The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)[1] based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly conducts analyses of events spanning the Middle East, the Balkans, and global affairs. IFIMES analyses the current situation in the Republic of Serbia and explores possible avenues for resolving the present impasse. From the analysis “Serbia 2025: Vučić’s self-critical turn – a chance to overcome the current situation?”, we publish the most important and compelling excerpts.
Serbia stands at a critical political and societal crossroads. What began as a student-led protest has evolved into a wider civic movement, exposing two sharply contrasting visions of the country’s future. Pressure is mounting on all fronts. The question that will shape the coming period is whether the current momentum will be seized to pursue reforms and restore confidence, or whether it will lead to an even tighter state control.
Resolving Serbia's pressing political and social challenges requires a comprehensive approach focused on de-escalation and the restoration of public trust in institutions. Sustained efforts are needed to reinforce and uphold democratic standards. While Serbia is a democratic country, it is still undergoing a prolonged transitional phase. In Turkey, the rise of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to power marked the beginning of a transitional process characterised by the elimination of the military’s role and “Kemalism” – a shift that remains incomplete. All countries in the region are still going through different stages of transition. The protests against Erdoğan began in Istanbul’s Gezi Park in the summer of 2013 as environmental demonstrations, but their underlying objective was to remove him from power. The tensions culminated in 2016 with an attempted coup aimed at toppling Erdogan. A comparable pattern – including signs of foreign involvement – can now be seen in Serbia.
Therefore, Serbia needs to initiate processes built around several key points: 1.) The authorities should invite students to an open dialogue between the government, students and other key actors. Students must select their own representatives for the talks, as refusing to engage in dialogue with the authorities will gradually erode public sympathy, since the goal of any society is to resolve social problems. 2.) The potential holding of early parliamentary elections, which would provide new legitimacy to the government (whether the existing or a new one), would reset the political landscape and enable an overall societal renewal. 3.) Institutional reform and the rule of law, including reform of the police, judiciary and public administration, supported by the EU, as well as a transparent investigation into violence against demonstrators and infrastructural failures (e.g. the case of Novi Sad). 4.) Protection of civil liberties without the use of repressive measures against protesters and journalists. Freedom of the media must be ensured as the foundation of social dialogue. 5.) Political renewal of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) through internal reform and distancing from compromised officials. If this is not done, democratic change in government becomes increasingly likely. 6.) The role of the international community — the EU should become more actively involved not only through criticism, but also by offering concrete incentives and accelerating Serbia’s path towards the EU.
Analysts believe that the way out of the current situation lies not in the use of force, but in the power of dialogue, trust and accountability. A government that recognises its own mistakes and demonstrates readiness for change has a chance to lead society forward. One that fails to do so will be replaced through the will of the people. Serbia is therefore at a historic turning point.
In his recent public appearances, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić (SNS) has increasingly acknowledged the government’s mistakes, shown a measure of self-criticism, and has not shied away from directing sharp remarks at certain officials from his Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). Such an approach, rarely witnessed on the political scene of the Western Balkans, may be interpreted as an attempt to seize the initiative amid growing societal tensions, political pressure, and international challenges.
It is precisely this ability to publicly recognise the shortcomings of his own political apparatus that gives Vučić the credibility to position himself as a leader capable of resetting political direction and offering solutions to Serbia’s current predicament. Although critics dismiss this move as tactical manoeuvring ahead of upcoming elections, the fact remains that political self-criticism—if authentic and supported by concrete action—can create space for systemic change.
The key issue now is whether Vučić will use this momentum for a genuine break with compromised cadres and the politics of closed power circles, or whether his self-criticism will merely serve to preserve the status quo under the guise of reform.
In a recent article titled “Bones, Ancestors, Homeland”[2], Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung journalist Michael Martens warns that Greater Serbian nationalism has taken hold of the student protests in Serbia, emphasising: “This trend has been emerging for some time, but has largely gone unnoticed abroad. Within the student movement, which remains the main driving force behind the protests, Greater Serbian nationalism has now become dominant.”
The author argues that this was already apparent in the line-up of speakers chosen by the students for the 28 June 2025 rally: “Nationalists and war crimes apologists competed in spreading Greater Serbian slogans. The student-selected moderator was no exception. Other speakers gave the impression that they cared little about the original goals of the protest movement—namely, the restoration of democracy and the rule of law in Serbia—and were more focused on inciting new wars in Kosovo or Bosnia.”[3]
Analysts believe that the student movement only appeared to have formed spontaneously in response to the tragedy in Novi Sad. Certain opposition political parties and foreign actors have exploited the student protests as a tool to advance their own interests, often without genuine concern for the students' actual demands. This has undermined the movement's authenticity and understandably fuelled public scepticism.
Radicalisation and the loss of control leading to street violence during the protests, bin fires and clashes with the police, though often provoked, compromise the peaceful character of the movement. The involvement of more extreme groups, such as football hooligans and ideological factions, has distorted both its message and narrative. No democratic country tolerates barricades. The French state took a hard line against the so-called “Yellow Vests” and their disruption of public order in 2018, when ten people were killed and 2,800 protesters were arrested. Similar incidents occurred in Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Nothing must stand above the law and institutions, which are essential for maintaining public order and peace.
The movement suffers from a lack of clear organisational structure and leadership. Although it prides itself on its “horizontal” model, the absence of defined leadership and strategy leaves it vulnerable to fragmentation and instrumentalisation. Only elected representatives of the student movement can serve as legitimate counterparts in dialogue with the authorities. Without credible, publicly visible negotiators—not shadowy ones—and internal cohesion, the movement risks losing its negotiating power.
The media landscape surrounding the protests has become saturated with unverified claims, fake news, and conspiracy theories, circulated by both activists and their opponents. Disinformation undermines the movement’s credibility and plays into the hands of regime propaganda.
Much of the movement’s activity unfolds on social media, where students are often confined to ideologically homogeneous circles. This can foster an illusion of widespread support and lead to detachment from broader society—particularly older and rural populations.
Some individuals within the movement use their position for personal promotion, crafting the image of “protest heroes” while lacking any real political vision. This kind of performative activism risks being short-lived and ultimately counterproductive.
The student movement in Serbia holds historical significance and stems from a legitimate cause, but it is not immune to distortion. To stay relevant and credible, it must resist radicalisation, political manipulation, disorganisation, and external interference or co-optation. Otherwise, it risks fading into a passing phenomenon rather than a driver of democratisation.
Relations between Serbs and Bosniaks represent one of the most crucial and sensitive aspects of the political, historical and social dynamics in the former Yugoslavia, most notably in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also in Serbia and the Sandžak region. While burdened by the difficult legacy of the 1990s, they still carry the potential for cooperation, stabilisation and reconciliation in the region.
Historically, Serb–Bosniak relations have alternated between coexistence and conflict. Prior to the war, Bosniaks and Serbs lived side by side for centuries, often in mixed communities marked by mutual respect, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
With the dissolution of Yugoslavia, relations deteriorated significantly, culminating in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995), during which war crimes—particularly against innocent civilians—inflicted profound trauma on both Bosniaks and Serbs.
While the Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995 established formal peace, it did not bring about reconciliation—interethnic mistrust remains deeply entrenched and is currently at its lowest point since the agreement was signed.
Relations between Serbia and the Bosniaks today remain complex. While the official rhetoric from Belgrade has become more moderate, the refusal to acknowledge the Srebrenica genocide continues to hinder genuine reconciliation.
The Sandžak region continues to be marked by tension and marginalisation, although the ruling SNS party has established coalition relations with the two leading Bosniak parties in the region and maintains good cooperation. Sandžak can serve as a bridge and a zone of cooperation rather than of tension—provided that Bosniak identity and distinctiveness are respected.
While political leaders from Republika Srpska—such as Milorad Dodik—continue to deny the genocide, glorify war criminals and advocate secession, directly undermining Bosniak identity and the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosniak leaders often respond in a purely defensive manner and lack a clear strategy for building a shared future.
Nevertheless, there are common interests in areas such as economic cooperation, poverty reduction, European integration, and collaboration in education, culture and sport.
A meaningful dialogue between the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) and the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina could also contribute constructively—provided both institutions move beyond nationalist frameworks.
Key obstacles to improved relations include historical revisionism, war crimes denial, the politicisation of history, nationalist discourse, media propaganda, and a lack of genuine political will on both sides.
Improved relations require mutual recognition of the truth and respect for all victims, open dialogue involving intellectuals, religious leaders and civil society, stronger economic and educational cooperation, political leadership focused on the future—not anchored in the past, and appropriate support from the international community in reconciliation efforts. Relations between Serbs and Bosniaks are essential for the stability and future of Bosnia and Herzegovina—naturally, not at the expense of any third party.
While relations between Serbs and Bosniaks are still weighed down by the past, they are far from hopeless. Reconciliation calls for political courage, moral clarity, and a shared vision of the future. Without these, the past will keep fuelling new divisions. Remaining mired in historical grievances for too long may lead to political stagnation and squander critical opportunities for lasting stability and prosperity—for both Serbs and Bosniaks.
Ljubljana/Washington/Brussels/Beograd/Sarajevo, 8 July 2025
[1] IFIMES - International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has a special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council ECOSOC/UN in New York since 2018, and it is the publisher of the international scientific journal "European Perspectives." Available at: https://www.europeanperspectives.org/en
[2] Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Knochen, Ahnen, Vaterland. Available at: https://fazarchiv.faz.net/faz-portal/document?uid=FAZ__FD02025070450102882462582
[3] DW: Njemački list: Tamna strana srpskog studentskog pokreta, (DW: German media: The dark side of Serbia’s student movement). Available at: https://www.dw.com/sr/nema%C4%8Dki-list-tamna-strana-srpskog-studentskog-pokreta/a-73153931
