The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)[1] based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly conducts analyses of developments in the Middle East, the Balkans and worldwide. On the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement and ahead of the early presidential election in Republika Srpska, scheduled for 23 November 2025, IFIMES examines the current political environment, the key actors and potential scenarios that may unfold. From the extensive analysis “Bosnia and Herzegovina 2025: The opposition against the ‘Manchurian candidate’?”, we highlight the most important findings.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is set to mark the thirtieth anniversary of the Dayton Peace Agreement[2] on 21 November 2025, just two days before early elections for the President of Republika Srpska (RS) scheduled for 23 November.
The trigger for the early elections was the final ruling of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which sentenced Milorad Dodik (SNSD), the former President of the RS, to one year in prison (later converted into a monetary fine), together with a six-year ban on political activity. Under the law, this automatically brought his presidential mandate to an end.
The ruling has created a deep institutional rift. The RS authorities and the SNSD initially rejected the verdict and continued to treat Dodik as an active political leader. They have since formally accepted the judicial outcome, but state institutions and international actors continue to insist on unconditional compliance with court decisions.
This has produced a paradox: although Dodik has been formally “neutralised” politically, he effectively maintains full control over the SNSD and much of the institutional apparatus of the RS. It is this very interplay between formal prohibition and actual power that underpins the model of the so-called “Manchurian candidate”[3], namely a proxy arrangement embodied in the candidacy of Siniša Karan (SNSD).
The Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina (CEC) has confirmed six candidates:
The other candidates are Dragan Đokanović (Alliance for a New Policy), Nikola Lazarević (Environmental Party of the RS), Igor Gašević (independent) and Slavko Dragičević (independent).
Although the other candidates add breadth to the electoral offer, their impact on the overall outcome is limited and is likely to manifest mainly through the potential fragmentation of the opposition vote.
Despite the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina imposing a six-year ban on political activity on Milorad Dodik, both the legal and political practice in Republika Srpska tell a very different story. According to the court’s decision, Dodik is barred from holding public office or undertaking any activity deemed to constitute political engagement. However, the actual distribution of power has remained unchanged.
Dodik continues to exercise unhindered control over the key levers of power within the SNSD: the party infrastructure, an extensive network of loyal cadres, and access to and oversight of public resources. In such an environment, he is able to orchestrate all crucial processes from behind the scenes – from candidate nomination and campaign management to shaping party policies and messaging. As a result, he effectively continues to operate politically, even though such activity is formally prohibited.
This disparity stems from a long-standing institutional conflict between the authorities in the RS and the BiH state institutions. The mechanisms for enforcing court decisions are limited in a territory where state institutions do not exercise full operational control, creating a legal and political vacuum in which the ban is difficult to enforce.
This is precisely why the Central Election Commission of BiH did not suspend the candidacy of Siniša Karan. The CEC is strictly bound by law and can act only on the basis of material facts relating to the candidate himself. There is no judicial or administrative decision against Karan that would render him legally ineligible to run. The SNSD has formally nominated him, not Dodik, and therefore the CEC has no legal basis for intervention, even if political logic suggests that Karan is essentially Dodik’s proxy candidate.
Put differently, the electoral administration operates according to legal form and procedure, while political reality unfolds in a space where formal rules and actual power are no longer in full alignment.
Throughout the election campaign, Milorad Dodik and his supporters relied on sharply polarising rhetoric, often marked by hate speech directed at Bosniaks and Muslims. This was particularly evident at public rallies, including those held in East Sarajevo. The SNSD candidate, Siniša Karan, positioned himself as a “sanitised version” of Dodik’s messaging, mirroring his hate speech and maintaining a confrontational stance towards state institutions, albeit in a slightly softer and more polite tone. Karan did not distance himself from this narrative, raising questions about the lack of action by the BiH Central Election Commission regarding his candidacy.
International actors also reacted to this campaign dynamic. The UN Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC) and the United Nations Special Envoy for Combating Islamophobia, Miguel Ángel Moratinos, publicly condemned the hate speech, stating: “Such derogatory rhetoric against Bosniaks is incompatible with the principles and values of the United Nations and runs counter to the core mandate of UNAOC, which seeks to advance mutual respect, constructive dialogue, and peaceful coexistence among individuals and communities of diverse cultural and religious backgrounds.”[4]
The Central Election Commission sanctioned the SNSD with a fine of 30,000 KM (around 15,000 EUR) for its polarising rhetoric and hate speech. While the fine constitutes a formal response, the regime’s rhetoric continues to deepen polarisation, mobilising SNSD supporters and, at the same time, prompting the opposition and international observers to intensify their scrutiny of the integrity and security of the electoral process. It is particularly concerning that the competent Prosecutor’s Office has failed to respond adequately to these public provocations and instances of hate speech.
In late October 2025, OFAC (U.S. Treasury / Office of Foreign Assets Control) announced amendments to its list, removing Milorad Dodik from it (29 October 2025). This move represents an important diplomatic and financial signal, as it formally lifts certain property and financial restrictions that had previously applied to him.
However, removal from the OFAC list does not automatically entail the lifting of sanctions in other jurisdictions – such as the EU, the United Kingdom, Germany, Poland or Slovenia – as each country independently determines its own measures.
Although the lifting of sanctions on Dodik and his associates technically bolsters his political position within BiH and facilitates lobbying efforts on the international stage, it does not amount to political rehabilitation. International actors still regard Dodik’s political agenda as a destabilising factor and as a channel for Russian influence.
Dodik’s strategy, centred on building entity-based and de facto separatist structures – a kind of “South Ossetia” in the Balkans, potentially including the presence of Russian military bases – poses a serious challenge to the EU, NATO and the United States, and continues to strongly shape the region’s security and political dynamics.
Following the lifting of OFAC sanctions, the growing insistence of the Serb member of the BiH Presidency, Željka Cvijanović (SNSD), on cooperation with the United States reveals the background of the arrangement with Washington. In this framework, the issue concerns not only Bosnia and Herzegovina’s path towards NATO but also the possibility of establishing a US military base on the territory of Republika Srpska. The seemingly constructive environment cultivated by Dodik’s regime may therefore be interpreted as laying the groundwork for such developments.
Analyses and polling station records indicate that Jelena Trivić won more votes in the 2022 elections for the President of Republika Srpska. Nonetheless, the Central Election Commission (CEC) – under considerable international pressure – declared Milorad Dodik the winner.
The question is whether a similar scenario could unfold in 2025. The answer is: it is possible, but not in the same form. OSCE/ODIHR now has enhanced monitoring powers, international scrutiny is far more intense, and both the judicial context of the elections and the pressure on the CEC differ markedly from the situation in 2022.
Even so, given the SNSD’s extensive political-institutional grip over administrative and party resources, the risk of manipulation remains high and realistic.
Local leaders, particularly Draško Stanivuković (Banja Luka – PDP) and Ljubiša Petrović (Bijeljina – SDS), will play a crucial logistical and political role in the forthcoming elections. Their influence is reflected in their control over polling boards and polling stations, oversight of the local administration, prevention of obstructions, and the mobilisation of opposition voters.
Should Stanivuković adopt a passive, calculating or even obstructive stance, the opposition would find itself at a considerable disadvantage. Conversely, his active support could enable the opposition to enter the race with a realistic chance of success, reinforcing coordination and enhancing the legitimacy of the opposition bloc at the local level.
The rhetoric of Milorad Dodik and the SNSD frequently claims that Republika Srpska is “under threat” from Sarajevo, foreign courts and international institutions. However, analysis by the international community and expert observers presents a different picture: Milorad Dodik’s political agenda undermines the BiH constitutional order, heightens ethnic tensions, poses a security risk to the state and the region, and inflicts economic, political and diplomatic harm on the RS itself.
In other words, the RS is not inherently under threat – rather, it is Dodik’s regime that threatens Bosnia and Herzegovina and, indirectly, the stability of the entity itself.
According to political assessments and international analysts, Siniša Karan is increasingly depicted as a “Manchurian candidate” — a nominal office-holder who in practice serves as an instrument of Milorad Dodik. Karan has no autonomous political weight; he follows Dodik’s directives fully and provides the means through which Dodik preserves power despite the court-imposed ban, acting as the regime’s “legalistic façade”. A victory for Karan would, in effect, be a victory for Dodik rather than for the candidate himself.
Should Karan (SNSD) win, a continuation of Dodik’s political agenda would be expected: intensified confrontation with state institutions, the possible formation of parallel structures, heightened internal tensions within the RS, a strengthening of Russian influence, stagnation and isolation of the entity, and further destabilisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Conversely, a victory for Blanuša (SDS) would open space for institutional stabilisation, de-escalation of relations with the state level, greater support from the international community, the launch of political dialogue and reforms, and the strengthening of democratic dynamics within the RS. Moreover, a Blanuša victory would make it possible to begin addressing crime and corruption and to gradually dismantle Dodik’s regime.
The international community — the EU, the US, OSCE/ODIHR and the UN — is closely monitoring the elections in the RS, focusing in particular on compliance with judicial decisions, the integrity of the electoral process and the prevention of hate speech. It exerts its leverage through political pressure, sanctions, observation missions and diplomatic initiatives.
Serbia formally refrains from interfering in the elections and seeks to avoid destabilisation, although it maintains close ties with Dodik’s regime. Croatia, on the other hand, indirectly favours the continuation of the SNSD’s policy due to its strategic interests in BiH, yet likewise seeks to avoid provoking international instability.
International actors — the EU, the US, the UN and the OSCE — consistently stress the need for peaceful and transparent elections, actively monitor potential hate speech and remain prepared to intervene in the event of serious irregularities, with the aim of safeguarding the legitimacy and stability of the electoral process.
The early presidential election in the RS is unfolding in an exceptionally strained institutional and political setting. The court proceedings against Milorad Dodik have created both a precedent and a power vacuum that the SNSD is attempting to fill through its “Manchurian candidate” — the proxy, Siniša Karan.
A Karan victory would signify the continuation of the existing policy of destabilisation and confrontation with state institutions and the international community. By contrast, a victory for Branko Blanuša would open the way for institutional reconfiguration, easing tensions and strengthening trust in state mechanisms, both in the RS and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and would herald a decisive effort to tackle crime and corruption.
The role of the international community remains pivotal: ensuring oversight of the electoral process, preventing manipulation, addressing hate speech, maintaining security and safeguarding the constitutional order and internal organisation of the state.
The final outcome of the election will depend heavily on the mobilisation of the opposition and the coordinated actions by local leaders, particularly in Banja Luka and Bijeljina, whose active support could have a decisive impact on the legitimacy and transparency of the electoral process.
Ljubljana/Washington/Brussels/Banja Luka, 20 November 2025
[1] IFIMES - International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has a special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council ECOSOC/UN in New York since 2018, and it is the publisher of the international scientific journal "European Perspectives." Available at: https://www.europeanperspectives.org/en
[2] The Dayton Peace Agreement was initialled on 21 November 1995 in Dayton (Ohio, USA), and formally signed on 14 December 1995 in Paris (France). The agreement formally ended the three-and-a-half-year war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and confirmed, under international law, its sovereignty, territorial integrity and state structure composed of two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (51% of the territory of BiH) and Republika Srpska (49% of the territory of BiH). A 2000 international arbitration decision established the Brčko District of BiH as a separate, single administrative unit with district status.
[3] Manchurian candidate – a political figure or candidate who appears nominally independent but is in fact influenced or controlled by hidden centres of power, typically external actors or interest groups. Such a person serves to advance the political, security or economic objectives of others, while formally appearing as a representative of the people or institutions.
[4] Press Statement by the High Representative for the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC)
and United Nations Special Envoy to Combat Islamophobia. Available at: https://www.unaoc.org/2025/11/press-statement-nov2025/
