International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)[1] from Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly analyses developments in the Middle East, the Balkans and around the world. Prof. Dr. Anis H. Bajrektarevic is professor in international law and global political studies, based in Vienna, Austria. In his comprehensive analysis titled “Comparative Study of Reconciliation Efforts in Post-Conflict Societies: Key Takeaways from selected regions of the world (African, American, Asian and European continent)”he explores reconciliation as a long-term and evolving process commitment to truth, justice, inclusion, and the social cohesion of all stakeholders within society.
Reconciliation after violent conflict is neither a certain nor linear process—it requires time, patience, and constant efforts in understanding and appreciating the unique socio-political dynamics on national, sub-national and communal level. Countries and regions emerging from protracted violence often turn to cooling and reflection that leads further on to truth-telling, justice, community healing, and power-sharing as tools of post-conflict transformation. This mini comparative study explores how nine diverse regions: Northern Ireland, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand’s Deep South, Canada, Mindanao, Austria, W Sahara, and Aceh—have approached reconciliation, offering valuable lessons for future peace processes worldwide.
The Good Friday Agreement (1998) was a landmark in ending three decades of violent conflict in Northern Ireland, that exploited the pro-Irish and pro-British as well as Catholic and Protestant sentiments for political polarisation and conformation. These bloody decades are generally referred as The Troubles. This Acord established a power-sharing government between Unionists and Nationalists and introduced significant reforms in policing, civil rights, and cross-border cooperation with the Republic of Ireland.
Despite the political success, deep sectarian divisions remain. Post-agreement reconciliation has relied heavily on community-based organizations such as the Corrymeela Community, which fosters dialogue across religious and political divides. Educational institutions like Queen’s University Belfast also support peacebuilding through academic research and policy development.
Key takeaway: Sustainable reconciliation requires both top-down political structures and bottom-up social healing mechanisms. The Northern Ireland case shows that institutional peace must be supported by grassroots trust-building and continuous civic engagement.
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of South Africa remains one of the most internationally referenced examples of restorative justice. Created after the fall of apartheid in 1994, the TRC allowed both victims and perpetrators to testify, often publicly, about atrocities committed during decades of racial segregation and oppression.
Chaired by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the TRC emphasized truth-telling over punishment, acknowledging that uncovering the past was essential to forging a shared future. While widely admired for encouraging forgiveness and national dialogue, critics point out that structural inequalities, cultural and socio-economic injustices remain inadequately addressed.
Key takeaway: South Africa's experience highlights the power of moral leadership, the importance of truth-telling, and the necessity of socio-economic redress to fully heal societies fractured by state-sponsored violence.
Following the end of a 26-year civil war between the Sinhalese-dominated government and the Tamil Tigers in 2009, Sri Lanka faced the urgent need to address ethnic grievances, war crimes, and mass displacement. The government created the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC), which recommended several reforms including demilitarization, language rights, and transitional justice mechanisms.
However, the LLRC has been widely criticized for lacking independence and failing to hold perpetrators accountable. Progress has been further hindered by political denial of civilian casualties, slow justice processes, and a lack of international engagement.
Like with some other conflicts noted here as well, this refers to the so-called Dual Pressures. The coercion and abuse streams from the rival group- externally, but also from the ‘own’ group – internally. Hence, the ‘own’ group often conducts intimidation, kidnaping summary executions, forced taxation, or forced recruitments for the violent ends, including the (ritual) acts as a demonstration of loyalty. Dual Pressures eliminates neutral and sober voices. Ultimately, it complicates peace building between the waring groups as well as the confidence building measures within the civilian population.
Key takeaway: Without genuine political will and transparent accountability, truth and reconciliation processes risk being perceived as overly formal or even harmful. Reconciliation in Sri Lanka illustrates the dangers of state-controlled narratives that suppress rather than heal. Therefore, the community level civic involvement is detrimental. The big neighbour refrained from involvement, and thus helped the architecture of constructive surrounding.
Thailand's southernmost provinces—home to a Malay-Muslim majority, but also the Thai-Muslim minority of this predominantly Buddhist country —have experienced decades of low-intensity insurgency, driven by ethnic and religious marginalization. While the central government has occasionally engaged in mediation and reconciliation – on its own, or catalysed by the bilateral talks with Malaysia, most efforts have focused on community dialogue and local peace initiatives.
These include incorporating religious leaders, village heads, and Islamic schools in conflict mediation. Unlike in some other contexts, traditional and informal dispute-resolution mechanisms have been given prominence, which has helped build local ownership of peace.
Interestingly, the Thai-Muslim minority of Thailand’s Deep South often felt either excluded or disillusioned by both, Bangkok’s and Kuala Lumpur’s efforts. Their perception of inferiority vis-à-vis Malaya-Muslim minority (who, by their own perception, have the powerful supporter from ‘motherland’, hence more respect in Bangkok, too) must be addressed and adequately refuted.
Key takeaway: In culturally distinct and racially sensitive conflict zones, top-down approaches often fall short. Thailand’s experience suggests that reconciliation benefits from decentralized, context-sensitive models that respect local traditions and languages. Singular approach is also inadequate; the Thai-Muslim and Malaya-Muslim minorities deserve full recognition of their peculiarities.
Truth and Reconciliation in Canada refers to the ongoing process of addressing the historical and intergenerational harm caused by the residential school system, which forcibly removed Indigenous children from their families in an effort to assimilate them into Euro-Canadian culture. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (TRC), established in 2008, gathered testimonies from survivors and released its final report in 2015, including 94 Calls to Action aimed at redressing the legacy of residential schools and advancing the process of reconciliation. This effort seeks to foster healing, acknowledge past injustices, and build respectful relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Canadians, with a focus on justice, education, and systemic change.
Key takeaways: The TRC teaches us that (i) the Regret acknowledgment is essential; (ii) through and fair listening of survivors matters; (iii) the reconciliation is a long-term process; (iv) (full and lasting access to) Education and justice is essential; and finally that the (v) sustained action on all levels must always follow words.
The long-standing Moro insurgency in the southern Philippines resulted in decades of conflict, civilian strives and displacement. A significant breakthrough came with the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) in 2014, which granted autonomous governance to the Bangsamoro people.
One of the most notable aspects of this peace process was its inclusive nature, despite very sensitive Christian-Muslim clash trajectory. Women played a central role, both as negotiators—such as Miriam Coronel-Ferrer, the first female chief negotiator in a major peace process—and as grassroots mobilizers. Traditional communal leaders (datus) and religious authorities (ulama) also helped mediate and legitimize the agreements locally.
Key takeaways: Mindanao shows that inclusive participation across gender, religion, and community lines enriches the legitimacy and sustainability of peace agreements. The deliberate inclusion of marginalized voices increases public buy-in and supports a more comprehensive reconciliation. Powerful neighbours (although predominantly Muslim, Indonesia and Malaya) refrained from involvement, and thus helped the architecture of constructive surrounding, and final reconciliatory enterprise.
Aceh’s separatist conflict between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Indonesian government had persisted for nearly 30 years when the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami devastated the province. Ironically and tragically enough, the natural disaster provided a rare opening for peace, as both sides recognized the necessity of cooperation during the colossal human catastrophe and massive humanitarian crisis.
The 2005 Helsinki Agreement granted Aceh special autonomy, including control over natural resources and local governance. Peace was reinforced through general amnesty and reintegration of ex-combatants, livelihood projects, and leveraging traditional customs such as “gotong royong” (mutual cooperation) for community rebuilding.
Key takeaways: Aceh illustrates how a non-man-made crisis (natural disaster) can catalyse socio-economic and politico-military reconciliation. Central government in Jakarta rapidly responded with the decentralisation notion. Subsequent customary practices and collective recovery efforts were central in restoring community cohesion and trust.
This is the first time in modern history that the cataclysmic environmental shock put all to the peace- and confidence- building trajectory.
Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony in North Africa, remains one of the world’s longest-running and unresolved territorial disputes. After Spain’s withdrawal in 1975, Morocco claimed much of the region, prompting armed resistance from the Libya and Algeria-backed Polisario Front, which declared the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in pursuit of independence. A 1991 UN-brokered ceasefire promised a referendum on self-determination, but it has never materialized due to political deadlock.
Today, Morocco controls the majority of the territory, while the Polisario maintains a government-in-exile and refugee camps in Algeria. The region remains tense, with periodic clashes and stalled diplomatic progress. Morocco is often criticised for the poor human rights record and for altering demography of the contested territory.
Key takeaways: Western Sahara demonstrates that (i) decolonization can remain incomplete decades later; (ii) lack of political will can undermine international legal promises; (iii) unresolved status contributes to long-term humanitarian crises; (iv) external actors’ ambivalence weakens mediation; and (v) the credibility of international institutions suffers when agreed solutions are indefinitely delayed.
South Tyrol (Alto Adige), a predominantly German-speaking province in northern Italy, experienced decades of ethnic tension following its annexation from Austria after World War I. Fascist-era policies of forced Italianization, contested by the post-Hapsburg monarchic legacy sparked deep resentment and, by the 1950s–60s, led to a violent autonomy movement, including bombings by German-speaking militants.
Back then, both leaderships – in Rome and in Vienna, exercised restrained and wisdom – agreeing (after the repeated attempts to resolve issue bilaterally) – that they disagree on all, and handed over the case to the United Nations. It led to the 1972 Autonomy Statute, which granted the contested territory of South Tyrol extensive self-governance. The agreement ensured proportional political representation, cultural and linguistic rights, and control over key areas like education and access to public services. Full implementation in the 1990s transformed South Tyrol into one of Europe’s most stable and prosperous regions.
Key takeaway: South Tyrol illustrates how deeply rooted identity-based (ethnic, cultural and linguistic) conflicts can be resolved through domestic restraint, external mediation, legal guarantees of cultural rights, and meaningful decentralization. De-escalation and management of the emotional charge through the reasonable and rational politics is a true study-case par excellence. The South Tyrol autonomy model remains a quiet but powerful example of a lasting peaceful coexistence.
Reconciliation is more than a singular process. It is a long-term, evolving commitment to truth, justice, inclusion, and social cohesion of all societal stakeholders. It can be initiated and accelatered by the external force, but it can be only delivered domestically. Neighbours cannot clean up the house, it has to be done by the household members.
Each of the elaborated regional case studies offers unique insights:
These examples make clear that there is no “one-size-fits-all” approach to reconciliation. Successful processes are those that are locally grounded, inclusive, truthful, and politically supported. They combine formal institutional reforms with informal community-based efforts, and critically, they address the structural inequalities that often lie at the heart of conflict.
Ultimately, reconciliation is not just about ending violence—it is about transforming relationships. It requires a deliberate shift from a logic of exclusion and vengeance to a culture of coexistence, where multiple identities are not only tolerated but respected and empowered in the shaping of a shared future.
The above contrasted and compared cases do problematize the central dilemma: More/longer international presence in the post-conflict society, or more national re-building and sovereignty regain? It is safe to conclude that the longer international presence (with the governing prerogatives at its hand) remains, the more nationhood drifts and erodes, making the complete re-sovereignisation utterly unattainable.
To support that claim, see charts and the 30-year comparison data below.
Finally, before closing the tentative proposal for the future:
| Dimension | Northern Ireland | South Africa | Sri Lanka | Thailand Deep South | Mindanao | Aceh |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Political Agreement | Good Friday Agreement | TRC Process | LLRC (limited impact) | Sporadic peace talks | Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro | Helsinki MoU |
| Community Involvement | High | Moderate to high | Moderate | High | Very high | High |
| Gender Inclusion | Emerging | Significant | Minimal | Low | Strong | Emerging |
| Use of Traditional Systems | Limited | Limited | Limited | Strong | Moderate | Strong |
| Major Challenges | Sectarian legacy, political gridlock | Inequality, weak follow-through | Accountability, political denial | Lack of national strategy | Fragile implementation, political instability | Post-disaster management, economic disparity |
Dimension | Northern Ireland | South Africa | Bosnia | Kosovo | N.Macedonia |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Political Agreement | Good Friday Agreement (1998) – comprehensive power-sharing & cross-border institutions | Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) – restorative justice approach without formal power-sharing | Dayton Accords (1995) – ended war but imposed rigid ethnic quotas and decentralization | Ahtisaari Plan / UN-led negotiations – state-building under international oversight | Ohrid Framework Agreement (2001) – power-sharing and decentralization after ethnic insurgency |
| Community Involvement | High – grassroots efforts like cross-community dialogue and integrated education | Moderate to high – civil society involved in TRC, though limited in economic restructuring | Moderate – civil society active but constrained by ethnic divisions and international frameworks | High – strong civil society and diaspora involvement during state-building | High – active participation from both Macedonian and Albanian groups in post-conflict reforms |
| Gender Inclusion | Emerging – women underrepresented in formal peace talks, growing role in civil society | Significant – strong women’s testimonies and leadership in TRC process | Moderate – gender often sidelined due to ethnic focus; some progress via NGOs | Low – women largely excluded from negotiations and early state-building | Moderate – women participated more in civil society than political negotiations |
| Use of Traditional Systems | Limited – mostly formal legal-political frameworks | Limited – focus on legal-political reconciliation through TRC | Moderate – some customary practices recognized at local level | Limited – traditional structures marginalized in favor of international law | Limited – formal legal approaches prioritized over community customs |
| Major Challenges | Ongoing sectarianism, political polarization, stalled governance | Persistent inequality, economic injustice, unmet expectations of the TRC | Dysfunctional power-sharing, ethnic segregation, frozen conflict dynamics | Ethnic polarization, status dispute, institutional fragility | Slow implementation of reforms, ethnic mistrust, youth radicalisation. |
Dimension | Northern Ireland | South Africa | Western Sahara | Bosnia | Macedonia (North) | Kosovo | Croatia |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Political Agreement | Good Friday Agreement (1998) | Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) | UN Ceasefire & Referendum postponed (1991) | Dayton Peace Accords (1995) | Ohrid Framework Agreement (2001) | Ahtisaari Plan & UN administration (2007-08) | Erdut Agreement (1995) |
| Community Involvement | High | Moderate to High | Low to Moderate | Moderate | High | High | Moderate |
| Gender Inclusion | Emerging | Significant | Very Low | Moderate | Moderate | Low | Low |
| Use of Traditional Systems | Limited | Limited | Limited | Moderate | Limited | Limited | Moderate |
| Major Challenges | Sectarian divisions, political stalemate | Structural inequality, socio-economic gaps | Political deadlock, occupation, refugee crisis | Ethnic fragmentation, governance fragility | Ethno-nationalism, weak institutions | Unresolved status, international recognition | War legacies, nationalism, minority rights |
Dimension | Northern Ireland | South Africa | Sri Lanka |
| Thailand Deep South | Mindanao | Aceh | Bosnia | Kosovo | Macedonia |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Political Agreement | Good Friday Agreement | TRC Process | LLRC (limited impact) | Sporadic peace talks | Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro | Helsinki MoU | Dayton Accords | Ahtisaari Plan / UN-administered talks | Ohrid Framework Agreement | |
| Community Involvement | High | Moderate to high | Moderate | High | Very high | High | Moderate | High | High | |
| Gender Inclusion | Emerging | Significant | Minimal | Low | Strong | Emerging | Moderate | Low | Moderate | |
| Use of Traditional Systems | Limited | Limited | Limited | Strong | Moderate | Strong | Moderate | Limited | Limited | |
| Major Challenges | Sectarian legacy, political gridlock | Inequality, weak follow-through | Accountability, political denial | Lack of national strategy | Fragile implementation, political instability | Post-disaster management, economic disparity | Ethnic division, power-sha | Unresolved status, institutional weakness, interethnic tensions | Ethno-nationalism, weak institutions |
(GDP shown in PPP, constant 2017 international dollars)
Category | Yugoslavia (1945) | Yugoslavia (1975) | Croatia (1995) | Croatia (2025) | Bosnia (1995) | Bosnia (2025) | Serbia (1995) | Serbia (2025) | Macedonia (1995) | Macedonia (2025) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Population (millions) | ~15.5 | ~22.5 | ~4.6 | ~3.8 | ~3.8 | ~3.0 | ~7.5 | ~6.5 | ~2.0 | ~2.0 |
| GDP (PPP, bn Int$) | ~$105 billion | ~$380 billion | ~$55 billion | ~$120 billion | ~$30 billion | ~$55 billion | ~$70 billion | ~$140 billion | ~$15 billion | ~$30 billion |
| Life Expectancy (yrs) | ~50 | ~68 | ~73 | ~78 | ~71 | ~77 | ~71 | ~76 | ~72 | ~76 |
| Literacy Rate (%) | ~60–65% | ~85–90% | ~95% | ~99% | ~90% | ~98% | ~92% | ~98% | ~91% | ~98% |
* Data compared by the author (using the UNDP HDI, OECD and WB figures).
** Many thanks to Ms. Kelly Fidler Donley for the figures and data processing, and for tables charting.
About author:
Anis H. Bajrektarevic is chairperson and professor in international law and global political studies, Vienna, Austria. He has authored eight books (for American and European publishers) and numerous articles on, mainly, geopolitics energy and technology. Professor is editor of the NY-based GHIR (Geopolitics, History and Intl. Relations) journal, and editorial board member of several similar specialized magazines on three continents. Earlier this year, his 9th book was issued in New York.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect IFIMES official position.
Ljubljana/Vienna, 10 July 2025
[1] IFIMES – International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has a special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council ECOSOC/UN in New York since 2018, and it is the publisher of the international scientific journal "European Perspectives."
