The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)[1], based in Ljubljana, regularly monitors and analyses political, economic and geopolitical developments in the Middle East, the Balkans, Europe and across the world. In its latest research, IFIMES views the political situation in Kosovo through the lens of repeated elections, institutional paralysis and the absence of a sustainable political compromise, which together have created a state of “permanent electoral crisis”. The analysis pays particular attention to the role of key political actors, the involvement of international stakeholders and the growing influence of young people and the diaspora against the backdrop of prolonged political instability. The research “Kosovo facing its third election in 18 months: between cyclical institutional instability and a “permanent electoral crisis” identifies the following key findings and assessments.
Kosovo’s early parliamentary elections, scheduled for 7 June 2026, are taking place amid a protracted institutional crisis, frequent electoral cycles and deep political polarisation. This is the third parliamentary cycle in a short span of time — or, when local elections are included, the fifth electoral process within the last 18 months — pointing to the structural instability of the political system and the persistent difficulty of establishing stable parliamentary majorities.
IFIMES had already identified these trends in its research “Kosovo ahead of the 2026 early parliamentary elections: between institutional crisis and a cycle of political instability” (https://www.ifimes.org/en/researches/kosovo-ahead-of-the-2026-early-parliamentary-elections-between-institutional-crisis-and-a-cycle-of-political-instability/5871? ).
Twenty-two political parties are participating in the elections, including three Serbian lists and three coalitions. The electorate numbers 2,092,174, of whom 131,800 are registered abroad, while Kosovo’s population, according to the 2024 census, stands at 1,586,659. The discrepancy between the number of voters and the total population has also prompted debate about the composition of the electorate, which is characterised by a predominantly young demographic.
The elections are taking place across 38 municipalities and in 36 countries worldwide, with the cost estimated at around EUR 12 million. The Kosovo Assembly has 120 MPs, including 20 seats reserved for minority communities, while Albanian parties must pass a 5% electoral threshold and a parliamentary majority requires 61 seats.
The main political actors remain Albin Kurti’s Self-Determination Movement (LVV), the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) and the Serb List, the dominant representative of the Serbian community, with limited but significant political influence.
The platforms of the main political options may be summarised as follows:
Supporters of the Serb List see it as a key political mechanism for safeguarding the Serbian community and its institutional position in Kosovo, while critics argue that its strong political and organisational links with official Belgrade may restrict political pluralism within the Serbian community.
International stakeholders – the European Union, the United States and NATO – still play a decisive role in Kosovo’s political life, but are increasingly operating through a model of crisis management and stabilisation, rather than as direct drivers of long-term institutional consolidation and democratic transformation.
Young people and the diaspora are increasingly shaping Kosovo’s political dynamics, emerging as one of the pivotal forces in the country’s electoral and social development. Kosovo’s demographic structure, marked by a particularly young population, coupled with a substantial number of citizens living and working abroad, gives these groups considerable influence over political processes and electoral outcomes.
Kosovo is often cited as the country with the youngest population in Europe. Residents under the age of 25 make up approximately 55.9% of the total population, or around 890,000 citizens, giving young people greater political weight and the potential to shape the country’s future development path.
At the same time, the diaspora constitutes a vital political, economic and social resource. Although estimates differ depending on the methodology used, between 700,000 and 900,000 people of Kosovo origin are believed to live abroad, a figure equivalent to nearly half the number of residents currently living in Kosovo. Through voting rights and growing political mobilisation, the diaspora is becoming an indispensable factor in electoral processes, while its financial and social reach continues to reinforce the bonds between Kosovo and its citizens worldwide.
A number of electoral analyses suggest that Albin Kurti and the Self-Determination Movement have traditionally commanded strong support among younger voters and a substantial part of the diaspora.
This support is most commonly attributed to anti-corruption rhetoric, a platform built around institutional reform, calls for greater transparency in the public sector and a strongly sovereigntist approach to politics.
On the other hand, critics of Kurti’s policies argue that his record on economic development and international relations has not always lived up to the high expectations raised among voters.
The latest electoral cycle, with the country heading into its third parliamentary elections in 18 months, confirms the assessment that its political system is caught in a state of permanent electoral instability. Elections are functioning less as a mechanism for consolidating government and more as a means of reproducing political crisis.
Although the Self-Determination Movement (LVV) won an absolute majority in the previous elections, the failure to establish stable institutions — most notably in the process of electing the president — exposes a central paradox of Kosovo’s political scene: electoral victory does not translate into political stability.
This confirms the previously observed trend of shifting from a model of an “electoral democratic cycle” to a pattern of post-election institutional deadlock, in which political competition does not conclude with the formation of government but instead persists in the form of a permanent institutional stalemate.
Frequent electoral cycles over a short period have turned early elections into a de facto regular political mechanism, altering the very nature of the democratic process.
Rather than building stable institutions, Kosovo is developing a pattern in which political forces fail to reach a sustainable compromise, institutional deadlines become crisis triggers and elections lose their stabilising function. This political dynamic is now often referred to as cyclical institutional instability.
As earlier IFIMES research has also indicated, the prolonged institutional crisis is increasingly shaping international perceptions of Kosovo as an “unfinished political community”, in which electoral legitimacy is not matched by genuine governing capacity.
Statements by key international stakeholders, including the European Union and the United States, reflect concern over recurring institutional deadlocks, the absence of political compromise and the gradual erosion of state institutions’ functionality.
In this context, Kosovo is seen as a system that has been stabilised in security terms, while remaining politically volatile.
IFIMES had previously noted a trend in which international stakeholders are moving steadily away from direct management of political processes. The new approach adopted by the United States and parts of the European Union prioritises the strengthening of local accountability, reduced interventionism and a focus on maintaining a security baseline, while gradually abandoning the practice of political engineering.
While this pivot places greater responsibility on domestic institutions, it may exacerbate internal deadlocks if political consensus fails to emerge.
Kosovo’s central structural problem lies in the absence of a political culture of compromise. This is reflected in the personalisation of political conflicts, the lack of even a minimum consensus on institutional continuity and the dominance of short-term political calculations over long-term state interests.
In such circumstances, elections do not resolve the crisis, but continue to reproduce it in new cycles.
Kosovo has entered a phase in which elections seldom produce stable or functional governments, serving instead to expose the deeply embedded structural weaknesses within the political and institutional system. Without a sustainable political compromise and an effective institutional framework, the country stays mired in a protracted transition, marked by recurring political blockages and cyclical instability. Some political actors argue that the policy pursued by Kosovo’s former president, Vjosa Osmani, contributed to certain international disagreements and additional tensions with some Western partners, while failing to make a tangible contribution to strengthening the country’s state sovereignty or international standing.
Current political indicators suggest that the Self-Determination Movement (LVV) remains the main favourite. The party aims to secure more than 500,000 votes, intending to bolster its mandate to overcome existing institutional deadlocks. Given its decisive victories in previous electoral cycles, the movement maintains its position as the pre-eminent political force in the country.
The Serb List continues to hold a dominant position within the Serbian community, maintaining close political ties with Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and serving as the principal political representative of the majority of Kosovo Serbs.
Meanwhile, opposition parties have mostly failed to demonstrate sufficient political vitality or offer a convincing and coherent programmatic alternative, and are caught in the patterns of their own political history. Among parts of the public, they are often seen as a continuation of earlier political structures linked to allegations of corruption, clientelism, institutional inefficiency and political compromise. Consequently, the political scene is marked by the absence of a new generation of opposition leaders, a clear strategic vision and a credible political platform.
Against this backdrop, voter turnout could have a decisive impact on the final election result, given the pronounced social apathy and the growing sense of political detachment within society.
Young people and the diaspora are a particularly important political factor, and their influence on elections continues to grow. The support enjoyed by the Self-Determination Movement among these categories of voters largely stems from the perception that it offers the strongest political response to corruption, organised crime and clientelist structures. In this context, debates on expanding youth political participation have become more prominent, including proposals to lower the voting age to 16 and to improve mechanisms for the diaspora’s political representation.
The International Institute IFIMES assesses that, without a fundamental shift in political logic — moving from a culture of confrontation towards one of compromise and institutional cooperation — Kosovo will stay trapped in a state of “permanent electoral crisis”. This limits the country's capacity to accelerate essential reforms and progress towards membership of the European Union and NATO, despite the continued support of key Western partners.
Any further delay in post-election political consolidation and the establishment of stable institutions strengthens the arguments of political and geopolitical actors who depict Kosovo as a functionally contested or institutionally unfinished system. In this respect, the ability of political elites to reach a sustainable institutional compromise after the elections is not merely a domestic political matter, but a critical indicator of the country’s international credibility, democratic maturity and the long-term viability of its statehood.
At the same time, the dialogue between official Belgrade and Pristina, mediated by the European Union, should continue and be successfully concluded through the signing of a comprehensive, legally binding agreement on the normalisation of relations. Such an outcome would represent the most significant contribution to long-term stability, peace and security in the Western Balkans.
Ljubljana/Washington/Brussels/Pristina, 4 June 2026
[1] IFIMES - International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has a special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council ECOSOC/UN in New York since 2018, and it is the publisher of the international scientific journal "European Perspectives." Available at: https://www.europeanperspectives.org/en
