International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES[1]) from Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly analyses developments in the Middle East, the Balkans, and around the world. In the text entitled “The NATO Meeting in The Hague and the Latest Developments in the International Security Environment: Conclusions and Lessons for Military and Intelligence Services[2]”, General (Rtd) Corneliu Pivariu, a member of IFIMES Advisory Board and founder and former CEO at Ingepo Consulting, examines the implications of the recent NATO summit in The Hague for global security and also important lessons for Romania.
“Geopolitics does not forgive ignorance and does not reward indecision.”
Adapted from Zbigniew Brzezinski— Corneliu Pivariu
The NATO meeting held in The Hague on June 24-25, 2025, took place in a tense and fluid international context, where the rules-based global order is under pressure, and the European security architecture continues to be deeply affected by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The persistence of the conflict in Ukraine, the escalation of tensions in the Middle East, the strengthening of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership, and the reconfiguration of global power balances define a critical stage for Euro-Atlantic collective security. The meeting serves as an essential preparatory moment for the next NATO Summit, where the Alliance’s strategic directions for the coming years will be established.
Concurrently, the world is witnessing rising tensions in the Middle East, intensifying rivalries among great powers in the Indo-Pacific, and the proliferation of hybrid and cyber conflicts. In this context, analyzing The Hague meeting is crucial for understanding the direction in which NATO is redefining its strategic role, while evaluating the lessons learned is necessary for both the armed forces and the intelligence communities of member states.
The meeting in The Hague conveyed several clear signals:
- Reaffirmation of Allied solidarity and strengthening collective defense capabilities, particularly on Europe’s eastern flank;
- Acceleration of the implementation of regional defense plans, part of NATO’s new deterrence and response strategy;
- Increased support for Ukraine, including through more robust supply lines for weapons, technical assistance, and operational intelligence sharing;
- Assessment of the readiness of Allied military capabilities in relation to the new concept of “multi-domain defense” (land, air, sea, space, cyber).
The meeting laid the groundwork for the next Summit, where additional member state contributions to the defense budget and the strengthening of NATO’s relations with global partners, particularly in the Pacific region, are expected to be formalized.
1. Persistence of the War in Ukraine – The conflict appears to be entering a phase of strategic attrition, with the risk of becoming a protracted “frozen conflict.” Russia continues to adapt its tactics, combining massive missile and drone strikes on civilian infrastructure with an offensive narrative in the international information space. NATO faces a dilemma: how to effectively support Ukraine without directly escalating the conflict.
2. Instability in the Middle East – The strategic rivalry between Israel and Iran has intensified, with the direct involvement of non-state actors supported by Tehran (Hezbollah, Houthis). The Gaza conflict has generated a wave of regional insecurity, and maritime security in the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz is constantly threatened.
A significant geopolitical and strategic development is the recent U.S. attack on key targets in Iran’s nuclear program, including uranium enrichment facilities and research centers suspected of developing nuclear weapons. The operation, conducted with high-precision means and supported by intelligence from regional partners, was limited but strategic: it sent a clear signal regarding the U.S. red line on nuclear proliferation in the region, while also raising risks of conflict escalation.
3. Escalating Tensions in the Indo-Pacific – Although NATO has no operational mandate in the Indo-Pacific, the meeting highlighted growing concerns about China’s actions: pressure on Taiwan, militarization of the South China Sea, indirect support for Russia, and the use of emerging technologies for surveillance, hybrid influence, and cyber espionage. NATO reaffirmed the need for enhanced cooperation with regional partners—Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand—to deter attempts to alter the status quo by force.
Despite demonstrated unity, NATO faces challenges regarding:
- Uneven defense budgets (not all states meet the 2% GDP[3] threshold);
- Persistent bilateral frictions (Turkey-Greece, Hungary-Ukraine, though the latter is not a NATO member), as well as positions expressed prior to the meeting by officials from Slovakia and Italy[4];
- The influence of domestic politics on military and intelligence efficiency.
A controversial issue was the impact of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) policies promoted in some Western structures. These are criticized for potentially undermining merit- and performance-based selection, to the detriment of operational efficiency—with possible negative effects in crisis situations.
- The importance of information superiority and rapid response at tactical, operational, and strategic levels is essential for the success of any operation.
- The need for genuine interoperability among member states’ military systems.
- Reevaluation of logistical capabilities.
- Strengthening air defense and anti-drone capabilities, based on lessons from Ukraine.
- The strategic and technological flexibility of the U.S. enables operations beyond the European theater.
- The relevance of preventive deterrence capabilities returns as a key point on the security agenda.
- Information warfare requires enhanced capacity to detect disinformation.
- Human resource policies must be reevaluated: meritocracy must take precedence.
- The need for genuine cooperation among Allied intelligence services.
- Strengthening protection against infiltrations and betrayals.
For Romania, the current context presents both opportunities and significant risks:
- Its geostrategic position on NATO’s eastern flank grants it a key role in deterring Russia. Accelerating military modernization is essential.
- Intelligence services must enhance their capacity for anticipation and protection of critical infrastructure.
Romania needs an updated national security doctrine based on real threats, which should include:
- Accelerating military modernization programs, with emphasis on ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) capabilities, drones, air defense, and A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) systems;
- Developing regional training and rapid response centers in cooperation with NATO allies;
- Strengthening logistical and strategic transport infrastructure along the Black Sea-Carpathians-Western Europe axis;
- Joint training and enhanced interoperability with NATO forces deployed in the region;
- Reassessing territorial defense strategies for potential medium-intensity, short-duration conflicts;
- Deepening and operationalizing bilateral partnerships within NATO;
- Rapidly rebuilding the defense industry (with immediate focus on ammunition production[5]) through firm and urgently implemented decisions.
Through professionalism, strategic coherence, and political will, Romania can play a role commensurate with its geographic position and the current historical context.
- Reevaluation of selection, training, and promotion processes within intelligence services, emphasizing meritocracy, professionalism, and accumulated experience;
- Rethinking operational-intelligence doctrines in an environment marked by hybrid wars and complex cyber threats, optimizing the TEHINT/HUMINT balance to better utilize human capital while considering financial constraints;
- Enhancing strategic anticipation capacity through operational partnerships with similar structures in NATO and EU states;
- Adapting the organizational culture of intelligence services to address new generations of threats, including narrative influence, disinformation, and covert non-military operations.
The NATO meeting in The Hague in 2025 was significantly influenced by the U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, which amplified global tensions and highlighted the fragility of international security. The decisions taken, from strengthening collective defense to intensifying intelligence cooperation, reflect NATO’s efforts to adapt to a volatile strategic environment. The Hague meeting reaffirms NATO as a cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic security. The Alliance faces a complex strategic equation: a conventional war in the East (Ukraine), asymmetric risks in the South (Middle East, North Africa), and systemic global competition with China. In this context, NATO’s ability to remain credible, cohesive, and effective will depend on modernizing doctrines, internal unity, and global projection capacity.
For Romania, this is an opportunity to position itself as a relevant regional actor, provided it has a clear strategic vision, an adapted defense policy, and a national security system aligned with NATO’s operational and value standards. It is also a moment for deep reflection on the quality of political and institutional leadership in defense and security, in an increasingly uncertain and unpredictable international context.
About the author:
Corneliu Pivariu is a highly decorated two-star general of the Romanian army (Rtd). He has founded and led one of the most influential magazines on geopolitics and international relations in Eastern Europe, the bilingual journal Geostrategic Pulse, for two decades. General Pivariu is a member of IFIMES Advisory Board.
Paper presented at the international webinar organized by EURODEFENSE – Bucharest, Romania, on June 26, 2025.
The article presents the stance of the author and does not necessarily reflect the stance of IFIMES.
Ljubljana/Brașov, 28 June 2025
[1] IFIMES – International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has Special Consultative status at ECOSOC/UN, New York, since 2018 and it’s publisher of the international scientific journal “European Perspectives”.
[2] Note on Methodology: This analysis was based on official NATO documents, public statements by Alliance leaders, and assessments published by international strategic and security think tanks such as RUSI, IISS, Foreign Affairs, Chatham House, RAND Corporation, and others.
[3] As of 2024, 23 out of the 32 NATO member states have reached or exceeded the 2% of GDP threshold for defense budgets. However, disparities persist: countries such as Spain (~1.3%), Canada, Italy, and Belgium still fall short of this level.
At the NATO Summit in The Hague (June 2025), a more ambitious target was adopted: 5% of GDP by 2035, divided into two components: 3.5% for direct military expenditures and 1.5% for infrastructure, cybersecurity, and resilience. The first intermediate report is scheduled for 2029, and some countries—such as Spain—have secured “flexibility” to align gradually. Only a few states (Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia) have already announced their commitment to reach 5% in the coming decades; most of the others have more ambitious goals than 2%, but remain below 3–4%.This transition marks a “quantum leap” in Europe’s defense capability and reflects both the political pressure from the United States and the strategic focus toward 2029–2035, in an increasingly tense global context.
[4] Recent statements from leaders of NATO member states have reflected differing visions for the Alliance’s future. Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico evoked the possibility of withdrawing from NATO “under certain conditions,” suggesting that neutrality could become a strategic option for his country (see: Euractiv Slovakia, June 2025).
Similarly, Italy’s Minister of Defense, Guido Crosetto, stated that “NATO no longer makes sense in its current form,” advocating for profound reform and for expanding the Alliance’s mission to include new strategic areas, including the Global South (La Repubblica, June 20, 2025). Although these statements do not represent the official positions of their respective governments, they reflect internal rhetoric that could influence perceptions of the Alliance’s unity.
[5] Although the war in Ukraine has already been ongoing for three years, the powder factory in Victoria (Brașov County), which has been in preservation since 2004, has still not been reactivated and is only now set to be rebuilt through a strategic partnership between ROMARM and the German company Rheinmetall.
The investment, estimated at over €400 million (including €47 million through the European ASAP program), aims to establish a modern production facility for energetic powders (TNT, RDX), with a projected completion date in 2027. Although the relaunch enjoys government support, the project faces structural difficulties: lack of active production, outdated infrastructure, recurring salary issues, and controversies surrounding the company's management—despite the high strategic importance for the national defense industry.
