The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)[1], based in Ljubljana, regularly analyses developments in the Middle East, the Balkans and across the world. In its analysis, “General elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2026: The battle for the Presidency of BiH is a battle over the model of governance”, IFIMES argues that the general elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, scheduled for 4 October 2026, will be about far more than choosing political representatives. They will also serve as a test of the functionality of state institutions, the capacity to form a government and the democratic legitimacy of the electoral system. The analysis specifically examines the key political and institutional relations that will shape the post-election dynamics and the future configuration of government in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Bosnia and Herzegovina will hold its tenth general elections on 4 October 2026. Citizens will elect the three members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, members of the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH and the House of Representatives of the Parliament of the Federation of BiH, the President and two Vice-Presidents of Republika Srpska, members of the National Assembly of Republika Srpska (NARS) and representatives to the assemblies of the Federation’s ten cantons.
The forthcoming general elections[2] will be characterised by pronounced political fragmentation. Across the various levels of government, 75 political parties, 29 coalitions and four independent candidates will contest the elections. The sheer number of political entities reflects the intensity of the competition but also underscores how deeply fragmented the political landscape remains ahead of the vote.
A total of 3,414,364 voters are listed on the Central Voters’ Register[3], including 48,074 voters[4] registered to vote from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, either by post or at the country’s diplomatic and consular missions. The electoral threshold stands at 3%.
These will also be the first general elections in which specific election technologies[5] will be deployed with the aim of strengthening the integrity of the electoral process, reducing the scope for electoral manipulation and enhancing its transparency and reliability.
Public debate over elections to the Presidency of BiH often centres primarily on who will represent Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs. However, such a perspective understates the institution’s broader constitutional and political role. The Presidency of BiH is not exclusively a mechanism for ensuring representation of the constituent peoples; it is one of the core institutions of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose members exercise their constitutional powers on behalf of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The forthcoming elections to the Presidency of BiH therefore carry significance well beyond the choice of three members of the collective head of state. Their outcome could directly shape the prospects for forming the Council of Ministers of BiH and consequently the future structure of state governance. There is also a possibility that the Presidency of BiH could emerge from the elections with an entirely new membership.
The Presidency of BiH nominates the Chair of the Council of Ministers of BiH, subject to approval by the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH. This means that a parliamentary majority alone is insufficient to form the state-level executive. The required majority within the Presidency of BiH must first be secured, making the institution central to the formation of the next government.
The 2022 elections offer a clear illustration of how the composition of the Presidency of BiH can shape the formation of state-level government. The Presidency nominated Borjana Krišto (HDZ BiH) as Chairwoman of the Council of Ministers of BiH after Željka Cvijanović (SNSD) and Denis Bećirović (SDP) voted in favour, while Željko Komšić (DF) voted against. The episode demonstrates how the make-up of the Presidency of BiH can have far-reaching consequences for the political architecture of state-level government.
The parliamentary majority that paved the way for the Council of Ministers of BiH after the 2022 elections rested on cooperation between the Troika parties (SDP, People and Justice and Our Party), HDZ BiH and SNSD. Yet the political relations within the Presidency of BiH were also instrumental in setting the process of forming the state-level executive in motion.
The claim that “government is formed from the top down” is therefore an oversimplification, but it is not without constitutional and political basis. The Presidency of BiH does not form a government on its own, yet its composition can be one of the decisive starting points in determining how that government ultimately takes shape.
In the current political context, the election of the Bosniak member to the Presidency of BiH carries additional weight because of the relationship between SDA and the Troika parties. If SDA were to regain the Bosniak seat in the Presidency while a parliamentary majority were formed without that party, the SDA-backed Presidency member could refuse to support the majority’s candidate for Chair of the Council of Ministers of BiH.
Political calculations are already beginning to raise the possibility of the Presidency of BiH pardoning Milorad Dodik (SNSD), particularly given his political ambitions in Republika Srpska and the prospect of his return to one of the entity’s highest executive offices. The issue further underscores how important the composition of the Presidency of BiH could be for future political relations at both state and entity level. The Presidency has the authority to grant pardons for criminal offences under BiH criminal legislation, pursuant to Article 119 of the Criminal Code of BiH and the Law on Pardons.
Under regular procedure, a single dissenting vote is insufficient to block the appointment of the Chair of the Council of Ministers of BiH, since Presidency decisions are taken by majority vote. An appointment therefore requires at least two votes. Nevertheless, the constitutional framework also provides for the possibility of initiating procedures for the protection of vital entity interests, which can render the ultimate political calculus considerably more complex.
This opens the door to a range of post-election configurations and renders relations within the Presidency of BiH every bit as important as relations among the parliamentary parties. Precisely for this reason, the outcome of the Presidency election may serve as a pivotal indicator of the future coalition architecture and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s institutional effectiveness.
This highlights one of the defining features of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s constitutional system. In conventional parliamentary systems, electoral mathematics largely revolves around a single question: who commands a majority in parliament? In BiH, the equation is considerably more complex. A parliamentary majority may be in place, yet the formation of the Council of Ministers of BiH can still be delayed or blocked at the level of the Presidency of BiH itself.
Consequently, the post-election picture must be tracked across at least three political arenas simultaneously: the composition of the Presidency of BiH, the balance of power in the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH and the composition of the House of Peoples, together with the potential activation of mechanisms designed to protect entity interests.
For that reason, post-election mathematics in BiH cannot be reduced simply to counting parliamentary seats. A political majority in one chamber does not, by itself, ensure an unobstructed institutional path towards the formation of government.
The institutional process may be further complicated by the constitutional mechanism allowing an outvoted member of the Presidency of BiH to declare a decision destructive of a vital interest of the entity, thereby triggering the constitutionally prescribed procedure for protecting that interest.
If invoked by the Bosniak or Croat member of the Presidency of BiH, the matter is referred to the Bosniak or Croat delegates, respectively, in the House of Peoples of the Parliament of the Federation of BiH. If invoked by the Serb member, it is referred to the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska.
This mechanism shows that a decision by the Presidency of BiH does not necessarily mark the final stage of the institutional process. Under certain circumstances, it may trigger a fresh constitutional and political dispute and further delay decision-making at state level.
For the Troika parties – SDP, People and Justice and Our Party – the question of who will represent Bosniaks in the Presidency of BiH after the forthcoming elections is not merely a matter of choosing an individual candidate.
It is closely tied to the broader question of whether the political configuration that formed the state-level government after the 2022 elections can be sustained. Should the Troika wish to continue cooperating with HDZ BiH and potentially other partners without SDA following the next elections, it would have to secure not only a sufficient number of parliamentary seats but also a politically compatible composition of the BiH Presidency.
Otherwise, a paradox could emerge: a parliamentary majority could be in place, yet there could be no political majority required to initiate the process of forming the Council of Ministers of BiH.
The upcoming elections thus carry significance that extends beyond the choice of individual members of the Presidency of BiH: the battle for the Presidency is, in essence, a battle over the model of governance. For SDA, capturing the Bosniak seat could offer a pathway back to the centre of the state government formation process. For the Troika, retaining the seat could prove important for preserving the continuity of the current political configuration. For HDZ BiH and SNSD, the composition of the Presidency will likewise be an important factor in future negotiations over the formation of the government.
Against this backdrop, the campaign for the Presidency of BiH could become a de facto informal referendum on the country’s future coalition architecture.
IFIMES believes that the key political negotiations in BiH will begin soon after the forthcoming elections, even before a definitive parliamentary majority has emerged. The first test will be the ability of the BiH Presidency to reach the necessary consensus on the candidate for Chair of the Council of Ministers of BiH.
The election of Presidency members is therefore about more than the representation of the constituent peoples. It is equally a question of the effective functioning of the state system.
It will be particularly important to ensure that political actors do not misuse constitutional mechanisms to obstruct the institutions. Should the right to political disagreement be turned into a permanent instrument of institutional blockage, BiH could enter a new cycle of political paralysis.
At the same time, the international community, particularly the EU and NATO, should closely follow post-election developments, as any protracted deadlock in forming the government would further slow BiH’s European and Euro-Atlantic integration.
The electoral equation in BiH does not end when the polling stations close. That is when it truly begins. The Presidency of BiH may play a crucial role in shaping the political configuration of government and, equally, in determining whether that configuration can ultimately produce a functional executive.
Another shortcoming of the current electoral system is the absence of a second round of voting for members of the BiH Presidency. Given a larger number of candidates, a member of the Presidency can be elected by a relative majority, namely with fewer than 50% of the votes cast. This raises questions about the democratic legitimacy of elected representatives and whether the introduction of a second round should be considered as a potential avenue for electoral reform.
An additional challenge stems from the fact that the existing electoral system cannot fully gauge the extent of direct electoral support that would be garnered by political actors who, despite commanding a significant voter base, do not participate directly in the electoral contest for the BiH Presidency. This is particularly relevant to Dragan Čović (HDZ BiH) and Milorad Dodik (SNSD), whose political influence extends beyond the results achieved by the candidates put forward by their parties in the upcoming elections.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is therefore entering a period in which both the country’s political architecture and the internal dynamics of its most important societal institutions will come under renewed scrutiny. The general elections will determine the political leadership, while the election of the Reis-ul-ulema will determine the new religious leadership of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Both processes, each unfolding within its own institutional framework, will take place at a time when Bosnia and Herzegovina is expected to deliver greater political stability, more effective institutions and a clearer European perspective.
Bosnia and Herzegovina will see two significant electoral processes in early October 2026 – the general elections on 4 October and the election of the Reis-ul-ulema on 10 October. While the two belong to different institutional frameworks, both are unfolding at an important juncture for the country’s political stability, institutional development and European future.
Under the Statute of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Reis-ul-ulema is elected for a seven-year term and may serve a maximum of two terms. Three candidates have been registered: Nedžad Grabus, Sarajevo Mufti, Mensur Malkić, Director of the Directorate for Religious Affairs of the Riyasat of the Islamic Community, and Salem Dedović, Mostar Mufti. The election is scheduled for 10 October 2026.
The election of the Reis-ul-ulema takes place within an autonomous religious community, yet owing to the societal role of the Islamic Community, it carries wider significance for society in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the same time, the question of how relations between the Islamic Community and the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina should be further regulated at the institutional level remains open.
Against this backdrop, the future Reis-ul-ulema will face the challenge of preserving the tradition, autonomy and identity of the Islamic Community while also responding to the social demands of contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina and the wider European context. The general elections will determine the political leadership, while the election of the Reis-ul-ulema will determine the new religious leadership of the Islamic Community.
Ljubljana/Washington/Brussels/Sarajevo, 8 September 2026
[1] IFIMES - International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has held a special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council ECOSOC/UN in New York since 2018, and it is the publisher of the international scientific journal "European Perspectives." Available at: https://www.europeanperspectives.org/en
[2] CEC BiH: General elections in BiH to be held on Sunday, 4 October 2026. Available at: https://www.izbori.ba/?Lang=3&CategoryID=64&Id=6013
[3] CEC BiH: General elections in BiH to be held on Sunday, 4 October 2026. Available at: https://www.izbori.ba/?Lang=3&CategoryID=64&Id=6013
[4] CEC BiH: 48,074 voters in the excerpt from the Central Voters’ Register for voting outside Bosnia and Herzegovina for the 2026 General Elections. Available at: https://www.izbori.ba/?Lang=3&CategoryID=64&Id=6013
[5] CEC BiH: First shipment of equipment for specific election technologies arrives in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 3 August 2026. Available at: https://www.izbori.ba/?Lang=3&CategoryID=64&Id=6091
