The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)[1], based in Ljubljana, regularly monitors and analyses political, economic and geopolitical developments in the Middle East, the Balkans and in global political processes. In this analysis, IFIMES examines Bosnia and Herzegovina through the lens of the United States’ strategic shift towards the concept of “managed stability”, the redefined role of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and intensified geopolitical competition in the Western Balkans. In this context, Bosnia and Herzegovina is described as a space of “stability without development”, an environment in which the security framework has been preserved, while institutional consolidation and Euro-Atlantic integration continue to be structurally delayed or obstructed. The following are the key segments from the extensive analysis entitled “Brussels decides: Bosnia and Herzegovina between the Belgian model of European integration and the paradigm of permanent managed stability on the EU periphery”.
The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) examines developments in and around Bosnia and Herzegovina in light of the latest Report to Congress[2] on United States Policy to Promote Regional Stability and Prosperity in the Western Balkans, an opinion piece[3] by former High Representatives Carl Bildt and Wolfgang Petritsch published in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the candidacy of Italian diplomat Antonio Zanardi Landi for the position of the new High Representative, the visit of European Council President António Costa and the forthcoming European Union–Western Balkans summit, to be held on 5 June 2026 in Tivat, Montenegro. Against this backdrop, the analysis focuses on the transformation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political and security framework amid intensified geopolitical competition and a redefinition of transatlantic policy.
The latest State Department report confirms a strategic shift in United States policy, moving away from “nation-building” towards a concept of managed stability and economic pragmatism. This pivot signals an abandonment of ambitious deep institutional transformation projects in favour of maintaining a minimum level of political and security stability.
For Bosnia and Herzegovina, this translates into a reduction in direct US political engagement, a focus on preserving the security minimum and the gradual transfer of greater responsibility to domestic political actors. This approach creates a paradox: while it ensures formal stability, it fails to create the preconditions for genuine institutional consolidation of the state. As a result, Bosnia and Herzegovina remains trapped in a state of prolonged political transition.
The report also confirms continued US support for the Dayton Peace Agreement, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while noting that a serious security and political crisis was averted during 2025. This approach primarily reflects the logic of crisis management rather than long-term crisis resolution.
In the view of IFIMES, Bosnia and Herzegovina remains secure, yet politically blocked. International actors continue to focus on preserving stability and preventing the escalation of conflict, while institutional reform, state functionality and democratic consolidation are secondary concerns. This sustains a model of “stability without development”, which keeps Bosnia and Herzegovina in a state of permanent political incompleteness and limits its ability to realise its full institutional and European potential.
The potential appointment of Italian diplomat Antonio Zanardi Landi as the new High Representative would signal the continued gradual transformation of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) – from a conventionally interventionist role towards a more facilitative model of engagement. Such a pivot would imply a gradual curtailment of the use of the Bonn powers, a stronger EU-compatible approach and a focus on preserving a baseline level of political stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
IFIMES assesses that the OHR is increasingly functioning as an instrument for managing political stagnation, rather than a driver of substantive structural reforms and profound state transformation.
Academician Mirko Pejanović, a member of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1996), believes the OHR to be a key guarantor of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s stability, peace and European perspective. He argues that any potential closure of the office before the basic requirements for European Union membership have been fulfilled would pose a serious risk to the state’s further political and institutional development.
Pejanović advocates an approach in which the OHR and the European Union would act in coordination, jointly steering a reform process that could steadily guide Bosnia and Herzegovina closer to full EU membership over the coming decade.
The new High Representative Antonio Zanardi Landi comes from the Sovereign Order of Malta, an institution steeped in a historical legacy linked to the Crusades. This further complicates the political and symbolic sensitivity of the position, given the ethnic and religious structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s population. Tomaž Mastnak[4] has written extensively on this subject, and his conclusions suggest that, in light of the historical relationship between Christianity and Islam, certain ideological and symbolic patterns from the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina may be interpreted as part of a long-standing European anti-Muslim discourse which, in some respects, echoes the legacy of the Crusades, while clearly noting that the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be reduced solely to a religious or crusading conflict.
Historically, the Sovereign Order of Malta’s most prominent contacts were with Russia, where the Romanovs developed the Order’s closest institutional and political relationship in Europe.
This relationship became particularly close between 1798 and 1801, when Russian nobles were even incorporated into the Order’s structures. It represented a rare example of convergence between the aristocratic and chivalric institutions of the time.
The Sovereign Order of Malta also maintained ties with the Karađorđević dynasty, although these contacts were primarily institutional, humanitarian and diplomatic in nature, lacking the forms of patronage or strategic alliance historically associated with the Romanovs. Both the Romanovs and the Karađorđević dynasty belong to the circle of European Orthodox royal dynasties that, despite the Order’s Catholic character, had long-standing relations with the Sovereign Order of Malta.
One of the principal criticisms levelled at the West concerns the fact that the post of High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina has often been held by representatives of countries that were on the side of the defeated powers in the Second World War. Since Bosnia and Herzegovina, as part of the former Yugoslavia, stood with the victorious coalition, there is a clear emphasis on the need for greater consideration of “soft power” in the selection and work of future international representatives.
In the new geopolitical landscape, sanctions are re-emerging as a central instrument of Western policy towards the Western Balkans.
IFIMES identifies three parallel processes: the possible reintroduction of US sanctions against Milorad Dodik (SNSD) and his associates in the event of a further escalation of political tensions, threats to peace and challenges to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s state institutions; the potential reactivation or expansion of previously lifted sanctions as part of a recalibration of US policy in the region; and the possibility that the European Union, following political changes in its member states and a hardening of its restrictive stance, may introduce or coordinate new measures against actors destabilising Bosnia and Herzegovina. This could include expanding the existing sanctions already imposed by certain European Union member states on Dodik and his inner circle, coupled with tighter scrutiny of financial flows.
The US Embassy in Sarajevo has already responded[5], stating that the reintroduction of sanctions against Milorad Dodik and other Republika Srpska officials is under consideration if their actions are once again deemed to undermine stability and the peace process.
In this context, IFIMES points out that recent political changes in Hungary — including the fall of Viktor Orbán’s regime and Fidesz, alongside the dismantling of prior blocking mechanisms within the European Union — could create room for a redefinition of European sanctions policy towards the Western Balkans. This would also facilitate closer alignment with the US approach, in which the new Hungarian Prime Minister Péter Magyar of the Tisza party could play an important role.
Against this backdrop, IFIMES emphasises the need for the European Union to impose targeted sanctions on Milorad Dodik and his inner circle, together with enhanced monitoring of financial flows to ensure more efficient and precise implementation of restrictive measures. At the same time, it suggests that the EU should view Dodik primarily through the lens of final court rulings and allegations of involvement in wider networks of corrupt and criminal activity. In IFIMES’s assessment, such an approach could have a stronger practical impact than the measures applied to date by the US administration.
An opinion piece by former High Representatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina Carl Bildt and Wolfgang Petritsch, published in the German daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) under the title “Bosnia and Herzegovina no longer needs international administration” (Bosnien-Hercegovina braucht die internationale Verwaltung nicht mehr), is an important signal in the international debate on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s future, especially following the resignation of High Representative Christian Schmidt and the ongoing re-evaluation of the role of international governance in the post-Dayton order.
Starting from the view that, three decades after the Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina remains trapped in a political limbo between formal sovereignty and permanent international oversight, the authors argue that the OHR has gradually evolved from a temporary mechanism into a long-standing institution whose legitimacy and operational effectiveness are increasingly under scrutiny.
IFIMES assesses that the article raises an important and legitimate question concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina’s transition from a model of international tutelage to a model based on the full political responsibility of domestic institutions. At the same time, it stresses that any eventual closure of the OHR would have to be carefully phased and aligned with the strengthening of the rule of law, the functionality of state institutions and the acceleration of the European integration process. Otherwise, it could further destabilise the existing institutional framework.
The fact that this perspective is offered by two former High Representatives gives it particular weight, pointing to a shift in perception within parts of the international community and to a growing belief that the existing model of international administration needs a new conceptual framework — though this contribution may also be interpreted through the lens of lobbying. The security and geopolitical realities in the Western Balkans call for caution and the avoidance of hasty moves, so that the process of redefining international engagement does not produce an institutional vacuum that could be exploited by destabilising political actors.
IFIMES believes that the debate on the future of the OHR cannot be reduced to the question of its formal existence. It should instead focus on building a sustainable institutional model that would provide Bosnia and Herzegovina with stability, functionality and a credible path towards full integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures. This also raises questions about the consistency and effectiveness of the international community’s approach to date.
Petritsch’s assessments of the OHR, state property and political actors are also seen as reflecting a long-standing dilemma surrounding the international presence. On the one hand, the OHR has lost a significant degree of its transformative capacity; on the other, Bosnia and Herzegovina still lacks a clearly defined exit strategy from international administration, while ethno-political elites continue to consolidate their positions. This further raises concerns regarding the responsibility and consistency of international actors in the process of building a functional state.
The International Institute IFIMES assesses that the OHR today functions more as a symbol of the continuity of the international presence than as an instrument of its substantive transformation. In this respect, the opinion piece by the two former High Representatives may be viewed as a contribution to the broader international discourse on redefining the role of international institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, rather than as a unilateral platform or an attempt to dismantle the existing constitutional and institutional arrangement. The question of the efficiency and strategic consistency of the international community in managing the post-Dayton order, however, remains open.
The European Union is entering a phase of “phased enlargement”, defined by a combination of security and energy conditionality, efforts to strengthen the geopolitical resilience of candidate countries and a slow, selective integration process. Within this framework, Bosnia and Herzegovina faces a real risk of remaining in the status of a permanent candidate without substantive institutional progress, if it fails to reach internal political consensus.
The EU–Western Balkans summit, to be held on 5 June in Tivat, is one of the central political events for the future of the European continent in recent years, particularly regarding the European Union’s redefinition of its enlargement policy. The meeting comes at a moment of marked dualism in the EU: institutional fatigue and internal political divisions persist, while the geopolitical imperatives to stabilise Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans are becoming increasingly urgent.
Against this backdrop, the Rama–Vučić initiative[6] — which enjoys the support of some European political actors, including advocates of accelerated enlargement — may be seen as one possible way of adapting the European integration process to new geopolitical circumstances. A model of “phased integration” is also gaining traction in European circles, under which Western Balkan countries could join the EU without full veto rights during the initial or transitional phase of membership.
This concept, also described as a form of limited sovereignty in decision-making, is an attempt to overcome the long-standing deadlocks in enlargement policy arising from the principle of consensus in European Union decision-making.
Should the European Union fail to strike a balance between institutional efficiency and geopolitical responsibility, there is a genuine risk that the Western Balkans will remain permanently positioned as a “strategic space of delayed integration”, without a clear membership timeframe.
Consequently, the region is emerging as a theatre of intense great-power competition. The United States prioritises the preservation of stability and a baseline of security, the European Union focuses on selective integration and controlled enlargement, while Russia and China operate through alternative political and economic channels of influence, leveraging networks of regional partners and actors.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is the most vulnerable point in this configuration, owing to its pronounced institutional fragmentation, political polarisation and a high degree of dependence on external actors.
The latest US approach further reinforces market logic and investment priorities through infrastructure and energy projects such as the Southern Gas Interconnection and a stronger US economic presence. For Bosnia and Herzegovina, this means both greater reform demands and the risk of falling further behind economically if political deadlock and institutional instability persist.
The combination of the US policy of “managed stability”, a redefined OHR under Antonio Zanardi Landi, the European Union’s selective enlargement model following the Tivat summit and the possible escalation of sanctions against key political actors, including Milorad Dodik, together with the potential coordination of new restrictive measures within the European Union, creates a framework of “controlled uncertainty” in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It also points to the full complexity of relations within and around the country.
Under these circumstances, IFIMES assesses that Bosnia and Herzegovina has been stabilised in security terms, but is still institutionally unfinished and strategically dependent on external centres of power. Brussels effectively determines the course of its future within the European Union: whether BiH will be integrated under a model similar to Belgium, with full institutional capacity and participation, or remain on the periphery of the European space, in a status that certain analytical frameworks compare with Ukraine in the context of the European integration process.
Ultimately, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s future hinges on whether it will move towards becoming a self-sustaining, functional state or persist over the long term in a zone of internationally managed stability, with sanctions mechanisms applied periodically as a tool for regulating political conduct. In this regard, the OHR appears neither as a definitive solution nor as the source of the problem, but as a symptom of an unfinished international-domestic political arrangement with no clearly defined endgame.
Ljubljana/Washington/Brussels, 3 June 2026
[1] IFIMES - International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has a special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council ECOSOC/UN in New York since 2018, and it is the publisher of the international scientific journal "European Perspectives." Available at: https://www.europeanperspectives.org/en
[2] US Department of State: Report to Congress on United States Policy to Promote Regional Stability and Prosperity in the Western Balkans. Available at:
[3] FAZ: Bosnien-Hercegovina braucht die internationale Verwaltung nicht mehr. Christian Schmidts Rückzug bietet die Chance für eine grundlegende Neuausrichtung (Bosnia and Herzegovina no longer needs international administration. Christian Schmidt’s withdrawal offers the opportunity for a fundamental realignment). Available at: https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/europa-braucht-einen-neustart-in-bosnien-hercegovina-accg-200858237.html
[4] Tomaž Mastnak, Kristjanstvo in muslimani (Christianity and Muslims), Ljubljana: Znanstveno in publicistično središče, 1996.
[5] TV N1: US Embassy eyes return to sanctions for Dodik, new High Rep expected in June. Available at: https://n1info.ba/english/news/us-embassy-eyes-return-to-sanctions-for-dodik-new-high-rep-expected-in-june/?utm_source=chatgpt.com
[6] Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Das wäre ein realistischer Weg in die EU (That would be a realistic path to the EU). Available at: https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/serbien-und-albanien-ein-realistischer-weg-in-die-eu-accg-110845507.html
