The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)[1], based in Ljubljana, regularly analyses developments in the Middle East, the Balkans and wider global political affairs. The current crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina extends beyond the country’s domestic political framework and forms part of a broader geopolitical contest that is shaping the future security architecture of the Western Balkans and Europe. Drawing on its comprehensive analysis entitled “Bosnia and Herzegovina 2026: Between Euro-Atlantic integration and destabilisation policies”, we highlight the following key findings and assessments.
Against the backdrop of mounting political and security challenges in Bosnia and Herzegovina, attempts to undermine state institutions, persistent threats of secession and the forthcoming general elections scheduled for 4 October 2026, the International Institute IFIMES analyses the main political processes, risks and prospects for the country’s future trajectory.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is now facing one of its most significant political and security junctures since the end of the war. Available public opinion surveys suggest that most citizens support the country’s European path, stronger institutions and economic progress. Certain political actors, however, use institutional blockades and manufactured crises as tools for political mobilisation, maintaining power and stalling reform processes.
Among the key threats to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s stability are policies that challenge its constitutional order, territorial integrity and the competences of state institutions. These are primarily pursued by parts of the political establishment in Republika Srpska, led by Milorad Dodik (SNSD), which have for years disputed the state’s constitutional framework, the powers of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s institutions and the international obligations stemming from its constitutional and international legal status.
Although a final and binding court ruling barred him from holding public office, Dodik continues to seek to preserve his political influence and remains one of the most significant power brokers in Republika Srpska. He also continues to lead the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), despite the direct implications of the court’s decision for his future political activity.
A particular cause for concern is that, due to institutional vulnerabilities and systemic risks within the judiciary, the relevant authorities have yet to ensure the full enforcement of the final court judgment. This underscores the need to strengthen the independence and effectiveness of judicial institutions, including the responsibility of the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HJPC BiH) for upholding legal and professional standards.
Policies that undermine Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territorial integrity and constitutional order are not merely a domestic political concern; they pose a challenge to the Dayton Peace Agreement, regional stability and European security. Persistent threats of destabilisation deepen the crisis, erode institutional functionality, deter investment, fuel emigration and hamper the country’s path towards European integration.
Attempts are often made in public discourse to portray NATO membership as an issue on which there is no political consensus in Bosnia and Herzegovina. From a legal and institutional standpoint, however, Euro-Atlantic integration and membership of the NATO Alliance already represent a defined strategic goal of the state, affirmed by existing laws, formal decisions and international commitments.
The Law on Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina[2] occupies a particularly important place in this framework. Its Article 84 explicitly requires the competent institutions to undertake the activities necessary for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s accession to NATO. This goal is also reflected in the country’s strategic documents, including the Security Policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Defence Policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as through the country’s active participation in the Membership Action Plan (MAP) and ongoing reform programmes conducted in cooperation with NATO.
The fundamental challenge, therefore, lies not in defining Bosnia and Herzegovina’s strategic orientation, but in the willingness of political actors to consistently implement the state’s decisions, legislation and international obligations. The vital question is not whether NATO membership is Bosnia and Herzegovina’s objective, but whether its institutions and political structures will ensure its realisation.
For Bosnia and Herzegovina, NATO membership is far more than a security arrangement. It is integral to a broader political, institutional and value-based framework that fosters stability, strengthens the rule of law, supports the development of democratic institutions and enhances the country’s international credibility.
Accession to NATO would provide additional security guarantees, narrow the space for internal destabilisation and integrate Bosnia and Herzegovina into a collective security system founded on the principles of common defence and democratic values.
NATO’s historical significance extends beyond its military function. After the Second World War, the Alliance became one of the key pillars of European stability, enabling former adversaries to forge long-term cooperation and a shared security space grounded in trust and common values. This transformative role offers an important lesson for Bosnia and Herzegovina: lasting stability can be built only through strong institutions, regional and international cooperation, mutual trust and the rejection of policies rooted in division and conflict.
It is worth stressing that NATO was not conceived solely as a military alliance. The early architects of the transatlantic security order, including figures such as George Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower, designed a political and security framework based on shared responsibility for security, institutional cooperation and a commitment to democratic values, turning former foes into partners and allies.
For Bosnia and Herzegovina, NATO’s central message is that peace, stability and security cannot be taken for granted. European and Euro-Atlantic integration provide a mechanism for preventing any return to policies of conflict, division and violence.
In this context, the presence of international forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including EUFOR Operation Althea, remains an important factor in maintaining a safe and secure environment and supporting peace.
The International Institute IFIMES assesses that Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Euro-Atlantic path is not merely a matter of foreign policy, but one of the critical instruments for preserving peace, reinforcing institutions and building a stable European framework for the country’s long-term development.
Bosnia and Herzegovina's position and future must therefore be understood within a wider regional and geopolitical context – one that encompasses multiple forms of political leverage, information-space operations, Russia’s economic projects and energy ties, China's growing economic footprint in Republika Srpska, relations with neighbouring Serbia and Croatia, and the EU accession process. The stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina is an integral component of the wider security architecture of the Western Balkans and the European continent.
Under the present circumstances, preserving the Office of the High Representative (OHR) remains essential to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s stability. Any weakening of international oversight mechanisms, at a time marked by open attempts to challenge the state order and block institutions, as well as threats of secession by Republika Srpska, would pose a serious risk to peace and security in the country.
Destabilisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina would not be contained within its domestic political arena. It could have direct repercussions for regional stability, heighten security risks across the Western Balkans and create the conditions for new political and security crises.
Attempts to delegitimise the OHR originate primarily from political structures seeking to undermine the international mechanisms for implementing the Dayton Agreement and to open the way for unilateral changes to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s constitutional order.
As long as there are persistent efforts to subvert the constitutional framework, weaken state institutions and question the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the international community cannot afford to disengage from the process of preserving peace and stability.
The OHR is not an obstacle to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s democratic development. Rather, it is a mechanism established under the Dayton Agreement to safeguard the constitutional order, deter unilateral action and ensure the implementation of the peace agreement. At the same time, the country’s long-term stability depends on strengthening domestic institutional accountability, the rule of law and the operational capacity of state bodies, thereby gradually fostering public trust and avoiding the perception of permanent international tutelage.
It is therefore essential that the appointment of a new High Representative of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina be secured without further delay, while also reinforcing the European Union's role in the region. The stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Western Balkans is directly linked to Europe’s security, as this region is one of the European continent’s principal security zones.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is now facing not only a political crisis, but also a profound crisis of governance, institutional trust and accountability.
Over the past several decades, a complex web of political-economic networks and vested interests has taken shape, exploiting public institutions as vehicles for preserving privilege and maintaining control over state resources. Corruption, institutional abuse, opaque public procurement and party control of key sectors are among the greatest obstacles to the country’s progress. The financial toll of such a system runs into millions and even billions in economic losses.
Citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina are not leaving the country because it lacks potential or resources. They are leaving because they have lost confidence that the existing system can provide equal opportunities, reward knowledge and work and allow people to advance based on merit rather than political affiliation.
The fight against corruption is therefore no longer solely a question of the rule of law or judicial efficiency. It has become a matter of national security, institutional stability and the long-term viability of the state. Yet effective anti-corruption efforts require a far-reaching reform of existing mechanisms, stronger institutional independence and deeper international cooperation.
Operational cooperation with international partners needs to be stepped up, particularly in the areas of financial investigation, capital-flow monitoring and countering organised crime. The experience of other countries shows that dismantling deeply entrenched criminal networks often requires both domestic reform and close cross-border operational coordination.
Particular vigilance is required in tracking financial transactions and the origin of capital, as proceeds from corruption and criminal activity are frequently transferred out of Bosnia and Herzegovina – including to EU member states – where they are channelled through various investment vehicles and financial operations in an attempt to give them a veneer of legitimacy.
For this reason, anti-corruption efforts must target not only individuals, but also the very networks and mechanisms that facilitate the siphoning of public resources. Unless such structures are dismantled and rendered inoperative, Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot become a functional, stable and Europe-oriented state.
The forthcoming general elections may prove to be the most consequential since the end of the war. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s citizens will be choosing not only new political representatives but also the strategic course the country will take over the coming decade.
The electorate is faced with two competing models for the country’s future development:
For this reason, the general elections on 4 October 2026 represent a critical political test of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s future strategic direction. Citizens will be deciding their own future – whether once again to place their trust in policies that have, over the past three decades, hindered or obstructed European integration, weakened institutions and pushed the country away from the European Union, or to support policies offering reform, economic progress, institutional consolidation and full integration into the European Union and NATO.
The International Institute IFIMES takes the view that Bosnia and Herzegovina has a genuine opportunity in the coming years to make a significant advance towards membership of the European Union and NATO – provided that it strengthens state institutions, accelerates reform efforts and moves beyond the policies that generate instability and erode public confidence.
In this regard, the recent EU-Western Balkans summit in Tivat is also noteworthy. It opens the prospect of bringing the countries of the region more rapidly into the European fold through gradual inclusion in the EU Single Market, under the concept of “enlargement without enlargement”. While this approach offers a pathway to deeper economic integration prior to full accession, it also demands consistent delivery on reforms and steady alignment with European standards.
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s inclusion[3] on the FATF list[4] of jurisdictions under increased monitoring in relation to anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism, within the international FATF/MONEYVAL standards framework, is a serious warning from the international community that the country’s institutions have failed to implement their obligations effectively. The core problem lies not merely in the existence of legislation, but in its enforcement, the absence of political will and the lack of institutional accountability.
This issue extends well beyond technical and financial considerations, as it directly affects the country’s international credibility, investor confidence and the pace of its European integration. Any further deterioration, potentially leading to stricter international monitoring regimes, could have serious consequences for the financial sector, economic stability and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s overall development prospects.
It is therefore essential that political institutions assume responsibility and demonstrate the capacity to implement their own legislation and meet international commitments. The cost of political inertia is not confined to the domestic sphere – it also shapes perceptions of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a reliable international partner.
Preserving the Office of the High Representative (OHR), maintaining the country’s Euro-Atlantic path, vigorously combating organised crime and corruption and upholding the constitutional order remain essential prerequisites for the country’s long-term stability.
IFIMES assesses that the general elections will amount to a strategic choice between competing models for the state’s future course: building a functional European Bosnia and Herzegovina, grounded in the rule of law, strong institutions and responsible governance, or perpetuating the political blockades that have stalled or thwarted its full development for decades.
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s future must be understood within a broader regional and geopolitical context, as the country’s stability is a cornerstone of security for both the Western Balkans and Europe as a whole. The continued deepening of political divisions and the manufacture of crises increase the risk of instability and conflict, whereas cooperation, institutional accountability and a clear commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration offer a path towards lasting peace, stability and sustainable prosperity.
It is imperative to strengthen institutions, implement reforms and ensure a clear commitment to a shared European future for all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as this process will serve as one of the critical tests of Europe’s security architecture.
Ljubljana/Washington/Brussels, 25 June 2026
[1] IFIMES - International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has a special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council ECOSOC/UN in New York since 2018, and it is the publisher of the international scientific journal "European Perspectives." Available at: https://www.europeanperspectives.org/en
[2] The Law on Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Available at: https://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/legal/laws-of-bih/pdf/014%20-%20ARMY%20LEGISLATION/BH%20Law%20on%20Defence%20of%20Bosnia%20and%20Herzegovina%2088-05.pdf
[3] Reuters: Global financial crime FATF watchdog adds Iraq and Bosnia to 'grey list'. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/global-financial-crime-fatf-watchdog-adds-iraq-bosnia-grey-list-2026-06-19/?utm_source=chatgpt.com
[4] The formal list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring, commonly known as the “grey list”, is maintained by the FATF (Financial Action Task Force). MONEYVAL, by contrast, is a regional European mechanism for assessing the effectiveness of systems for anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism. MONEYVAL’s findings, assessments and recommendations often carry significant weight and may serve as an important basis for further consideration within the FATF. However, since the final decision on placing a country on the “grey list” is made by the FATF, it is more precise, both methodologically and terminologically, to refer to the FATF grey list rather than a “MONEYVAL list”.
