Serbia 2026: Political consolidation and challenges ahead of the elections

The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)[1], based in Ljubljana, regularly monitors and analyses European integration processes and the evolving relations between the European Union and the Western Balkans. IFIMES assesses that Serbia is undergoing a period of intensive political transformation, marked by the simultaneous consolidation of executive power and institutional relations, deepening social polarisation and a redefinition of its relations with key international partners. The forthcoming electoral cycle, the pace of European integration and the continued policy of balancing among global actors will pose key challenges to institutional stability, the quality of democratic dialogue and Serbia’s future strategic orientation. Drawing on the analysis “Serbia 2026: Political consolidation and challenges ahead of the elections”, we highlight the key findings, which reflect current political trends, structural challenges and possible scenarios for the further development of Serbia’s domestic and foreign policy, as well as the future dynamics of EU enlargement policy. 

 

Serbia 2026: Political consolidation and challenges ahead of the elections

 

The International Institute IFIMES observes that Serbia’s political arena is undergoing a phase of intensive institutional and communication consolidation of executive power, accompanied by deepening social and political divisions and an increasingly stark confrontation between the ruling structures and the opposition bloc. Although fragmented and lacking clearly defined leadership, the opposition has developed a virtual social base and retains significant capacity for mobilisation through social media. This dynamic extends beyond political parties to include parts of the academic community, the media sector and civil society organisations, which in recent months have assumed a more active role in shaping political developments and public discourse.

In a climate in which almost every aspect of social life has acquired a political dimension, the student protests—though formally independent of party structures—should be analysed as a social phenomenon with clear political implications. In this respect, students have become relevant political actors, while the actions of Vladan Đokić, Rector of the University of Belgrade, can also be viewed within the broader political and social process currently shaping Serbia’s political landscape. These developments show that the boundaries between the academic, social and political spheres are becoming blurred, turning the university community into one of the key factors in the country’s contemporary political dynamics. Political competition is intense, with the public sphere marked by sharp confrontation, concentrated political power and rhetoric that impedes compromise and narrows the space for institutional dialogue.

In his statements, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić has repeatedly highlighted the idea of a “united Serbia”, political stability and freedom of opinion, placing strong emphasis on the need to preserve social peace, maintain stability, prevent violence and curb political radicalisation. Meanwhile, public discourse has seen the growing use of labels that frame political opponents and parts of civil society in terms of “colour revolutions”, “hybrid war” and “dehumanisation”, further deepening social tensions and narrowing the space for dialogue. One of the key challenges for Serbia in the coming period will be to ease social tensions, uphold institutional dialogue and prevent violence and political radicalisation.

Analysts note that Serbia’s public sphere is highly politicised, with the legitimacy of political actors across the political spectrum being contested simultaneously. The intense criticism directed at President Aleksandar Vučić, together with competing narratives about the role of the authorities and actors aligned with the opposition, points to deep social and political polarisation, further complicating institutional dialogue and making it harder to find room for compromise.

1. Internal political scene and electoral dynamics

The prospect of elections by the end of the year signals that Serbia is entering an intense pre-election period, with the political landscape already being shaped by a strong mobilisation narrative, heightened rhetorical confrontation and various political actors staking out clearer positions. At the same time, announcements regarding potential institutional reforms, especially in education and higher education, bring to the fore the broader question of the long-term redefinition of social elites, institutional relations and future models of governance.

President Aleksandar Vučić’s statement that he would “do everything to secure a parliamentary majority” to implement reforms prior to a potential departure from office is particularly significant. This message may be read as an attempt to consolidate key political processes, institutional arrangements and strategic directions of development before the possible end of the current political cycle.

The Serbian President’s statements reveal a distinct focus on media, academic and societal actors perceived as belonging to the opposition or critical public sphere. Against this backdrop, protests, rallies and various forms of civic engagement are increasingly framed as part of a broader political effort, amid mutual accusations of attempts to delegitimise institutions and the government.

As the elections approach, one of Serbia’s main challenges will be to preserve citizens’ trust in democratic institutions, expand the scope for pluralistic debate and prevent social divisions from deepening further. The pre-election environment may also lead to a further reshaping of the political scene, including the emergence of new participants and the redefinition of existing political initiatives.

In this context, some political and business circles are exploring whether one of Serbia’s most recognisable businessmen, Bogoljub Karić, founder of the Strength of Serbia Movement (PSS), could assume a more visible role. His decades of experience in delivering major development and investment projects across European, Asian and Middle Eastern markets constitute considerable social and business capital.

His potential return to a more active political role could shift the debate towards economic growth, building human capital, investment attraction, technological innovation and systemic educational reform. Initiatives targeting young people and students are drawing particular attention, including proposals for universal scholarships as part of a broader development policy built around knowledge, innovation and competitiveness.

However, the real political weight of any such engagement would depend on whether Karić could translate his business credibility and international experience into broader social support and tangible political mobilisation.

2. Foreign policy and regional relations

IFIMES notes that the proposed Franco-German initiative reflects growing internal dilemmas within the European Union over the pace, credibility and political viability of its enlargement policy. Allowing candidate countries that meet clearly defined criteria to access the Single Market before the formal completion of their full accession process can be seen as an attempt to move beyond “enlargement without enlargement” — a model in which candidate countries spend years implementing reforms without seeing visible and tangible benefits from European integration.

Seen in this light, the initiative represents an institutionalisation of certain elements of regional economic and political initiatives[2] previously championed by Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama, which have now secured broader political legitimacy through the EU framework. This approach suggests that the EU is looking for innovative models to bring the Western Balkans closer to European structures, while maintaining conditionality based on reform and the rule of law.

Relations between Serbia and its neighbours—particularly Montenegro—are increasingly marked by narratives concerning strained bilateral ties and the influence of external political and media factors on the internal political scene. At the same time, the status of Serbs in the region remains one of the central themes in Belgrade’s political discourse, with an emphasis on protecting their cultural, linguistic and identity rights.

Critical rhetoric towards the European Union and some European institutions, including objections to the work of the European Parliament’s rapporteur for Serbia, points to Serbia’s complex position between its strategic commitment to European integration and its efforts to preserve room for an autonomous foreign policy. This pursuit of balance remains a defining feature of Belgrade’s contemporary foreign policy.

The Venice Commission’s recent opinion[3] represents a positive institutional signal regarding Serbia’s progress in aligning its judicial system with European standards. According to available assessments, the fact that seven of the nine key recommendations have been fully implemented indicates a degree of institutional capacity to carry out rule-of-law reforms.

The opinion also notes that concrete steps had already been taken on the remaining two recommendations, with their full implementation now a matter of continued follow-through and institutional development. It is particularly important that the legislative amendments were prepared through consultations with relevant stakeholders, lending greater legitimacy to the reform measures.

For Serbia, this is an integral element of the European integration process, given that the rule of law remains one of the key benchmarks for progress towards EU membership. In the long term, however, the success of the reforms will be judged not only by the adoption of legislation, but primarily by their consistent application, stronger institutional independence, greater public trust in the judiciary and relations between official Belgrade and Pristina.

3. Serbia between domestic political consolidation and international balancing

Serbia is pursuing a multi-layered foreign policy designed to maintain relations with leading global actors—the European Union, the United States, the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China. Belgrade’s refusal to impose sanctions on Russia, while preserving close political, economic and security cooperation with Western partners, has become one of the defining features of its foreign policy strategy.

This approach affords Serbia a degree of diplomatic flexibility and room for manoeuvre in a complex international environment. However, it also generates heightened expectations and pressure from different international actors. As a result, foreign policy issues are increasingly becoming the subject of domestic political debate and of the wider contest over the country’s future strategic orientation.

Yet this approach also has its limits, especially in light of Serbia’s European integration process and EU expectations that Belgrade gradually align its foreign policy with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.

This stance is also evident in Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić’s public remarks, including in his article[4] addressed to US President Donald Trump and published by the US outlet Fox News. In the piece, Vučić underscores the need to maintain a balance among major powers while bolstering regional stability and international cooperation. It also turns to criticism levelled by segments of the European political establishment against the “America First” agenda, as well as to trends interpreted as a gradual distancing of some European actors from Washington. Against this backdrop, the text warns that weaker transatlantic relations could have consequences for Europe’s wider security architecture, while the European Union’s concept of “strategic autonomy” is viewed as a process of redefining the relationship between Brussels and Washington.

Serbia is meanwhile working to build a pragmatic relationship with the United States, including with the Donald Trump administration, despite the historical legacy and trauma of the 1990s. Belgrade seeks to frame its international position as a bridge between European and American interests, by fostering economic partnerships, attracting investment and deepening strategic cooperation grounded in regional stability and shared interests.

However, the long-term sustainability of this delicate balance will depend on Serbia’s ability to reconcile its European aspirations, its relations with Western partners and its existing ties with Russia and China. Managing this complex set of relationships will be one of the main challenges for Belgrade’s future foreign policy.

4. The economic pillar of political legitimacy and challenges to Serbia’s long-term stability

Serbia’s ruling structures derive a significant share of their political legitimacy from economic performance indicators, including wage and employment growth, infrastructure delivery, foreign investment inflows and the preservation of macroeconomic stability. Together, these factors underpin the political narrative of continuity in the current development model and of institutions capable of providing stability, attracting investment and creating a long-term economic outlook.

According to the latest projections by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Serbia retains a degree of macroeconomic resilience, with the recovery ongoing and economic activity expected to pick up gradually. The IMF estimates that real gross domestic product (GDP) growth could stand at around 2.8% in 2026, before accelerating to approximately 4% in 2027, supported by investment activity, infrastructure projects, stronger export potential and the recovery of certain sectors of the economy.

The IMF also considers inflationary pressures to be relatively contained, while warning of possible risks linked to energy price volatility, global market disruptions and geopolitical uncertainty. The National Bank of Serbia’s monetary policy is expected to remain central to safeguarding price stability and keeping inflation within the medium-term target range.

In June 2026, the IMF concluded the third review[5] under the Policy Coordination Instrument (PCI) for Serbia, noting that key fiscal and reform objectives had been met. The Fund gives particular weight to continued reforms in public finances, public investment management, the energy sector and the business environment. In the IMF’s assessment, the long-term sustainability of economic growth will depend on Serbia’s ability to further strengthen its institutional framework, raise productivity, improve competitiveness and create a more stable environment for private-sector development.

According to available economic projections, Serbia could overtake Croatia in nominal GDP terms in 2026 and further consolidate its position as region’s largest economy by 2027. This would further confirm its status as the leading economic player in the Western Balkans and a pivotal factor in regional economic stability. However, the long-term sustainability of this position will depend not only on the rate of economic growth, but also on Serbia’s ability to translate growth into inclusive development, reduce regional disparities, reinforce institutional capacity, build energy resilience and improve the overall competitiveness of its economy.

At the same time, perceptions of economic progress are not shared equally across all sections of society. Regional development gaps, the rising cost of living, limited access to economic opportunities and a sense of social insecurity among segments of the population leave room for differing interpretations of the results achieved. Economic indicators may help underpin political legitimacy, but they are not the only criterion by which citizens judge the success of public policy. Structural challenges also weigh heavily in this assessment, including demographic trends, labour outflows, productivity levels and the quality of the contribution made by foreign investment to long-term development.

Energy-sector stability is a strategic issue in its own right. In this context, the agreement between the Serbian government and the Hungarian company MOL on the future ownership structure of the Petroleum Industry of Serbia (NIS) becomes especially relevant. A further five-percentage-point increase in the Serbian ownership stake could improve the state’s position in the strategic management of energy resources and serve as a tool for strengthening energy security, supply stability and the protection of long-term economic interests.

The International Institute IFIMES assesses that Serbia is entering a phase of intense political mobilisation ahead of the announced early parliamentary elections, accompanied by a continued concentration of political decision-making and a further deepening of social divisions. The authorities base their legitimacy largely on messages of political stability, economic development, the protection of national interests and sovereign decision-making. By contrast, critical and opposition actors raise concerns about the quality of democratic dialogue, media pluralism, institutional balance and transparency in decision-making.

The main challenge in the period ahead will be the ability of the political system to preserve institutional stability while reducing social tensions, creating space for broader political dialogue and more inclusive decision-making. The forthcoming elections will test not only the democratic maturity of institutions, but also the willingness of all political actors to ground political competition in programmes, policy proposals and concrete results rather than in exacerbating conflict and social divisions.

Serbia is entering a period in which political stability will depend not only on the authorities’ ability to manage institutions, but also on the capacity of the entire system to restore trust between citizens and state structures. The quality of that relationship will be one of the decisive indicators of the country’s long-term stability, democratic consolidation and overall social development.

5. Western Balkans: a new dynamic in European integration through early access to the Single Market

The recent Franco-German non-paper on the Western Balkans and Moldova marks a notable shift in the European Union’s approach to the future of enlargement policy. This initiative is particularly relevant because it offers candidate countries the prospect of accessing specific segments of the EU Single Market upon meeting clearly defined criteria, before the full accession process is formally completed.

If turned into concrete policy, this concept could move the current approach beyond a model based primarily on lengthy reform processes and towards a model of gradual, functional integration. For candidate countries, this would mean earlier economic and institutional benefits, a stronger incentive to carry out reforms and a narrower gap between the formal accession process and actual integration into European structures.

A new phase in European policy towards the Western Balkans could rest on stronger economic connectivity as an instrument of political stabilisation, greater regional resilience and faster progress towards the EU. The model’s success, however, will depend on transparent criteria, equal treatment of all candidates and the European Union’s ability to offer a credible long-term prospect of full membership, rather than only selective inclusion in individual European mechanisms.

At the same time, such an approach also carries certain risks. It could create a perception of “second-class membership”, with candidate countries gaining limited access to economic benefits without full institutional participation in EU decision-making. Further challenges include preserving rule-of-law standards, preventing reform criteria from being watered down and avoiding the political conditioning of economic rapprochement.

Should the new European initiatives be implemented in line with the principles of equality, clear rules and measurable reform outcomes, they could represent a meaningful step towards overcoming the limits of the current enlargement policy. After 2026, relations between the Western Balkan countries, European institutions and the region’s societies are likely to undergo further transformation. The success of that process will depend on whether political actors can forge a broader consensus anchored in institutional stability, democratic dialogue and a clear European perspective.

Ljubljana/Washington/Brussels/Belgrade, 22 June 2026      


[1] IFIMES - International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has a special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council ECOSOC/UN in New York since 2018, and it is the publisher of the international scientific journal "European Perspectives." Available at: https://www.europeanperspectives.org/en

[2] Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Das wäre ein realistischer Weg in die EU (That would be a realistic path into the EU). Available at: https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/serbien-und-albanien-ein-realistischer-weg-in-die-eu-accg-110845507.html

[3] Serbia: Venice Commission assesses legislative amendments to laws governing the judiciary and the prosecution. Available at: https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/venice-commission-assesses-legislative-amendments-to-laws-governing-the-judiciary-and-the-prosecution

[4] Fox News: President Aleksandar Vučić: Europe vilifies Trump, but we in Serbia see a friend, Available at:  https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/president-aleksandar-vui-europe-vilifies-trump-serbia-see-friend

[5] IMF Staff Reaches Staff-Level Agreement on the Third Review under the Policy Coordination Instrument with Serbia. Available at: https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2026/05/06/pr26140-serbia-imf-staff-reaches-staff-level-agreement-on-the-3rd-review-under-the-pci?utm_source