The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)[1], based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly monitors and analyses key developments in the Middle East, the Balkans and worldwide. In his article, “2026 in focus: Five neuralgic points of global uncertainty”, Dejan Azeski – a Macedonian historian, journalist and publicist, and a member of IFIMES – explores the major global challenges set to shape the year ahead.
If anyone thought that 2020 or 2022 marked the peak of global chaos, 2026 suggests that such assumptions may have fallen short. This year is taking shape as a period of exceptional turbulence, fuelled not only by the bombastic rhetoric of world leaders but also by the tangible force of their actions. Five key “neuralgic points” of global uncertainty – the status of Greenland, Iran’s internal and external dynamics, Hungary’s parliamentary elections, the spillover of the Venezuelan crisis towards Cuba, and the prospective formation of an “Islamic NATO” – herald what may become the most complex and unpredictable period of the modern world.
The abduction of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, violent protests in Iran, increasingly serious plans for the annexation of Greenland, and threats against Cuba – these are but a few of the explosive events that have marked the very start of 2026. If the opening weeks are anything to go by, this year indeed holds promise, albeit in a deeply unsettling sense.
After everything we have witnessed over the past five years, there was hope that the coming period might restore at least a semblance of reason. However, the opposite appears more likely: we stand on the threshold of a year defined by unprecedented transformations and political theatre unlike any our generation has ever seen.
Recent reports from the United States suggest that Donald Trump has instructed special forces commanders to draft a plan for an invasion of Greenland. Yet, senior military officials are, for the time being, strongly opposed to the idea.
Sources claim that “hawks” within the president’s security circle, led by political adviser Stephen Miller, have been emboldened by the purported success of the operation that led to the arrest of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro. Their objective is to secure US control over Greenland as soon as possible, before Russia or China makes a strategic move of its own in the Arctic.
British diplomats believe that Trump is additionally motivated by domestic political considerations, namely a desire to divert public attention away from economic woes ahead of the midterm elections later this year, in which Republicans risk losing control of Congress.
The same sources indicate that Trump requested that the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) prepare an invasion plan, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff declined, deeming such an operation illegal and politically untenable without congressional backing. In its place, less controversial options were put forward, such as intercepting Russian “ghost ships” – a clandestine fleet allegedly used by Moscow to evade sanctions – or even limited military operations against Iran.
Diplomatic sources also refer to the existence of a so-called “escalation scenario”, whereby Trump could resort to military force or political coercion to sever Greenland’s institutional ties with Denmark. One diplomatic cable characterised it as “the worst-case scenario”, warning that it could result in the “disintegration of NATO from within”.
Some European officials go even further, arguing that the destabilisation of NATO is precisely one of the objectives of the hardline MAGA faction surrounding Trump. Given that Congress would in all likelihood refuse to authorise a formal US withdrawal from NATO, the occupation of Greenland could compel European member states to leave the Alliance of their own accord, effectively bringing it to an end.
At the same time, several European states have deployed troops to Greenland under a NATO mission, both to reinforce security in the Arctic and to deter any potential unilateral action by Washington.
For the first time in over two centuries, the United States finds itself in open strategic disagreement with the United Kingdom and France – a grave precedent in modern transatlantic history.
The wave of protests that engulfed Iran at the end of last year and continued throughout 2026 represents the most formidable test of the Islamic Republic’s stability in recent decades. Although the demonstrations have not resulted in a political breakthrough, they have laid bare profound structural frailties of the Iranian system – economic, social, and legitimacy-based.
The economic factor remains the key driver of discontent. Prolonged international sanctions, the depreciation of the Iranian rial, rampant inflation and chronically high youth unemployment have created an explosive social mix. However, the protests rapidly assumed an overtly political character, as reflected in slogans directed against Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and in the symbolic rehabilitation of the monarchist narrative (“Long live the Shah”). Such rhetoric suggests that part of Iranian society is no longer seeking partial reforms within the existing system, but rather its fundamental transformation.
The bellicose rhetoric of US President Donald Trump regarding a “readiness to help” the demonstrators must be understood within the wider framework of US strategy towards Iran. Washington combines a normative discourse on human rights with a classic policy of deterrence and pressure. Threats of military intervention function primarily as strategic signals – to Tehran, but also to regional partners such as Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE – confirming that the American security architecture remains active.
Nevertheless, a direct military intervention would entail enormous risks: the destabilisation of the Strait of Hormuz, escalation through Hezbollah and Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria, and a potentially broader conflict with Russia and China, which view Iran as a pivotal element of the emerging multipolar order.
The Iranian authorities interpret the protests as part of a long-standing Western strategy of “soft subversion” – a narrative that has served as a central pillar of the regime’s legitimacy since 1979. The introduction of communication blackouts and the brutal repression of demonstrations indicate that Tehran does not see the protests as a social phenomenon, but rather as an existential threat to the regime.
At the same time, Iran is striving to consolidate its relations with Moscow and Beijing, positioning itself as a cornerstone of the anti-Western axis, particularly in the context of the war in Ukraine, the crisis in the Middle East, and the intensification of global major-power competition.
The European Union has condemned the repression and voiced support for the demonstrators, but it remains constrained in its ability to project strategic power. EU policy towards Iran balances normative discourse (human rights, democracy) and pragmatic interests (the nuclear agreement, energy, migration), thereby limiting its effective influence on the ground.
Iran today stands at a strategic crossroads: public discontent is growing, yet the regime continues to command robust repressive and ideological instruments of control. Meanwhile, escalating US rhetoric heightens the risk of inadvertent confrontation within an already fractured Middle Eastern security landscape.
The protests in Iran are, therefore, not merely an internal matter – they form part of a broader global rivalry among major powers, in which Iran represents a crucial geopolitical node between the West, Russia and China.
One of the defining political questions in Europe this spring is whether Hungary will see a change in government. The forthcoming parliamentary elections are not relevant solely for Budapest; they carry wider geopolitical implications for Central and Eastern Europe, particularly in light of Hungary’s strategic role as Ukraine’s western neighbour and, at the same time, an internal “dissenter” within the European Union.
According to the latest polls, the opposition currently holds an advantage, yet long-serving Prime Minister Viktor Orbán still holds substantial political, institutional and media leverage. After nearly fifteen years of uninterrupted Fidesz rule, a dip in approval ratings is to be expected. However, the central question remains: is there an opposition capable of capitalising on voter dissatisfaction and offering a credible alternative to the existing illiberal model of governance?
Opposition leader Péter Magyar has accused former European Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi of failing to “disclose the full truth” regarding an alleged Hungarian espionage affair that has for months eroded Orbán’s political legitimacy. According to his claims, Hungarian intelligence operatives, posing as diplomats, attempted to recruit staff within EU institutions, while Várhelyi reportedly concealed key information from his tenure as Hungary’s ambassador to the EU.
Magyar further accused Minister János Lázár of supervising the deployment of intelligence operatives in Brussels during his time in office, which the opposition cites as evidence of the systemic politicisation and instrumentalisation of state institutions in the interests of the ruling elite.
Orbán, however, is far from a passive political actor. Historian Anne Applebaum links him to ideological circles close to the American MAGA movement, arguing that he has developed an illiberal model of governance that formally relies on democratic institutions while fundamentally transforming their normative and functional substance. Against this backdrop, Orbán has strategically reframed the elections as a referendum on support for Ukraine and its potential EU membership, thereby mobilising a nationalist voter base and shifting the focus away from domestic scandals towards issues of sovereignty, identity and war.
The outcome of the elections remains uncertain. Orbán still retains the ability to adjust electoral legislation and institutional procedures, while opposition actors may face administrative marginalisation or disqualification. Consequently, Hungary’s electoral process is increasingly viewed as a test of the resilience of democratic institutions within the EU.
An added paradox is that Péter Magyar was once a close ally of Orbán, while his former wife, Judit Varga, was one of the key figures in Fidesz and served as Minister of Justice. Magyar maintains that he left Fidesz due to the party’s departure from its pro-European orientation; his detractors, however, portray his political realignment as driven by personal ambition and opportunistic repositioning.
The election campaign has been further encumbered by serious personal allegations. Judit Varga publicly accused Magyar of domestic violence and blackmail, branding him a traitor. Her statements, made following a court hearing in Budapest, triggered profound public polarisation and galvanised pro-government media outlets against the opposition leader. Magyar denied the accusations, describing them as a politically motivated smear campaign, and released audio recordings that allegedly point to political pressure on the judiciary, further reinforcing perceptions of institutional corruption and the erosion of the rule of law.
The Hungarian elections thus represent more than a national political contest: they serve as an indicator of Central Europe’s future geopolitical direction, its stance towards Ukraine and Russia, and the internal cohesion of the European Union in confronting growing trends of illiberal democracy.
The divorce between Judit Varga and Péter Magyar in 2023, coupled with the subsequent scandal surrounding an amnesty in a paedophilia case, has severely undermined the credibility of the Orbán government and accelerated the process of fragmentation within the ruling elite. These developments created space for a new political dynamic, in which Magyar capitalised on the institutional and societal vacuum to establish the opposition Tisza party. According to current polls, Tisza holds the lead ahead of the fateful parliamentary elections scheduled for April.
A potential change of government in Hungary would carry broader geopolitical implications far beyond national borders. Orbán’s downfall could weaken the illiberal bloc within the European Union and redefine Budapest’s relations with Ukraine, Russia and its transatlantic partners. Conversely, his political survival would further consolidate the populist axis in Europe, deepening ideological and political rifts across both the EU and NATO.
US President Donald Trump delivered a stark warning to the Cuban authorities, urging them to strike a deal with Washington. “There will be no more oil or money going to Cuba – zero! I strongly suggest they make a deal before it is too late,” Trump wrote on the platform Truth Social.
Trump noted that for decades, Cuba had survived on vast quantities of oil and financial aid from Venezuela in exchange for “security services” provided to the regime. “Most of those Cubans are dead from last week’s US operation, and Venezuela no longer needs the protection of thugs and blackmailers who held the people hostage,” the American president added.
He further emphasised that Venezuela can now count on the support of the United States – “the most powerful military in the world” – and that Washington stands ready to preserve regional stability. He reiterated that oil and money from Venezuela would cease to flow to Cuba, calling on the authorities in Havana to find a swift solution.
Venezuela, long Cuba’s primary oil supplier, has come under renewed pressure following the arrest of President Nicolás Maduro by US forces. Trump has reportedly requested that interim President Delcy Rodríguez redirect Venezuelan oil to the United States, a move that would deprive Cuba of a vital energy and financial lifeline.
Global media outlets cite US intelligence assessments warning of severe problems within the Cuban economy. According to information from multiple sources, key sectors, such as agriculture and tourism, are burdened by frequent power outages, trade sanctions, and other economic challenges. The potential loss of oil and financial support from Venezuela could further destabilise the Cuban administration, which has ruled the island since Fidel Castro’s 1959 revolution.
This situation illustrates how regional political upheavals in Venezuela directly affect Cuba’s strategic and economic position, rendering the island vulnerable to geopolitical pressures and evolving power dynamics in Latin America.
Turkey is preparing to join a defence alliance between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, whose principle of collective defence stipulates that any act of aggression against one member shall be treated as an attack on all. According to sources familiar with the negotiations, the creation of this so-called “Islamic NATO” is at an advanced stage, with an agreement expected to be reached imminently.
The anticipated expansion of the defence alliance could lead to a significant shift in the regional balance of power. It bears recalling that the Saudi-Pakistani pact, signed in September last year, includes a collective defence clause reminiscent of Article 5 of NATO – an alliance of which Turkey is a member and which commands one of the world’s largest military forces.
Sources indicate that the interests of Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are increasingly converging across the Middle East, South Asia and parts of Africa. Ankara views the alliance as an instrument for strengthening its own security and deterrence, particularly amid growing uncertainty over the commitment of the United States and NATO under Donald Trump’s administration.
Analysts assess that Saudi Arabia would contribute financial power, nuclear capabilities, ballistic missiles and manpower to the alliance, while Turkey would bring military experience, a developed defence industry and geopolitical influence in the region. Pakistan, for its part, would offer strategic connectivity in South Asia and a long-standing tradition of military cooperation with both countries.
Turkey’s accession to the alliance would signal a new phase in relations between Ankara and Riyadh, following years of tension. In recent years, the two countries have intensified economic and military cooperation, including a recent joint naval meeting held in Ankara.
Turkey and Pakistan share a decades-long military partnership encompassing F-16 upgrades, drone technology transfers and joint exercises. Turkey’s entry into the alliance could further consolidate this trilateral bloc, creating a regional counterbalance to traditional Western influence and potentially redefining the geopolitical dynamics of the Middle East, South Asia and North Africa.
Ljubljana/Washington/Skopje 27 February 2026
[1] IFIMES - International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has a special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council ECOSOC/UN in New York since 2018, and it is the publisher of the international scientific journal "European Perspectives." Available at: https://www.europeanperspectives.org/en
