-Pacific region, and enjoys privileged access to the Arctic, whose economic and strategic importance continues to grow.
Energy and mineral resources complete this strategic profile. Oil, natural gas, uranium, rare metals and other critical resources continue to provide Moscow with important instruments of external influence.
Consequently, Russia is perhaps the most relevant contemporary example of the distinction between economic power and strategic power. It cannot compete with the United States or China in terms of global economic weight, yet it can influence the international balance to a degree disproportionate to the size of its economy.
A comparison of the three actors highlights the existence of distinct structural advantages.
The United States dominates the global financial system, the network of alliances and worldwide military power projection. China dominates industrial production and possesses the greatest long-term economic growth potential among the major powers. Russia dominates the sphere of strategic resources and remains one of the pillars of the global nuclear balance.
From this perspective, competition among them is not merely a confrontation between states, but also a competition among different models of power. Washington relies on the combination of finance, technology and alliances. Beijing relies on economic strength, industrial capacity and accelerated technological development. Moscow bases its influence on security, geography and strategic autonomy.
This diversity of power sources makes the emergence of a new global hegemon impossible in the foreseeable future and explains why today’s world is more complex than both the unipolar model of the 1990s and the classical bipolarity of the twentieth century.
The Beijing photograph may suggest the existence of a strategic triangle composed of the United States, China and Russia. A closer analysis, however, shows that the three powers are neither equal nor interchangeable. Each possesses unique advantages, specific vulnerabilities and distinct strategic objectives.
The United States remains the only fully comprehensive global power. China is Washington’s principal systemic competitor and the most important emerging economic force of the twenty-first century. Russia continues to exercise major strategic influence disproportionate to the size of its economy.
The fundamental challenge of the future world order is not the emergence of a single leader, but the management of interaction among these different forms of power. It is precisely these asymmetries that constitute one of the defining characteristics of emerging multipolarity and one of the factors that will shape the stability—or instability—of the international system in the decades ahead.
If the Beijing photograph conveys the idea of dialogue among the great powers, an analysis of their strategic interests reveals a far more complex reality. Beyond diplomatic gestures, official statements and the need to maintain functional channels of communication, the United States, China and Russia remain engaged in a profound competition for influence, security and positioning within the future international order.
History demonstrates that great powers can cooperate in certain areas while simultaneously confronting one another in others. Relations among Washington, Beijing and Moscow are no exception. Indeed, one of the defining characteristics of the current historical period is the coexistence of dialogue and rivalry, economic interdependence and strategic competition, selective cooperation and mutual distrust.
Despite their ideological and geopolitical differences, none of the three powers seeks the total isolation of the others. Instead, each strives to maximize its own advantages while limiting the ability of its competitors to transform their resources into dominant global influence.
Of all bilateral relationships in existence today, that between the United States and China is probably the most important for the evolution of the international system. It is not merely a competition between two states, but a contest between two models of development, two visions of governance and two different projects concerning the distribution of global power.
Over recent decades, China’s economic rise has profoundly altered international power relations. Whereas in the early 1990s Beijing was largely perceived as a developing regional actor, today it represents the only competitor capable of challenging the long-term economic and technological supremacy of the United States.
The competition is most visible in the technological domain. Artificial intelligence, advanced semiconductors, next-generation communications, quantum computing and digital infrastructures have become the new arenas of strategic rivalry. Both states understand that technological superiority will decisively influence economic competitiveness, military performance and the capacity to exert influence in the decades ahead.
Taiwan represents another major source of tension. For Beijing, the reunification of the island constitutes a fundamental strategic and symbolic objective. For Washington, preserving the status quo is essential to the credibility of its commitments in the Asia-Pacific region and to the regional balance of power. For this reason, Taiwan continues to be regarded by many analysts as one of the most sensitive flashpoints in contemporary international security[8].
In economic terms, competition manifests itself through trade disputes, technological restrictions, industrial policies and efforts to reduce mutual dependencies in sectors considered strategic. Although the economies of the two states remain deeply interconnected, the overall trend is one of selective decoupling in areas relevant to national security.
The paradox of the Washington–Beijing relationship has been described by some economists and analysts through the concept of “Chimerica,”[9] a term derived from the combination of China and America. It reflects the high degree of economic interdependence built between the two economies over recent decades, despite the increasingly intense strategic competition that now places them in opposition.
In essence, Sino-American rivalry is not a temporary confrontation, but the expression of a structural competition that will likely shape the entire first half of the twenty-first century.
Relations between Washington and Moscow are marked by an accumulation of strategic mistrust that extends far beyond the context of current regional disputes. Although the period of ideological confrontation between capitalism and communism ended with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, numerous geopolitical divergences survived and continue to influence the behaviour of both states.
The war in Ukraine has become the principal point of tension in the bilateral relationship. From the Western perspective, the conflict represents a challenge to the fundamental principles of European security. From Moscow’s perspective, it is inseparable from the issue of NATO enlargement and the strategic balance in the post-Soviet space.
Beyond Ukraine, divergences also concern the European security architecture, arms-control regimes, influence in the Middle East and the distribution of power across Eurasia. Each capital views the intentions of the other with suspicion and seeks to prevent the emergence of strategic advantages deemed unacceptable.
Nevertheless, the U.S.–Russian relationship cannot be reduced solely to conflict. Their status as the world’s principal nuclear powers necessitates the existence of mechanisms for dialogue and risk management. Even during periods of maximum tension, Washington and Moscow have been compelled to maintain channels of communication in order to avoid uncontrolled escalation.
This paradox—strategic confrontation combined with the simultaneous necessity of cooperation—will likely continue to define relations between the two states for the foreseeable future.
The relationship between Beijing and Moscow is often portrayed as one of the pillars of the new multipolar order. In reality, it combines convergent interests with significant differences in perspective and objectives.
The two states share an interest in limiting Western influence and promoting an international system less dominated by the United States. Both support the principle of state sovereignty and challenge attempts to universalize certain Western political or institutional models.
Their cooperation manifests itself in the energy, commercial, diplomatic and military spheres. Economic relations have intensified considerably in recent years, while coordination within various organizations and multilateral frameworks has become increasingly visible.
Nevertheless, the partnership does not eliminate the existence of structural differences. The economic imbalance between the two states is evident, as China’s economy is several times larger than Russia’s. This reality inevitably generates concerns regarding the risk of excessive dependence on the Chinese market. The absence of an agreement on the Power of Siberia 2 project even after the Xi–Putin meeting in May 2026 illustrates the fact that, although politically and strategically solid, the Sino-Russian partnership continues to be shaped by differing economic interests and by a growing asymmetry in Beijing’s favour.
In Central Asia, the two powers pursue objectives that are not always identical. Russia regards the region as a traditional zone of strategic influence, while China sees it as an important component of Eurasian economic connectivity. Similarly, the development of Arctic routes and access to northern resources create both opportunities for cooperation and potential sources of competition.
Consequently, the Sino-Russian relationship should be analysed as a flexible strategic partnership rather than a classical military-political alliance. It is strengthened by shared interests, but constrained by disparities in power and distinct national objectives.
An analysis of the relationships among Washington, Beijing and Moscow highlights an important conclusion: multipolarity does not eliminate competition among the great powers; it merely changes its form. Unlike the bipolarity of the Cold War, where the logic of confrontation was relatively simple and predictable, the new international configuration generates a complex network of rivalries, selective cooperation and fluctuating relationships.
The United States and China compete for the economic and technological leadership of the twenty-first century. The United States and Russia continue to confront one another over issues of security and strategic balance. China and Russia cooperate in numerous areas, yet are not free from differences of interest and divergent perceptions regarding the future of Eurasia.
Under these conditions, international stability will depend less on the existence of rigid alliances and more on the ability of the great powers to manage competition without allowing it to escalate into direct confrontation.
The Beijing photograph may suggest growing proximity among the three great powers, yet strategic reality is dominated by profound divergences and structural competition. Sino-American rivalry over global leadership, U.S.–Russian confrontation regarding European security, and the complex relationship between Beijing and Moscow demonstrate that the interests of the three actors are far from convergent.
Nevertheless, these divergences do not exclude dialogue or occasional cooperation. On the contrary, in a world characterized by economic interdependence, nuclear risks and shared technological challenges, the great powers are compelled to combine competition with negotiation and confrontation with responsible risk management.
Emerging multipolarity is therefore not a world of consensus, but a world of managed rivalries. It is precisely this capacity to keep competition within manageable limits that will decisively influence the stability of the international system in the decades ahead.
An analysis of the divergences among the United States, China and Russia may create the impression that relations between the three powers are defined exclusively by competition and confrontation. Such a conclusion would, however, be incomplete. In reality, one of the essential characteristics of the contemporary world is the coexistence of strategic rivalry with common interests that compel the great powers to maintain forms of dialogue and cooperation.
The history of international relations demonstrates that states do not cooperate because they share the same values, but because certain fundamental interests converge. In the case of the United States, China and Russia, political, ideological and geopolitical differences are evident. Nevertheless, there exists a series of major objectives that none of the three powers can achieve individually and whose realization requires at least a minimum level of coordination and mutual predictability.
Paradoxically, it is precisely the scale of their power that makes these states both competitors and inevitable partners at the same time.
Perhaps the most important common interest shared by the three great powers is the avoidance of a direct military conflict that could escalate to the nuclear level.
The United States and Russia continue to possess the majority of the world’s nuclear weapons, while China is gradually expanding its own strategic arsenal. Under such conditions, any major military confrontation among them would generate risks incomparably greater than the regional conflicts that have characterized recent decades.
Beyond political rhetoric and geopolitical rivalries, the leaders of all major powers understand that a nuclear war cannot produce winners[10]. The destructive capacity accumulated within the world’s strategic arsenals transforms mutual deterrence into a fundamental shared interest.
This is why, even during periods of maximum tension, military and diplomatic communication channels have been maintained. Strategic stability is not a concession granted to an adversary, but a condition of one’s own survival.
However, the existence of a common strategic vocabulary does not always imply the existence of a common interpretation. A relevant example is the notion of “strategic stability,” frequently employed by both Washington and Beijing. Although both parties claim to pursue stability, the meaning attributed to this objective differs significantly. For the United States, strategic stability is associated primarily with preventing direct military conflict, maintaining the nuclear balance and ensuring effective crisis-management mechanisms. For China, the same concept also includes recognition of its fundamental security interests, the limitation of external pressures and acceptance of an international role commensurate with its status as a major power. Consequently, Sino-American strategic dialogue is characterized by a degree of controlled ambiguity[11]: both sides employ the same concepts, but do not always assign the same meaning to them.
In a multipolar world, managing nuclear risk will continue to be one of the principal areas in which cooperation among the great powers remains indispensable.
Despite trends toward economic fragmentation and increasing commercial competition, the United States, China and Russia share a common interest in avoiding major disruption of the world economy.
China depends on exports and access to external markets. The United States benefits from the central role of the dollar and from the integration of the global economy. Russia relies on energy and commodity exports for a significant portion of its revenues. Although each seeks to reduce its vulnerabilities and dependencies, none of these powers would benefit from a collapse of global trade or a deep worldwide recession.
The same logic applies to the critical infrastructures of the global economy. Freedom of maritime navigation, the functioning of financial systems, the security of communications and the stability of major trade corridors constitute shared interests even for states engaged in competition.
The experiences of recent years have demonstrated that major disruptions occurring in one region rapidly spread on a global scale. In an interdependent economy, stability itself becomes a strategic resource.
For the first time in modern history, technological development is producing transformations whose effects are potentially comparable to those generated by the Industrial Revolution.
Artificial intelligence, quantum computing, biotechnology, autonomous systems and new space technologies simultaneously represent sources of strategic advantage and sources of systemic risk[12]. The United States, China and Russia are engaged in intense competition for technological supremacy, yet all face the same dilemma: how can they exploit new technologies without losing control over their consequences?
The risk of the proliferation of lethal autonomous systems, the vulnerability of digital infrastructures, the possibility of large-scale cyberattacks and the impact of artificial intelligence on decision-making processes constitute common challenges.
Although technological competition is likely to intensify, the major powers will probably be compelled gradually to develop certain mechanisms for regulation and risk management, similar to those created in the past for nuclear weapons or for outer-space exploration.
In this domain, competition and cooperation do not exclude one another; they coexist inevitably.
International terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and cyberattacks constitute threats that transcend national borders and simultaneously affect all major powers.
The United States, China and Russia have different experiences in combating these phenomena, yet their fundamental interest is common: preventing the destabilization of their societies and protecting critical infrastructures.
None of the three powers can effectively combat these threats in isolation. Intelligence sharing, diplomatic coordination and ad hoc cooperation among security institutions will continue to be necessary even during periods characterized by heightened political tensions.
The same applies to emerging risks such as cyberattacks against energy, financial or communications infrastructures, which can generate difficult-to-control cross-border effects.
Although they promote different visions of the international order, the three great powers share one fundamental interest: preventing systemic chaos.
The United States seeks to preserve an international environment that allows the global economy and its alliance network to function effectively. China requires stability to sustain economic development and protect its commercial interests. Russia seeks to preserve a strategic framework that enables it to exercise influence and safeguard its security interests.
Beyond their differences regarding the rules of the system, none of these powers seeks the complete disintegration of the international order. A world dominated by uncontrolled conflicts, economic collapse and the proliferation of violent actors would undermine the interests of all of them.
In this sense, the great powers are not merely competitors for influence; they are also co-stakeholders in global stability. Each seeks to shape the system according to its own interests, yet all require the system to continue functioning.
Beyond the rivalries that often dominate public discourse, the United States, China and Russia share a number of fundamental interests that make a complete rupture among them impossible. Avoiding nuclear war, preserving the stability of the global economy, managing the technological revolution, combating transnational threats and preventing systemic chaos constitute common objectives that transcend political and geopolitical differences.
This reality explains why relations among the great powers cannot be interpreted exclusively through the prism of confrontation. Strategic competition will continue to define relations among Washington, Beijing and Moscow, but it will inevitably be accompanied by varying forms of dialogue, negotiation and selective cooperation.
Ultimately, the paradox of the multipolar world lies precisely in the fact that the actors competing for influence are simultaneously obliged to cooperate in order to avoid destroying the very conditions that make the exercise of that influence possible. This combination of rivalry and interdependence constitutes one of the defining features of the emerging international order.
The photograph taken in Beijing in May 2026, featuring the leaders of the United States, China and Russia, possesses undeniable symbolic value. It captures three of the most important centres of power in the contemporary world and presents the image of a strategic core capable of decisively influencing the evolution of the international system. Yet the photograph is incomplete.
In reality, the emerging multipolar world cannot be reduced to the relationships among Washington, Beijing and Moscow. Global power is today more dispersed than at any other period since the end of the Second World War. New states are asserting regional or global influence, organizations and economic groupings are gaining increasing relevance, and non-state actors are exercising forms of power that in the past belonged exclusively to states.
Therefore, if the Beijing photograph captures the gravitational centre of the international system, it does not capture the entire architecture of the emerging multipolar world.
If there is one actor whose absence is immediately noticeable in the Beijing photograph, it is India[13].
Over the past two decades, India has become one of the principal beneficiaries of global economic and geopolitical transformations. With a population that has surpassed China’s, one of the fastest-growing economies in the world, and a technological sector undergoing continuous expansion, India is steadily consolidating its status as a major power.
Unlike many emerging states, India simultaneously possesses several of the essential attributes of a pole of power: demographic scale, a developing industrial base, technological capability, significant armed forces and nuclear weapons. In addition, its geographic position provides access to one of the world’s most important maritime regions—the Indian Ocean—through which a substantial share of global trade passes.
Another advantage is its strategic flexibility. New Delhi generally avoids the logic of exclusive alliances and pursues a foreign policy characterized by decision-making autonomy. India cooperates simultaneously with the United States, maintains functional relations with Russia, and develops important economic ties with China, without fully identifying with any of the competing camps.
For these reasons, India is probably the leading candidate to become the fourth pole of the international system in the coming decades. Ignoring its role would lead to an incomplete understanding of the ongoing process of global rebalancing.
Another notable absence is Europe.
Viewed as a whole, the European Union represents one of the world’s largest economies, an important technological centre and one of the principal global trading poles. Its level of economic development, industrial capacity, financial resources and normative influence make Europe a first-rank actor in many domains.
However, economic power does not automatically translate into geopolitical power.
Europe’s principal difficulty lies in the absence of a unified political and strategic authority comparable to those existing in Washington, Beijing or Moscow. Consensus-based decision-making, differences in interests among member states and external dependencies in key sectors limit the European Union’s ability to act as a fully autonomous strategic pole.
In recent years, debates concerning European strategic autonomy, the development of a defence industrial base and the strengthening of common military capabilities have intensified considerably. Nevertheless, transforming Europe’s economic weight into a unified geopolitical power remains an incomplete and uncertain process[14].
Europe is therefore too important to ignore, yet still insufficiently consolidated strategically to be regarded as the direct equivalent of the three major powers analysed above.
Another limitation of the Beijing photograph is the absence of the actors that are often grouped under the label of the Global South.
This concept does not refer to a homogeneous political bloc, but rather to a multitude of states which, despite differences in culture, political systems and levels of development, share an interest in a more balanced distribution of international influence.
Brazil aspires to the role of leader of Latin America and to a global influence commensurate with its economic and demographic dimensions. Turkey is increasingly asserting its status as a regional power situated at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia. Saudi Arabia seeks to transform its energy resources and financial position into expanded geopolitical influence, while Indonesia benefits from a rare combination of a large population, a strategic geographic location and considerable economic potential.
For its part, South Africa continues to play an important role on the African continent and within the multilateral structures of the emerging world.
Individually, none of these actors possesses the capacity to rival the United States, China or Russia. Collectively, however, they contribute to the fragmentation of centres of power and to the reduction of the ability of major actors to unilaterally control the international agenda.
In many respects, multipolarity is being shaped not only through the rise of new great powers, but also through the growing influence of regional actors that refuse to align automatically with the interests of any single camp.
Perhaps the most significant absence from the Beijing photograph is not a state at all, but an entire category of actors that are profoundly transforming the nature of power in the twenty-first century.
For centuries, geopolitics was dominated almost exclusively by states. Today, influence is also exercised by organizations, networks and corporations operating beyond traditional borders.
Major technology companies manage platforms used by billions of people and control digital infrastructures without which the contemporary economy could not function[15]. Algorithms shape access to information, influence perceptions and contribute to the formation of public opinion to an unprecedented degree.
At the same time, the development of artificial intelligence is creating new centres of power based on the control of data, computing capabilities and digital infrastructures. The competition for technological supremacy is taking place not only among states, but also among corporations possessing financial resources comparable to the budgets of major countries.
Global financial networks represent another dimension of this transformation. Capital flows, investment funds, financial markets and digital trading mechanisms influence entire national economies and can alter power relationships without the use of military force.
In this context, power can no longer be defined exclusively through territory, population and military strength. Control over information, technology and digital infrastructures is becoming as important as control over natural resources or geographic space.
Thus, the Beijing photograph captures the leaders of states, but it does not capture the many actors who are already contributing to the shaping of the world order.
The Beijing photograph provides a meaningful image of the strategic core of the contemporary international system, yet it cannot be confused with a complete representation of the emerging multipolar world. India’s absence, Europe’s ambiguous role, the rise of actors from the Global South and the growing influence of non-state actors demonstrate that the distribution of power is far more complex than the simple interaction among Washington, Beijing and Moscow would suggest.
In reality, twenty-first-century multipolarity is being shaped not only through competition among the great powers, but also through the emergence of new centres of economic, technological and informational influence. If the twentieth century was dominated primarily by states, the twenty-first century appears increasingly characterized by the coexistence of state and non-state poles whose interactions will shape the architecture of the future world order.
For this very reason, the Beijing photograph is important yet incomplete: it captures the principal actors of the present, but not the full distribution of power that will define the future.
If the Beijing photograph captures a moment in the process of global rebalancing, the essential question remains the same: what type of international order will emerge from the transformations currently under way?
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, many analysts anticipated the emergence of a more stable and cooperative world, based on economic interdependence and the expansion of multilateral mechanisms. The developments of the past two decades have demonstrated, however, that economic integration does not eliminate geopolitical competition, just as technological progress does not automatically guarantee political stability.
Today, the world is experiencing a period of transition characterized by the redistribution of economic power, accelerated technological transformation, informational fragmentation and the contestation of rules that have governed the international system since the end of the Cold War. Under these circumstances, the future of multipolarity remains open.
Three principal scenarios can be identified.
In the most favourable scenario, the major powers succeed in accepting the existence of multiple centres of influence and develop effective mechanisms for managing competition.
In such a context, the United States, China and Russia would continue to pursue their own strategic interests while avoiding the transformation of rivalries into direct confrontations. Dialogue on arms control would be resumed and expanded to encompass new military technologies; trade disputes would be managed through negotiation; and international institutions would be adapted to reflect the new realities of global power distribution.
India, Europe and the principal actors of the Global South would participate more actively in international governance processes, contributing to the reduction of tensions and to the enhancement of the system’s representativeness.
In this scenario, competition does not disappear, but it becomes predictable and manageable. The global economy maintains a high degree of integration, while cooperation in areas such as climate change, public health, cybersecurity and artificial intelligence helps to limit systemic risks.
Such a scenario would provide the highest level of global stability and prosperity. Its realization, however, would require a significant degree of mutual trust and political will—conditions that are often absent during periods of international power redistribution.
The second scenario—and probably the one most consistent with current trends—envisages the continuation of strategic competition among the major powers without its degeneration into a major conflict.
In this configuration, the United States and China continue to compete for technological, economic and strategic supremacy. Russia maintains its role as a major military and geopolitical actor, while India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and other regional powers gradually expand their influence.
Rivalry becomes a permanent feature of the international system, yet it is accompanied by mechanisms designed to limit escalation. Strategic dialogue continues even during periods of tension, and economic and technological interdependencies discourage direct confrontations.
Under this scenario, the world is neither harmonious nor stable in the classical sense. Regional crises, trade disputes, information conflicts and technological competitions continue to emerge periodically. Nevertheless, the major powers understand that certain red lines must not be crossed and that maintaining at least a minimum level of cooperation serves the interests of all.
Managed competitive multipolarity does not eliminate risks, but it keeps them within controllable limits. It represents an imperfect, yet functional, international order.
In many respects, this appears to be the most likely direction for the coming decade.
The most dangerous scenario is one in which strategic competition evolves into a generalized systemic confrontation.
In such a development, rivalry between the United States and China would intensify to the point of a major economic and technological rupture. Relations between Russia and the West would continue to deteriorate, while regional conflicts would become increasingly frequent and more difficult to control.
Instead of a world characterized by interdependence and selective cooperation, rival geopolitical blocs would emerge, separated by commercial, technological and financial barriers. Globalization would be replaced by accelerated processes of regionalization and fragmentation.
Emerging technologies would amplify these tensions. Artificial intelligence, cyber warfare, autonomous systems and competition in outer space would become central instruments of confrontation among the major powers. At the same time, regional actors would attempt to exploit global rivalries in pursuit of their own interests, thereby increasing instability.
Such a scenario does not necessarily imply the outbreak of a traditional world war. Its principal danger lies in the simultaneous accumulation of numerous regional, economic, technological and informational crises capable of gradually eroding international stability.
In a world characterized by strategic fragmentation and generalized mistrust, the capacity to manage risks would steadily diminish, while the probability of miscalculation would increase significantly.
Future reality will most likely contain elements of all three scenarios.
Some domains will continue to be marked by cooperation, others by intense competition, while certain regions will remain vulnerable to conflict and instability. The international order of the twenty-first century will be neither entirely cooperative nor entirely conflictual.
Its dominant characteristic will most likely be the continuous process of power rebalancing.
This process is driven by economic, demographic, technological and geopolitical factors that operate simultaneously and sometimes in contradictory ways. The rise of new centres of influence, accelerated technological transformation and the fragmentation of the information space are continuously reshaping relationships among states and societies.
In this context, stability will not depend upon the existence of a dominant power capable of imposing universal rules, but upon the ability of the principal actors to manage their differences without transforming competition into an existential confrontation.
The emerging multipolar world has no predetermined outcome. It may evolve toward a system characterized by cooperation and institutional adaptation; it may remain in a state of managed competition; or it may slide into conflictual fragmentation with consequences that are difficult to foresee.
At present, the most probable outcome is that of managed competitive multipolarity, in which the major powers continue to compete for influence while avoiding direct confrontation and maintaining minimum mechanisms of cooperation.
Ultimately, the future of the international order will not be determined exclusively by the power of the United States, China or Russia, but by the manner in which all centres of influence—state and non-state alike—succeed in managing the inevitable tensions of a world undergoing a profound process of rebalancing.
This is, perhaps, the true geopolitical meaning of the Beijing photograph: not the announcement of a new order already established, but the capture of a moment within a historic transition whose final outcomes remain open.
The successive visits of Presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin to Beijing in May 2026 provided one of the most suggestive geopolitical images of recent years. For many observers, the presence of the leaders of the world’s principal military and strategic powers symbolized the emergence of a new configuration of global power. A careful analysis of contemporary realities, however, shows that this image must be interpreted with caution.
The Beijing photograph captures an essential core of the international system, but not its full complexity. The United States, China and Russia undoubtedly represent the principal actors in the current process of geopolitical rebalancing. Each possesses distinct strategic advantages: the United States continues to benefit from the most comprehensive combination of economic, financial, technological and military power; China has established itself as the world’s principal industrial and commercial centre and as Washington’s foremost systemic competitor; Russia retains its status as a major strategic and nuclear power, exercising an influence disproportionate to the size of its economy.
Nevertheless, the emerging multipolar world cannot be reduced to the relationships among these three states. India is progressively asserting itself as a potential fourth pole of the international system. Europe continues to represent one of the world’s most important economic forces, even though its transformation into a unified strategic actor remains incomplete. At the same time, regional powers such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa contribute to the diversification of centres of influence and to the reduction of any single actor’s ability to control the global agenda unilaterally.
The publication in May 2026 of the strategic report issued by the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) on coexistence between China and the United States provides further confirmation of this trend. The document is based on the premise that neither Washington nor Beijing can single-handedly shape global developments and that the stability of the international system will depend on the ability of major powers to manage competition and cooperation simultaneously. At the same time, the report reflects one of the current limitations of geopolitical analysis: the tendency to interpret global transformations primarily through the prism of Sino-American relations. The emerging reality is, however, far more complex, encompassing not only other state centers of power, but also economic, technological, and informational actors capable of exerting significant influence on global dynamics.
At the same time, one of the most profound transformations of the twenty-first century is the emergence of forms of power that transcend the classical framework of the state. Major technology corporations, global digital infrastructures, artificial intelligence, transnational financial flows and information ecosystems are exerting an increasingly powerful influence on economic, social and political processes. If the geopolitics of previous centuries was defined primarily by the control of territories and resources, contemporary geopolitics is increasingly shaped by the control of data, technologies and perceptions.
An analysis of relations among Washington, Beijing and Moscow also reveals another fundamental paradox of our age. The three powers are simultaneously competitors and interdependent actors. They compete for economic, technological and strategic influence, yet they share common interests regarding the avoidance of nuclear conflict, the stability of the global economy, the protection of critical infrastructures and the management of risks generated by the technological revolution. Rivalry does not exclude cooperation, just as cooperation does not eliminate competition.
From this perspective, twenty-first-century multipolarity differs both from the bipolarity of the Cold War and from the unipolar moment that followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The world now taking shape is more fragmented, more interdependent and more difficult to control. Power is distributed among multiple actors, and advantages in one domain do not automatically guarantee supremacy in others. Neither the United States, nor China, nor Russia alone possesses all the components of global hegemony.
For this reason, the fundamental question of the coming decades is not who will dominate the world, but whether the principal centres of power will succeed in managing competition without allowing rivalry to evolve into systemic confrontation. International stability will depend less on the existence of an uncontested global leader and more on the ability of major actors to build mechanisms capable of adapting to a continuously evolving distribution of power.
In this sense, the Beijing photograph does not represent the final image of the multipolar world, but merely a snapshot of a historical process that is still unfolding. It captures the central actors of the present, but not the entire architecture of the future. The true significance of the moment lies not in what the photograph depicts, but in what it suggests: the transition from an international order dominated by a single centre of power toward a world that is more complex, more competitive and more diverse, in which equilibrium will result from the permanent interaction among states, technologies, economies and societies.
The central challenge of the coming decades will not be the emergence of a new hegemon, but the management of coexistence among multiple centres of power operating across different dimensions of influence.
Ultimately, the multipolar world is not a destination already reached, but a process of rebalancing that is still unfolding. The Beijing photograph represents one of the symbolic images of that journey, not its final destination.
About the author:
Corneliu Pivariu is a highly decorated two-star general of the Romanian army (Rtd). He has founded and led one of the most influential magazines on geopolitics and international relations in Eastern Europe, the bilingual journal Geostrategic Pulse, for two decades. General Pivariu is a member of IFIMES Advisory Board.
The article presents the stance of the author and does not necessarily reflect the stance of IFIMES.
Ljubljana/Brașov, 29 May 2026
[1] IFIMES - International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has a special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council ECOSOC/UN in New York since 2018, and it is the publisher of the international scientific journal "European Perspectives." Available at: https://www.europeanperspectives.org/en
[2] President Donald Trump’s visit to Beijing led to the resumption of Sino-American strategic dialogue and to the agreement of measures aimed at reducing trade and technological tensions between the two countries. By contrast, the meeting between Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping reaffirmed the strategic nature of the Sino-Russian partnership but was not followed by the announcement of any major new agreements. The Russian President’s apparently abrupt departure and the cancellation of the joint press conference scheduled at the conclusion of the visit fuelled speculation regarding unresolved differences between the two sides, including over the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline project, regarded by Moscow as a strategic priority but towards which Beijing continues to display caution and economic prudence.
[3] The Yalta Conference (1945) established the foundations of the post-war bipolar order; the Nixon–Mao meeting (1972) facilitated Sino-American rapprochement and altered the global strategic balance; while the Reagan–Gorbachev Reykjavik Summit (1986) marked the beginning of the final phase of the Cold War.
[4] In the literature of international relations, power is assessed through the combination of several dimensions: economic, financial, military, technological, demographic, institutional and cultural. No single indicator can fully describe the status of a great power.
[5] According to data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the U.S. dollar remains the principal reserve currency held by central banks and the most widely used currency in international financial transactions.
[6] The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched by President Xi Jinping in 2013, aims to develop transport, energy and connectivity infrastructure linking China with countries across Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Europe and Latin America. It is widely regarded as one of the largest geoeconomic projects of the twenty-first century.
[7] According to estimates published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), the United States and the Russian Federation together possess more than 80 percent of the world’s nuclear warheads, thereby maintaining the dominant role within the global architecture of strategic deterrence.
[8] Taiwan hosts the world’s most advanced semiconductor industry. The Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) produces the majority of advanced chips used in the digital economy, artificial intelligence systems and numerous military applications, giving the island exceptional strategic importance.
[9] The term “Chimerica” was popularized by British-American historian and economist Niall Ferguson to describe the economic symbiosis between the United States and China during the first decades of the twenty-first century. The concept suggests that the American economy, driven by consumption and the central role of the dollar, and the Chinese economy, driven by manufacturing and exports, functioned for many years as two components of an interdependent economic system. Although strategic rivalry between the two states has intensified since 2018, numerous commercial, financial and technological links continue to reflect this interdependence.
[10] The formula “A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” was established in the joint Reagan–Gorbachev statement of 1985 and subsequently reaffirmed by the leaders of the five permanent nuclear-weapon states of the United Nations Security Council in their joint declaration of 3 January 2022.
[11] Several analyses published by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) have highlighted that Washington and Beijing frequently employ the concept of “strategic stability”, yet attach different conceptual emphases to it. Whereas the American approach focuses primarily on military balance and crisis management, the Chinese approach also incorporates dimensions related to international status, technological development and respect for what Beijing considers its fundamental interests. See also: Council on Foreign Relations, “China and the U.S. Agreed to ‘Strategic Stability’ in Beijing. They Don’t Define It the Same Way”, May 2026.
[12] Numerous contemporary strategic assessments regard artificial intelligence as one of the technologies with the greatest transformative potential for the economy, security and the global distribution of power, often comparing its prospective impact to that of the Industrial Revolution or the advent of nuclear energy.
[13] In 2023, India became the world’s most populous country, surpassing China. Numerous international economic forecasts estimate that by the middle of the twenty-first century the Indian economy could rank among the world’s three largest.
[14] The concept of “European strategic autonomy” refers to the European Union’s ability to act independently in the fields of security, defence, technology and the economy, while reducing external dependencies considered critical.
[15] The combined market capitalization of the world’s leading technology companies exceeds the gross domestic product of many developed countries, granting them an unprecedented level of economic, technological and informational influence in modern history.
[16] Multipolarity refers to the simultaneous existence of several autonomous centres of power capable of influencing developments within the international system at both regional and global levels. Unlike unipolar or bipolar systems, the distribution of power is more fragmented and diversified.
