The International Institute for Middle-East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)[1], based in Ljubljana, regularly monitors and analyses political, economic and geopolitical developments in the Middle East, the Balkans, Europe and across the world. In his article, “Reviving Multilateralism in the Era of Global Disorder,” Ambassador Lamberto Zannier, former OSCE Secretary General (2011–2017), former UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations (2008–2011), and IFIMES Director for Euro-MED since 2021, argues that the erosion of multilateralism calls for renewed investment in inclusive regional frameworks. Drawing on the OSCE model, he proposes an Oman-led Gulf dialogue as a practical mechanism for managing geopolitical tensions, strengthening regional cooperation and fostering long-term stability.
In the following lines, the OSCE Secretary General (2011–2017) argues that the erosion of multilateralism calls for renewed investment in inclusive regional frameworks capable of sustaining dialogue among states with conflicting interests. Drawing on the OSCE experience, Zannier identifies the Gulf as a natural setting for such an approach and points toward an Oman-led process, supported by a broader Group of Friends of the Process, as a practical model for dialogue, sustained cooperation, and long-term regional stability.
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The crisis of multilateralism has become a dangerous signal that the world order based on shared principles enshrined in the UN Charter and other key international instruments and Treaties is crumbling under the weight of a series of global challenges. These challenges are increasingly met with power politics and confrontation, not only in the military sphere but also in the political, economic, trade and financial domains.
The current international environment is marred by increasing geopolitical and geoeconomic competition, which is not only the result of the unfinished business after the end of the Cold War but also, more importantly, provoked by policies aimed at ensuring the control of key mineral resources and sources of energy in an environment where the lack of these resources would threaten the path towards further development and growth, especially for the greater world powers.
The conclusion of the Cold War brought with it expectations of an era of peace, stability and prosperity for all. In Europe, in the early years after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia had floated the idea that NATO itself might be reformed into a cooperative defence organization, one that would contribute to UN peacekeeping, of which Russia itself might over time have become a member. After all, Russia was arguing at the time, since NATO had been created as a defensive alliance, who were its enemies after the end of the Cold War?
In fact, a North Atlantic Cooperation Council was soon established, followed by a Partnership for Peace programme encompassing both NATO members and their former adversaries. Discussions on the new principles for modern peace operations were held in an extended forum, which included Russia, Eastern European countries and other European nations particularly active and experienced in peacekeeping under a UN flag. The group produced important agreed reports, which highlighted the key role of the UN and other inclusive regional organizations such as the OSCE to issue mandates which would ensure full legitimacy of future operations. It looked like a new era of cooperation had in fact emerged, as had been announced in the 1999 CSCE Charter of Paris.
Yet that path was not sustained. A deep inset diffidence between the US and the Russian political and military establishments had in fact not been fully overcome. True, during the 1990s important steps were made, especially in the CSCE/OSCE framework, in the area of disarmament and confidence-building. Regular reciprocal inspections, visits to military establishments, observations of military activities took place in those years, resulting in intensive and stable military relationships. However, the USA, as the only remaining superpower at the time, felt that it had special responsibilities to ensure peace and stability through promotion of democratic institutions. NATO could be a useful tool to support this policy and therefore it started expanding to include former Eastern European members of the former Warsaw Pact which had vowed to embrace a democratic path.
In spite of the reassurances that were provided to Russia, the latter began to perceive NATO’s enlargement as unfriendly and potentially threatening, and this helped fuel the rise of more nationalist political leadership inside Russia, which engaged more actively in rebuilding its own sphere of influence in the former Soviet space. Western support for reforms and leadership changes in countries like Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, among others, was seen in Moscow as open interference in this space and contributed to increasing tensions in Europe and to the introduction of illiberal reforms in Russia.
Deterioration of relations between the West and Russia had an immediate impact on the process of dialogue and cooperation within the OSCE. Throughout the 90s, this organization had regularly issued political statements at the ministerial level, showing an unprecedented degree of convergence among European nations. As disagreements started to emerge towards the end of the decade, especially following NATO’s aerial campaign in Kosovo and against Serbia, achieving consensus on these political statements became increasingly difficult. The last agreed statement was in fact adopted in 2002, after which no OSCE Chairmanship managed to issue an agreed statement: this marked just how wide the underlying divide had become.
From that point onwards, the trajectory was consistently negative. Arms control agreements collapsed one after another at a time when these mechanisms would have been most useful and needed. Russia came to view Western support for democratic movements in countries like Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan as open interference in its neighbourhood. It reacted by tightening its grip over the former Soviet space through new economic and security mechanisms of its own. Ukraine became “the most visible example” of this collision, and the current conflict ultimately was one of its consequences.
As the OSCE was founded on a shared set of governing principles, their violation in the name of national security imperatives produced their progressive erosion and weakening, as European relations were witnessing the progressive emergence of raw power politics.
As one looks at the consequences of the growing geopolitical confrontation, it is important not to dismiss the importance of the overall environment within which they are taking place, an environment which is profoundly affecting our societies.
The last half century has undoubtedly witnessed the most profound and unprecedented changes in human history. If we step back and take a broader look at these developments in terms of history of life on our planet, these changes are even more striking. If we look at the decades that immediately follow the end of the Second World War, the world population level was in the order of a couple of billion, with a very different distribution compared to what we see today; the lack of internet and social media prevented global flows of communication; development and growth were the key goal for all economies, without particular concern for the availability of resources. Today, just half a century later, population levels have skyrocketed past 8 billion; we are all connected, via internet and social media, and artificial intelligence is opening up new frontiers; new competition and conflict is surfacing over the control of resources increasingly less available for all; the environment is deeply affected by these rapid changes, with a clear trend towards a drastic reduction of biodiversity, increase of pollution levels, and changes in the climatic patterns with an overall tendency towards global warming.
The Earth has seen profound changes before, but never at this speed: in the past, this speed of change had only been witnessed in conjunction with extinction-level events. Plotted on a chart, this trajectory does not curve gently upward; it rises as a near-vertical line. The implication is not a matter for debate about whether such acceleration is occurring, but a matter that should concern policy makers enough to act.
The rapid pace of these changes has left out societies unable to process and often even understand their extent and impact, and governments find it more expedient to focus on day-to-day business and invest in popular policies that will keep them in power.
Demographic imbalance, such as in regions with insufficient working-age population to sustain the rates of economic growth expected by governments and investors, sits alongside the politically charged debate over migration, itself driven by climate pressure, poverty, conflict, human rights violations and pressure by criminal networks.
Beneath these dynamics lies competition for resources. As economies continue to expand and global population levels grow out of control, resources are simultaneously more in demand and less available, and the resulting competition for control over them has become an increasingly central object of contemporary politics, fuelling geopolitical competition at the global level and deepening already existing imbalances in the process.
This complex pressure tends to produce a particular kind of political response: a turn toward leaders offering simple, often illusory, solutions – build walls, restore past greatness, correct past injustice – that minimise or deny the underlying complexity rather than engage with it. This results in a stronger polarization due primarily to the underlying conflict of interests but greatly amplified by the impact of social media and algorithmic curation, which connect individuals predominantly with others who already share their views, reinforcing existing convictions, and make genuine debate across different perspectives progressively harder. Unfortunately, such dynamics are now visible even within multilateral institutions designed explicitly as spaces for such debate.
From this perspective, artificial intelligence will hardly assist. Pushed by hi-tech corporations, the military (seeking technological superiority over their adversaries on the battlefield) and the industrial/financial sector (seeking economic advantages and a disinvestment in costly human resources), it has the potential to turn into a dangerous spiral if left unmanaged.
In the early 1970s, a MIT team of experts issued a study, commissioned by the Club of Rome, on limits to growth, based on data available at the time and with the limited computer simulation capacity existing then. While the report predictions did not materialize, its basic concept remains valid today: continuing population growth against dwindling resources cannot sustain a process of continuous growth. Yet, this is the mantra of governments, pressed by imperatives such as ensuring high rates of employment, affordable living conditions, effective social assistance policies.
Most economic and political systems, including pension systems predicated on continuous growth, remain structurally resistant to any suggestion to sacrifice growth levels to adjust to principles of sustainability. Artificial intelligence can accelerate growth even further, but at the expense of the livelihoods of those it replaces.
Obviously the corporate and private sectors seek constant increase in profits through exponential growth. However, this trend cannot be sustained in the conditions I have described, and alternatives need to be urgently considered and adopted, having in mind sustainability as the primary goal. This concept is a very hard sell, very unpopular with current political leaders, also in well established western democracies. The Italian physicist and Nobel laureate Giorgio Parisi was criticised after stating in the Italian Parliament that growth itself should no longer be treated an unquestioned policy objective, and that limits to development needed to be acknowledged.
Given the challenges before us, what is needed is an integrated strategy, grounded in a recalibrated model of development. This strategy has to measure progress against the availability of resources, and prioritize quality of life over simple quantitative growth, since the latter, pursued without limit, ultimately will run our world into a wall.
Returning to multilateralism is essential but also difficult, precisely because it requires governments to accept constraints on their freedom of action. As governments resist or hesitate, multilateral frameworks carry one underappreciated advantage for political leaders themselves: they offer political cover. A leader reluctant to adopt an unpopular but necessary policy can point to an EU directive, a UN initiative, or an OSCE-agreed position as the reason why action is required, transferring some of the political risk of difficult choices onto the institution itself.
Ultimately, though, renewed multilateralism can be advocated for, but never imposed: an institution can offer the framework, but the willingness of states to use it remains, in the end, a matter of political choice. For this reason, the level of noise of those who realise how fundamental these issues are has to increase. In any case, strong leadership at the head of multilateral organizations can actively help drive this process by putting issues on the agenda and pressing governments to develop much needed policies.
At recent conference, I was asked why a heavily multilateralized region such as Europe, which has developed an inclusive cooperative framework such as the OSCE, could nonetheless find itself at war. I offered a three-part answer.
Firstly, I referred to the Organisation’s founding logic: the OSCE was born as a space of dialogue among enemies, originally between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, facilitated by neutral and non-aligned states during the Cold War. That underlying function remains intact and available to any state that wishes to use it, including on matters as consequential as the long-term security architecture of post-conflict Ukraine, the future of EU-Russia, and the security guarantees that might allow Ukraine to feel secure in a future settlement.
Secondly, I identified the deficiency not in the instrument but in its use. The space is there, it can be used, but we don’t have the kind of wise leadership, in a way, that is needed and willing to use it. I pointed specifically at the European Union, which holds a majority of OSCE member states but has not taken the lead in using the Organisation’s distinctly inclusive framework; a framework in which Russia, Ukraine, the United States, and effectively all European states, including a number of Central Asian former Soviet states, sit together as partners.Thirdly, I pointed to the same polarization dynamic discussed earlier, now operating inside the European Union itself, compounded by a broader international climate in which policies of sanction are prevailing over policies of engagement, even less if the engagement would have to be among enemies. A not well-known fact, technical cooperation has often persisted even where high-level political dialogue collapses entirely. I experienced this presenting the OSCE’s small arms work to Asian partners through the ASEAN Regional Forum despite political objections to the interaction between the two Organizations, showcasing OSCE engagement in Europe in the context of Korean reunification efforts, or promoting the work on controversial histories in relation to antagonistic historical narratives in the Western Balkans, Ukraine or the Baltic region. This work is evidence that there remains space for leadership beyond what states are currently prepared to offer.
Successive UN Secretaries General also saw the importance of investing in multilateral instruments at the regional level – a policy of revitalization of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. An efficient and well coordinated web of regional organizations operating autonomously but under an overall UN umbrella to ensure that the key principles of the Charter are upheld also in the context of very different and specific regional dynamics, perspectives and requirements, might prove to be the most effective way forward.
It would seem that the proposed Muscat/Oman Process, which has been in diplomatic circulation since June through the Group of Friends of the Process, has also found resonance in Muscat itself: Omani Foreign Minister Sayyid Badr Albusaidi said later in July that all eight countries on the Gulf littoral – Oman and the five other GCC members, plus Iran and Iraq – should be involved in designing a new regional security arrangement, while calling for greater regional responsibility for security and a recalibration of relationships with major external powers.
An example of the importance of a renewed investment on multilateralism at the regional/sub-regional level could be provided by recent developments in the extended Gulf region. While a number of Gulf countries have developed a successful process of cooperation through the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), this remains a process of interaction between largely like-minded countries, and not one of inclusive engagement among all regional actors with different political, economic, and security perceptions and objectives. The conflict between Iran and Iranian-backed groups with Israel and the US has prompted talks between GCC members, Pakistan and Turkey to strengthen more independent regional defence capabilities. However, this remains a one-sided effort, while an inclusive framework for possible engagement among all relevant regional actors is still missing. The centrality of the principle of freedom of navigation, which should apply also to the Strait of Hormuz, could be a key point in this dialogue, which should bring together actors that, beyond their historic differences and disagreements, have common interests in terms of economic development, security and stability of the region.
The OSCE model of a framework for dialogue and cooperation among enemies could come useful in this regard – as argued by the Group of Friends for some time. Oman, which has been having conversations with Iran on the sensitive issue of navigation through Hormuz, would be best placed to take the lead in establishing an inclusive framework for dialogue on a broader range of issues of concern to regional actors.
The core group could be the GCC6 plus Iran, but then it would be up to the core group to decide which other regional or global actors could be involved, at what level and with what status. The OSCE, once again, could serve as a model – some of its members have been part of certain arms control negotiations, others have not. Some countries enjoy the status of partners and have access to only some of the activities of the Organization. The UN also offers the model of observer status. In any case, any such process should be initiated by the states of the region themselves, who would determine the agenda and the degree of institutionalisation of the process.
The UNGA might be kept informed of any progress and should be encouraged to recognise the usefulness of subregional efforts aimed at promoting peace and security in line with Goal 16 of the Sustainable Development Agenda.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect IFIMES official position.
Ljubljana/Vienna, 21 August 2026
[1] IFIMES - International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has a special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council ECOSOC/UN in New York since 2018, and it is the publisher of the international scientific journal "European Perspectives.", link: https://www.europeanperspectives.org/en
