International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)[1], based in Ljubljana, regularly monitors and analyzes developments in the Middle East, Balkans, and other regions worldwide. In this analysis titled “The Fractures of the World Order: Between the Civilizational Paradigm and Structural Analysis,” General (Retd.) Corneliu Pivariu examines how at the beginning of the third decade of the 21st century, the international system is increasingly characterized by the fragmentation and overlapping of multiple structural tensions that challenge traditional explanatory paradigms of global order. In this context, understanding contemporary transformations requires an integrative analytical framework capable of capturing the interaction between geopolitical, economic, technological, informational, and socio-internal fractures that jointly shape the dynamics of global power.
Motto: “International order does not collapse when it is defeated from the outside, but when it ceases to be sustained from within.” (conceptual adaptation based on reflections from classical realist thought)
The article proposes an integrative analytical framework for understanding the current transformations of the international system, starting from the limitations of the civilizational paradigm formulated by Samuel P. Huntington and the structural-anthropological analysis developed by Emmanuel Todd. In this context, the concept of “fractures of the world order” is introduced, defined as the dynamic interaction between multiple lines of tension – geopolitical, economic, energy-related, technological, informational, socio-internal, and civilizational – that structure the contemporary global environment.
The paper argues that power in the 21st century can no longer be explained through singular indicators, but through the ability of actors to simultaneously manage these fractures and to maintain internal coherence under conditions of systemic pressure. Within this framework, Romania’s position is analyzed, highlighting a convergence of structural vulnerabilities – ranging from economic and energy dependencies to institutional and informational dysfunctions – which reduce the capacity for autonomous decision-making and strategic projection.
The central conclusion is that the evolution of states no longer depends exclusively on resources or geographical positioning, but on the capacity to integrate and control these fractures within a coherent strategy, the difference between vulnerability and strategic relevance being determined primarily by the quality of internal decision-making.
At the beginning of the third decade of the 21st century, the world order can no longer be described through stable balances or one-dimensional paradigms, but rather through an accumulation of structural tensions that intersect and amplify one another.
In an effort to understand the profound transformations of the contemporary international system, the specialized literature has, in recent decades, provided two major interpretative frameworks: the civilizational paradigm, established by Samuel P. Huntington[2], and the structural-anthropological analysis recently developed by Emmanuel Todd.[3]
Although different in methodology and level of analysis, both models capture real dimensions of global dynamics; however, neither is sufficient, taken in isolation, to explain the complexity of the current world order. This requires an integrative approach, capable of capturing the simultaneous interaction of multiple types of tensions and discontinuities – which, within the present material, is conceptualized in the form of “fractures of the world order.”[4] The concept of “fractures” does not describe only lines of tension, but also mechanisms of interaction between them, within a dynamic logic in which vulnerabilities and strategic advantages are generated and amplified reciprocally.
Under the conditions of the transformations of the contemporary international system, neither the civilizational paradigm nor the structural analysis are sufficient, taken separately, to explain global dynamics; these can be adequately understood only through an integrative approach, based on the interaction between multiple fractures of the world order.
The model proposed by Huntington, formulated in the post–Cold War context, is based on the premise that the main lines of conflict in the world will no longer be ideological or economic, but civilizational. In this logic, cultural and religious identity becomes the fundamental determinant of state behavior and international alliances. The fault lines between civilizations – especially between the West and the Islamic world or between the West and the Sinic space – are considered the most likely zones of conflict. This paradigm had the merit of anticipating the revaluation of identity in international relations and of highlighting the limits of Western universalism. However, it tends to oversimplify reality, treating civilizations as relatively homogeneous blocs and underestimating the internal dynamics of states, as well as the economic and technological interdependencies that cross these cultural boundaries.[5] In reality, internal fractures within civilizations often become more relevant than those between them, affecting the strategic coherence of state actors.
In contrast, Emmanuel Todd proposes a radically different interpretation, centered on the internal structures of societies. His analysis is based on variables such as demography, level of education, family structure, and the evolution of religious or post-religious values. From this perspective, the decline of the West is not the result of an external conflict, but of a progressive internal erosion, manifested through declining birth rates, social fragmentation, loss of industrial capabilities, and the weakening of cultural cohesion. In his reading, the war in Ukraine is not the cause of this weakness, but merely a revealer of it. At the same time, Todd suggests that states such as Russia or China still benefit from more coherent social structures, capable of sustaining long-term strategic efforts.[6] The apparent stability of these actors may, however, mask latent structural vulnerabilities, which become visible under conditions of major systemic stress.
Nevertheless, Todd’s approach, although profound and innovative, presents its own limitations. It tends to minimize the role of classical geopolitical factors, such as military alliances, technological capacity, or control of strategic resources, and, in certain cases, to overestimate the stability of some non-Western actors. In addition, his analysis does not sufficiently integrate the informational dimension and narrative competition, which have become essential in the current era.
In this context, a conceptual synthesis becomes necessary, one that can overcome the limitations of these two paradigms and provide an analytical framework appropriate to contemporary complexity. The concept of “fractures of the world order” responds to this need, proposing a systemic vision in which global conflict is no longer reduced to a single explanatory dimension, but is understood as the result of the interaction between multiple lines of tension, constantly evolving. In analytical terms, these dynamics can be synthesized into a model of the seven fractures of the world order: geopolitical, economic, energy-related, technological, informational, socio-internal, and civilizational.
Thus, the current world order is characterized by the overlapping of multiple types of fractures. In geopolitical terms, the rivalry among major powers – especially between the United States, China, and Russia – shapes a long-term strategic competition, without, however, leading to a classical bipolarity.[7] In economic terms, an increasingly pronounced divide is emerging between economies dominated by financial capital and those oriented toward production, as well as between the Global North and the emerging South.[8] The energy dimension, in turn, introduces a critical fracture, in the context of the energy transition and competition for resources.[9]
In addition, the technological revolution generates a distinct fracture, between states capable of developing and controlling advanced technologies – artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, digital infrastructures – and those dependent on them.[10] Control over semiconductor production chains or access to strategic digital infrastructures becomes an instrument of power comparable to control over maritime routes in previous eras. In parallel, the informational dimension becomes an autonomous field of confrontation, in which states and non-state actors compete for control of narratives and the shaping of collective perceptions,[11] in many cases the perception of the outcome of a conflict becoming more important than the military outcome itself.
Finally, at the internal level, numerous states face their own fractures of cohesion, generated by political polarization, economic inequalities, and identity crises, internal fragmentation often reducing the capacity for external projection more than pressure from adversaries.[12] To these is added a fracture of a civilizational nature, reflecting persistent differences in values, identity, and models of political organization among major cultural spaces.
What fundamentally differentiates this approach from previous models is its integrative character. The fractures do not act in isolation, but generate chain amplification effects, in which vulnerabilities in one domain can produce disproportionate consequences in others. For example, an economic vulnerability may generate social instability, which in turn affects the strategic capacity of the state and makes it more vulnerable in geopolitical competition. Similarly, a technological dependency can be exploited informationally, generating effects on national security.
Within this framework, power can no longer be defined exclusively through classical indicators, such as military strength or economic size. It becomes the result of a complex combination of factors, in which internal cohesion, adaptive capacity, control of resources, and technological superiority are as important as the projection of force. In this context, power can be defined as the capacity of an actor to manage multiple systemic fractures simultaneously, maintaining internal cohesion and adaptive advantage in relation to adversaries. Moreover, strategic advantage does not necessarily belong to the most powerful actor in absolute terms, but to the most coherent and most capable of managing these multiple fractures simultaneously.
Therefore, if Huntington’s paradigm provided a map of global cultural differences, and Todd’s analysis highlighted the internal vulnerabilities of the West, the concept of “fractures of the world order” proposes a synthesis adapted to the realities of the 21st century. This allows not only a better understanding of international dynamics, but also the formulation of more nuanced strategies, capable of responding to the complexity of the current global environment.
In the current context of transformations within the international system, Romania’s positioning can no longer be assessed exclusively through classical indicators of security or economic development, but must be analyzed through the lens of its capacity to simultaneously manage the fractures that traverse the world order. From this perspective, Romania is not merely a peripheral actor of the system, but a state situated at the intersection of multiple lines of tension, which confers upon it both significant vulnerabilities and strategic opportunities.
In geopolitical terms, Romania is positioned on the frontier of the Euro-Atlantic space, in direct contact with the conflict zone generated by the confrontation between Russia and the West. Membership in NATO and the European Union provides security guarantees and access to mechanisms of strategic coordination; however, this integration is accompanied by a limited capacity for autonomous initiative in defining foreign policy.
In practice, Romania’s external profile is characterized more by alignment with positions formulated at the level of Euro-Atlantic structures than by the articulation of autonomous strategic objectives adapted to specific national interests. This tendency reduces diplomatic flexibility and the ability to capitalize on regional opportunities, particularly in areas of direct interest such as the Black Sea or relations with the eastern neighborhood.
At the same time, proximity to the conflict in Ukraine and the role of a frontline state confer increased strategic relevance upon Romania, but also exposure to security risks and external pressures. In the absence of a more proactive and coherent foreign policy, this positioning risks transforming geostrategic advantage into a peripheral-type vulnerability, characterized by a predominantly transit and implementation role, rather than that of an actor with influence capacity.
From an economic perspective, Romania reflects the characteristics of an integrated, yet structurally dependent economy, situated between the logic of industrial production and that of consumption sustained through external capital. Although it records economic growth and attracts investment, this evolution is accompanied by persistent imbalances, particularly a high trade deficit and dependence on external financing.
The structure of the economy indicates a predominantly peripheral integration into European value chains, with specialization in relatively low value-added activities and a limited capacity to control strategic sectors. At the same time, a growth model largely based on consumption, supported through budget deficits and imports, accentuates vulnerability to external shocks and reduces the room for maneuver of economic policies.
In the context of global economic fragmentation and tendencies toward production relocation, this positioning exposes Romania to the risk of remaining trapped in an intermediate zone, without the capacity to significantly advance within value chains, but also without consolidating its economic autonomy. In the absence of a coherent industrial policy and firmer control over strategic resources, this configuration tends to transform economic integration from an advantage into a source of vulnerability.
The energy fracture, in Romania’s case, reveals a structural contradiction between potential and the effective capacity to capitalize on it.[13] Although Romania possesses significant natural gas resources, including offshore developments in the Black Sea, as well as a diversified energy mix (nuclear, hydro, renewables), these advantages are partially neutralized by increasingly evident internal vulnerabilities.
On the one hand, the natural gas sector indicates the premises for consolidating relative autonomy and even a growing regional role, in the context of future exploitation. On the other hand, in the field of electricity, a structural deficit is already taking shape, driven by the decline of available production capacities, delays in the completion of strategic projects, and pressures generated by energy transition policies.
This dysfunction is amplified by a strategic incoherence in the management of resources, under conditions in which Romania finds itself simultaneously importing electricity during critical periods while supporting exports or deliveries to sensitive external spaces, such as the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. In the absence of a clear prioritization of internal energy security, this dynamic gradually transforms the energy domain from a potential strategic advantage into a systemic vulnerability, with direct implications for economic stability and the state’s resilience capacity.
In technological terms, Romania faces a clear fracture between its capacity to adapt and the lack of real control over critical technologies. Although it has a dynamic IT sector and well-trained human resources, dependence on infrastructures, platforms, and technologies developed outside the national space limits strategic autonomy. In a world where technological control becomes a determinant of power, this dependence may generate significant vulnerabilities, especially in areas such as cybersecurity or critical infrastructures.
The informational dimension highlights a growing structural vulnerability, determined by the inability to generate, sustain, and protect coherent strategic narratives within the public space. In the current context, international competition is no longer conducted solely in the military or economic domains, but also at the level of perceptions, where control of narratives becomes an essential instrument of power.
In Romania’s case, the informational space is characterized by a high degree of fragmentation and polarization, as well as by a significant dependence on external sources for the interpretation and validation of reality. In the absence of an institutional capacity consolidated around the “strategic shaping of narratives,” the state fails to coherently articulate and sustain its own positions, becoming rather a receiver and multiplier of externally generated discourses.
This situation is aggravated by exposure to disinformation and influence campaigns, but also by the emergence of an increasingly visible tension between the necessity of countering these phenomena and the risk of expanding mechanisms of control over information flows. In the absence of solid institutional safeguards, such tendencies may lead to the limitation of pluralism and the erosion of public trust, generating effects contrary to those intended.
Under these conditions, the perception of reality becomes a field of confrontation in which external actors can influence internal cohesion, strategic orientation, and even the legitimacy of political decision-making. In analytical terms, the informational fracture does not represent merely a sectoral vulnerability, but a multiplier of the other fractures, as it affects the state’s capacity to correctly interpret the strategic environment and to build internal consensus around fundamental objectives.
The socio-internal fracture represents one of the most sensitive dimensions of the vulnerability of the Romanian state, being the cumulative result of negative demographic, economic, and institutional developments. Beyond these trends, a determining factor is the degradation of the quality of the political class and the weakening of the functioning of representative institutions.
The political space is predominantly characterized by competition for access to resources and power, to the detriment of the coherent articulation of the national interest and the formulation of long-term strategies. Under these conditions, political decision-making often becomes fragmented, reactive, and dependent on electoral cycles, which reduces the state’s capacity to manage complex structural processes.
At the same time, the fundamental institutions of representative democracy show an erosion of their functional role. Parliament, although formally retaining its constitutional prerogatives, tends to be increasingly perceived as an actor with limited influence in the real decision-making process, while the transfer of power toward executive or informal areas reduces transparency and public accountability.
These developments are also reflected in international evaluations, where Romania is classified, in certain comparative analyses, as belonging to the category of hybrid regimes[14], which indicates a discontinuity between the formal institutional framework and the effective functioning of democracy.
Overall, this fracture affects not only social cohesion, but also the capacity of the state to formulate and implement coherent policies, transforming internal vulnerabilities into a multiplier factor of the other fractures – economic, energy, and geopolitical.
In civilizational terms, Romania is situated within the Western space, but with historical and cultural particularities that place it at an intersection of value systems. This positioning may generate ambivalences in relation to themes such as sovereignty, identity, or the relationship between the state and the individual. At the same time, it offers the possibility of serving as a bridge between different cultural spaces, if strategically leveraged.
Analyzed as a whole, these fractures do not act independently, but interconnect and amplify one another. Economic vulnerabilities may fuel social tensions, which in turn can be exploited informationally, affecting the strategic coherence of the state. Technological dependencies may generate security risks, while energy incoherence may have significant economic and geopolitical effects. In this sense, the main challenge for Romania is not the existence of these fractures, but the capacity to manage them in a coherent and integrated manner.
Within this framework, Romania’s position in the international system is not determined exclusively by its economic or military size, but by the level of internal coherence and its capacity for strategic adaptation. Romania is not condemned to the status of a vulnerable state, but neither can it become a relevant actor without a strategy that integrates these multiple dimensions.
Therefore, within the logic of the fractures of the world order, Romania may evolve in two distinct directions: either as a dependent state, affected by the intersection of vulnerabilities, or as a regional pivot state, capable of transforming its geographical position and available resources into a strategic advantage. The difference between these two trajectories will not be determined by the international context, but by internal decision-making capacity.
In a world in which power is defined by the management of fractures, Romania cannot afford the luxury of a reactive approach. Without a clear understanding of its own vulnerabilities and their interdependence, any strategy will remain fragmented. By contrast, an integrated approach, correlating geopolitical, economic, energy, technological, and social dimensions, can transform these fractures from sources of risk into instruments of strategic consolidation.
In this logic, Romania’s strategic vulnerability does not result from the intensity of a single fracture, but from their convergence and synchronization, within a cumulative model that reduces the capacity for autonomous decision-making and strategic projection.
The detailed analysis of these vulnerabilities, including economic, energy, demographic, and institutional dimensions, is already developed in another material dedicated to the multisectoral “assassination” of Romania, which will appear in a book currently in preparation, where these fractures are empirically highlighted. In this sense, the present analytical framework does not represent an exhaustive description, but a key for interpreting processes already manifested in concrete terms.
Therefore, if Huntington’s paradigm provided a map of global cultural differences, and Todd’s analysis highlighted the internal vulnerabilities of the West, the concept of “fractures of the world order” proposes a synthesis adapted to the realities of the 21st century. The current dynamics of the international system can no longer be understood through a single explanatory key, but only through the interdependent analysis of the tensions that simultaneously traverse the geopolitical, economic, energy, technological, informational, and social domains.
Within this framework, stability is no longer the result of a balance between comparable powers, but of the capacity of actors to manage complexity and to integrate these fractures into a coherent strategy. Power no longer belongs exclusively to the largest or the strongest, but to those who are the most coherent and most capable of defining and consistently pursuing their strategic objectives.
In a world defined not by equilibrium, but by the permanent intersection of fractures, international order will no longer be determined by dominance, but by the capacity to manage instability. Consequently, states that do not understand their own fractures will inevitably become the object of others’ strategies, while those that are able to integrate and control them will, in fact, define the architecture of the future world order.
Partea inferioară a formularului
About the author:
Corneliu Pivariu is a highly decorated two-star general of the Romanian army (Rtd). He has founded and led one of the most influential magazines on geopolitics and international relations in Eastern Europe, the bilingual journal Geostrategic Pulse, for two decades. General Pivariu is a member of IFIMES Advisory Board.
The article presents the stance of the author and does not necessarily reflect the stance of IFIMES.
Ljubljana/Brașov, 28 April 2026
[1] IFIMES - International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has a special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council ECOSOC/UN in New York since 2018, and it is the publisher of the international scientific journal "European Perspectives." Available at: https://www.europeanperspectives.org/en
[2] Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1996. See also the original article: “The Clash of Civilizations?”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3, 1993.
[3] Emmanuel Todd, Après l’Empire. Essai sur la décomposition du système américain, Gallimard, Paris, 2002; for recent developments regarding the decline of the West and the dynamics of the conflict in Ukraine, see his public interventions and analyses from the period 2022–2024.
[4] The concept of “fractures of the world order” is used in this study to describe the set of structural lines of tension that traverse the contemporary international system and which, through their interaction, determine the dynamics of power, stability, and the evolution of conflicts. Unlike one-dimensional explanatory models, this approach proposes an integrative perspective, in which geopolitical, economic, energy, technological, informational, social, and civilizational dimensions are analyzed in an interdependent manner.
[5] Although useful for understanding identity-based conflicts, the civilizational paradigm is partially contradicted by realities such as the intense economic cooperation between states belonging to different civilizations (for example, U.S.–China trade relations or interdependencies between the EU and states in the Middle East).
[6] The conflict in Ukraine (beginning in 2022) has demonstrated both Russia’s capacity for economic adaptation under sanctions and the West’s difficulties in achieving rapid and decisive results, highlighting the limits of classical instruments of pressure.
[7] The strategic rivalry between the United States and China manifests itself in the Indo-Pacific, while the confrontation between Russia and the West is concentrated in Eastern Europe, including the Black Sea region, with direct implications for regional security.
[8] The emergence of alternative mechanisms to the Western financial system (for example, BRICS initiatives regarding payment systems independent of SWIFT) reflects this emerging economic fracture.
[9] The energy crises generated by the conflict in Ukraine and tensions in the Middle East, including risks associated with the Strait of Hormuz, demonstrate the critical role of energy resources in global competition.
[10] Technological restrictions imposed on China by the United States (especially in the field of semiconductors) highlight the emergence of a global “technological curtain.”
[11] The informational warfare associated with the conflict in Ukraine and the narrative confrontations in the Middle East illustrate the importance of controlling perceptions in defining strategic outcomes.
[12] Political polarization in Western states and institutional fragilities in various regions highlight the fact that internal fractures can become decisive factors in the capacity for external projection of power.
[13] The concept of “secondary energy fracture” describes a situation in which a state’s vulnerability does not derive from the absence of energy resources, but from the mismatch between their availability, internal production capacity, and the infrastructure for their valorization, on the one hand, and the coherence of public policies and strategic prioritization, on the other.
In Romania’s case, this fracture becomes particularly visible in the electricity sector. If in 1989 the total installed capacity exceeded 22,000 MW, at present the effectively available capacity is significantly reduced, estimates indicating a decrease of at least 6,000–7,000 MW, as a result of the closure of certain energy units and delays in investments in new capacities. Consequently, Romania has become, in certain periods of high consumption, a net importer of electricity.
This evolution contrasts with the existing potential in the natural gas sector, especially through offshore projects in the Black Sea (Neptun Deep), which can consolidate Romania’s position as a regional supplier. However, the lack of correlation between the development of primary resources and the expansion of electricity production capacities generates a structural imbalance in the energy chain.
In analytical terms, this fracture reflects a discontinuity between resources, capacities, and strategic decision-making, constituting a specific form of systemic vulnerability within the model of the fractures of the world order.
[14] According to the Democracy Index 2024, published by the Economist Intelligence Unit, Romania is classified in the category of “hybrid regimes,” occupying positions around 70th place globally. This classification reflects the existence of a formal democratic institutional framework, but with significant dysfunctions regarding the quality of governance, the functioning of institutions, political culture, and the level of civic participation.
