The International Institute for Middle Eastern and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)[1], based in Ljubljana, regularly monitors and analyses political, economic and geopolitical developments in the Middle East, the Balkans, Europe and globally. Relations between Serbia and Kosovo are entering a new phase, characterised by heightened security tensions and strategic reassessments amid rapid changes in the European and global geopolitical landscape. At the same time, the emergence of new forms of military and security cooperation between Croatia, Albania and Kosovo is further reshaping regional security dynamics, underscoring a broader strategic transformation of the Western Balkans. From the comprehensive analysis “Serbia and Kosovo between new regional alliances and old geopolitical patterns”, we highlight the most important and compelling segments.
Relations between Serbia and Kosovo are entering a phase of heightened security tensions and a reassessment of strategic positions, amid rapid changes in the European and global geopolitical landscape. The establishment of new forms of military and security cooperation between Croatia, Albania and Kosovo represents a significant signal of political and military rapprochement[2], which, while ostensibly not aimed at any third party, is perceived in Belgrade as a distinct strategic challenge.
Albanian Minister of Defence Ermal Nufi recently emphasised in Zagreb that Albania and Croatia are fully aligned with NATO and that all their activities will be undertaken in accordance with that framework. At the same time, he underlined that this does not preclude the readiness of these states to act in the defence of Kosovo. The declaration between Croatia, Kosovo and Albania, as he noted, reflects the political will of both the Albanian and Croatian peoples. In this context, Kosovo remains firmly committed to integration into the EU, NATO and broader security mechanisms, while Zagreb and Tirana view regional security as a shared interest of all countries in Southeast Europe.[3]
In Serbia, however, this has further strengthened the belief that such cooperation is implicitly directed against it. While these messages are primarily intended as a deterrent, they also deepen mistrust and raise political temperature across the region.
In a broader context, this military arrangement should be understood as part of a NATO-dominated security architecture: Croatia and Albania are full members, while Kosovo remains under an international security umbrella.
A comparison with the Balkan Pact[4] of 1953 – concluded between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey – allows for a deeper analysis. The agreement, signed in Ankara on 28 February 1953, contained an explicit collective defence clause: an armed attack against one member was to be treated as an attack against all, with an obligation to provide assistance, including the use of military force, in line with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
Formed under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito, the alliance had a clearly defined objective – collective defence against a potential threat from the Soviet Union at the height of Cold War confrontation. It represented a formalised military-political alliance with significant strategic depth and a clearly defined adversary.
By contrast, the current arrangement between Zagreb, Tirana and Pristina is characterised by markedly different features: it lacks a formal defence treaty with binding provisions, functions within an established NATO framework, and carries a predominantly political and symbolic, but also deterrent, dimension.
Whether Kosovo’s Prime Minister Albin Kurti has taken a step comparable to that once taken by Tito calls for a more nuanced assessment. While there are certain similarities in the logic of ensuring security through regional alignment, the differences are substantial in terms of context, capacities and the degree of strategic autonomy. Whereas Kurti operates within a clearly defined Western security system, Tito pursued a policy of balancing and building a relatively independent position between opposing blocs.
Nevertheless, the crucial fact remains that a potential attack on any one of the states involved would carry wider implications: two are NATO members, which could potentially draw the Alliance itself into an escalation of the conflict.
Serbia’s status as a militarily neutral state remains one of the central pillars of its foreign and security policy. Such an orientation allows Belgrade to maintain balanced relations with Western partners, while also engaging with actors such as Russia and China—Serbia being one of the few European nations to have signed a free trade agreement with Beijing. At the same time, this position inherently limits deeper integration into Western security structures.
Serbia’s strategic commitment to EU membership entails gradual alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy, giving rise to internal strategic tensions between competing priorities: military neutrality versus political alignment with the EU, balancing between East and West, and a pragmatic approach versus the need for long-term strategic clarity.
This ambivalence is further compounded by the fact that nearly all neighbouring countries are NATO members, which affects the perception of the security environment and Serbia’s overall strategic positioning in the region. Within this framework, relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina remain particularly sensitive, especially between Serbs and Bosniaks, which call for direct and institutional dialogue between Belgrade and Sarajevo, free from additional political mediation that complicates the process.
The victory of Péter Magyar (Tisza) in Hungary and his initiative to redefine and potentially expand the Visegrad Group to include additional states, such as Austria, Slovenia, Croatia and Romania, may be seen as an effort to reinforce a Central European political and economic bloc within the European Union.
Yet this process also carries wider geopolitical implications: it could further distance Serbia from the EU’s main integration pathways, contribute to the emergence of an informal “inner core” within the Union, and deepen the sense of political and strategic marginalisation across the Western Balkans.
Against this backdrop, Serbia is confronted with an increasingly complex challenge – to simultaneously preserve military neutrality, accelerate European integration and navigate new regional bloc and quasi-bloc structures that are once again taking shape across Europe.
The recently unveiled “Serbia 2030” strategy reflects a clear ambition of the authorities in Belgrade to position the country as a regional hub of economic and technological development over the coming decades. At the same time, the document outlines three key directions: continuing the EU integration process while pragmatically balancing international partnerships; bolstering internal stability through infrastructure investments, energy security and the preservation of military neutrality; and transforming the economic model through the development of digital technologies and artificial intelligence.
Nevertheless, significant challenges remain – primarily in the areas of institutional reforms, adverse demographic trends and the region’s persistent geopolitical instability. Ultimately, the strategy's success hinges on the capacity of state institutions to implement substantial reforms to the rule of law, improve the education system and strengthen the efficiency of public administration.
Consequently, the “Serbia 2030” strategy represents both a forward-looking orientation and an ambitious development vision, serving as a critical test of Serbia’s political resolve and institutional maturity in translating declared objectives into measurable and sustainable long-term outcomes.
Contemporary geopolitical shifts are significantly shaping relations between Serbia and Kosovo. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has accelerated the militarisation of the European continent and redefined security priorities, while the growing strategic rivalry between the United States and China is further transforming the global balance of power. At the same time, the European Union is seeking to consolidate its own security and political space in response to these geopolitical realities.
The Western Balkans is once again emerging as a zone of overlapping great power interests, with regional security dynamics no longer viewed in isolation but rather through the lens of a wider global context.
The new military and security arrangement between Croatia, Albania and Kosovo does not constitute a formal military alliance modelled on the Balkan Pact, but it nonetheless serves a clear political and psychological purpose as a form of deterrence and strategic signalling.
For Serbia, such developments further entrench the perception of strategic encirclement and complicate the balancing act between a policy of military neutrality and the European integration process. For Kosovo, they simultaneously represent an instrument for bolstering its international security and political standing.
A key strategic message is that Serbia continues to see its long-term future in European Union membership, with the possibility of accession projected by 2035. At the same time, President Aleksandar Vučić has expressed a measure of pragmatism and scepticism regarding the European Union’s capacity to make major strategic decisions under the current circumstances.
This approach points to Belgrade’s effort to reconcile European integration with a policy of multi-vector partnerships. Serbia has signalled its interest in access to the single market and the free movement of goods and people, even in a scenario of partial integration ahead of full membership. The joint call by Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and Prime Minister Edi Rama for the accelerated integration of candidate countries into the EU single market and the Schengen Area, without veto rights, constitutes a constructive proposal that deserves serious consideration within the European Union.
This stance underscores the continuity of Serbia’s long-standing strategy of balancing relations with the European Union, China, Russia and other global actors, which has for years underpinned its foreign policy doctrine.
Serbia’s strategy clearly affirms its commitment to military neutrality, while at the same time developing a broad spectrum of cooperation both with NATO member states and with other international partners. Belgrade seeks to build flexible forms of military and security cooperation without formally acceding to existing military alliances, thus preserving room for strategic manoeuvre in a complex international environment.
Historical parallels with the era of Josip Broz Tito are only partially applicable: the contemporary Balkans is no longer defined by rigid bloc divisions, but it remains a highly sensitive geopolitical arena in which the interests of regional actors and global powers continue to intersect.
Against this backdrop, without stronger and more coherent engagement by the European Union, as well as the consistent continuation of dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, there is a real risk that new security arrangements may, rather than contributing to stability, lead to further political fragmentation and increased security polarisation across the Western Balkans.
Ljubljana/Washington/Brussels/Belgrade, 22 April 2026
[1] IFIMES - International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has a special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council ECOSOC/UN in New York since 2018, and it is the publisher of the international scientific journal "European Perspectives." Available at: https://www.europeanperspectives.org/en
[2] TV N1: John Bolton: Any military alliance other than NATO in Europe is a security risk. Available at: https://n1info.rs/svet/dzon-bolton-bilo-kakav-vojni-savez-sem-nato-a-u-evropi-je-bezbednosni-rizik/
[3] Dnevnik.hr: Anušić responds to what Croatia will do if Kosovo is attacked, also reflects on Vučić. Available at: https://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/anusica-ne-zabrinjava-naoruzavanje-srbije---974757.html
[4] The Balkan Pact, signed on 28 February 1953 in Ankara, was a treaty of friendship and cooperation between the FPR of Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey. Its main goal was defence against the Soviet threat and the territorial ambitions of the Bulgarian regime following the Tito-Stalin split. The alliance was viewed as an alignment with the Western bloc, although Yugoslavia remained non-aligned.
