The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)[1], based in Ljubljana, regularly monitors and analyses developments in the Middle East, the Balkans and across the world. The analysis entitled “Serbia after Aleksandar Vučić’s second term: between political continuity and a new institutional phase” examines the conclusion of Aleksandar Vučić’s second presidential term following his resignation on 27 September 2026, against the backdrop of his potential continued political engagement, changes in the institutional configuration of power, domestic political polarisation, Serbia’s European path and the country’s relations with the major powers. Particular attention is given to whether the next political phase will bring stronger institutions and greater institutional autonomy or see the continuation of a political system organised around a dominant political centre.
Aleksandar Vučić stepped down as President of the Republic of Serbia on 27 September 2026, bringing his second and final presidential term to a close. His second term began with his swearing-in on 31 May 2022, following his victory in the presidential election. Serbia’s constitutional framework limits any individual to a maximum of two terms as President of the Republic.
However, the end of his second presidential term does not necessarily signal Vučić’s exit from Serbian politics. On the contrary, his decision to step down before the regular expiry of his term has raised the question of a new distribution of political offices and the possibility of his continued political engagement from a different institutional position. Vučić has announced that he will stand for Prime Minister in the forthcoming parliamentary elections, although his appointment to the post would depend on the election results and the formation of a new parliamentary majority. Early parliamentary elections have been scheduled for 25 October 2026.
The conclusion of his second presidential term marks the end of an era defined by Aleksandar Vučić as the central figure in Serbian politics, first serving as Prime Minister and subsequently as President of the Republic. Throughout that period, his political clout extended well beyond the formal constitutional boundaries of the presidential office.
As his mandate drew to a close, Vučić framed his own track record around infrastructure, economic development, the preservation of peace and stability, Serbia’s international standing and his ability to navigate relations with a diverse range of global powers. In his final address as head of state, he singled out the construction and modernisation of roads and railways, EXPO 2027 and the Belgrade Waterfront project.
These achievements form an important part of any assessment of Vučić’s policies and legacy. Yet a political mandate cannot be assessed by infrastructure and economic indicators alone. In its reports, the European Commission has repeatedly pointed to areas where further progress is needed, including the rule of law, the electoral framework, media pluralism, institutional independence and the fight against corruption. In its 2026 assessment of the preconditions for EU support to Serbia, the Commission stated that political pressure on the judiciary and prosecution remained a serious challenge, while political and economic influence over the media continued to give cause for concern. The Commission also stressed the need for further progress in implementing OSCE/ODIHR recommendations, with similar challenges evident, albeit to varying degrees, elsewhere in the Western Balkans
Consequently, the definitive political verdict on the Vučić era will be shaped not merely by what was built during his years in power, but by the institutional legacy left in the wake of this political chapter.
One of the defining challenges in the final stretch of Vučić’s second term has been the months-long student and civic protests sparked by the railway station tragedy in Novi Sad in November 2024.
The protests brought to the fore issues of institutional accountability, corruption, the management of public projects, media freedom and the overall functioning of state authorities. European institutions have noted a rise in political polarisation and a surge in civic mobilisation since November 2024, alongside concerns over attempts to discredit protest organisers and civil society.
Vučić, on the other hand, has offered a markedly different reading of the protests and their political fallout. In his final appearance as president, he claimed that outside forces had sought to influence developments within Serbia and that the country’s refusal to impose sanctions on Russia was among the reasons for what he called a “colour revolution”. These claims reflect Vučić’s own political interpretation and should be distinguished from competing accounts, particularly those put forward by his political opponents.
The protests have become a fault line in Serbia’s increasingly polarised political landscape. For part of society, they represent a demand for greater institutional accountability and democratic change, while those in power and their supporters view them as a potential source of destabilisation, citing possible foreign influence, which is present in Serbia’s public and political space.
One of the hallmarks of Vučić’s foreign policy was an effort to maintain balanced relations across competing centres of global power.
While preserving its strategic commitment to European Union membership, Serbia refrained from imposing sanctions on Russia and continued to cultivate political and economic links with China. As his presidency drew to a close, Vučić repeatedly emphasised Belgrade's capacity to maintain channels of communication with both the Russian and Ukrainian leadership, while preserving close ties with China, members of the Non-Aligned Movement, Arab states and Israel.
This approach could be described as strategic redundancy – maintaining multiple political, economic and diplomatic channels in parallel. It has given Belgrade relatively wide diplomatic room for manoeuvre, but has also heightened the expectations and pressures placed upon it by various international partners.
In June 2026, President of the European Council António Costa set out three clear priorities for EU–Serbia relations: good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation, alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and the reforms needed to move the accession process forward. He placed particular emphasis on the rule of law, media freedom and electoral reform.
At the same time, Serbia remains a vital factor in regional security and stability. Consequently, international stakeholders will need to ensure that this political transition does not spiral into institutional instability once Vučić steps down from the presidency. Given Serbia’s central place in the region’s political and security landscape, any destabilisation of the country could have broader repercussions for the stability and predictability of the Western Balkans.
Kosovo remains one of the most pressing issues in Serbia’s foreign and security policy. Throughout his final presidential term, Vučić continued to balance international pressure, dialogue with Pristina and expectations at home.
As his presidency drew to a close, he once again raised the issue of arrests of Serbs in Kosovo, while defending his approach to the 2013 Brussels Agreement.
Looking ahead, the critical question for Serbia will not merely be who formally occupies the presidency, but whether the new political arrangement can sustain the Belgrade–Pristina dialogue and ensure that commitments undertaken as part of the European integration process are carried forward.
In June 2026, the European Union reiterated the importance of the Belgrade–Pristina dialogue and the full implementation of the Ohrid Agreement for regional security and Serbia’s European path.
This is the crucial question as Vučić’s second presidential term comes to an end. Formally, he cannot seek another term as President of the Republic, as Serbia’s Constitution limits any individual to two presidential terms. Politically, however, the picture is far less straightforward.
Should Vučić move from the presidency to the premiership, Serbia would face a significant shift in the institutional framework without necessarily disrupting the established centre of political gravity. This possible move lies at the heart of the country’s current political transition: a change of office may not mean a corresponding change in political influence. Vučić remains the central and most recognisable figure in Serbian politics, as reflected in his announced candidacy for Prime Minister in the forthcoming parliamentary elections.
This gives the forthcoming early parliamentary elections added political and institutional significance. They will be more than a contest between competing electoral lists: they will also test Serbia’s ability to forge a new political configuration through its institutions after the end of Vučić’s presidency and amid the prospect of his move to the premiership.
Serbia is thus confronted with at least four interconnected questions:
First, whether the change at the top of the state will bring about a genuine institutional separation between state institutions and party politics.
Second, whether the electoral process will command sufficient confidence across Serbia’s political and social spectrum.
Third, whether Serbia can continue along its European path while preserving its ties with Russia and China, or whether changing international circumstances will force it to define its strategic position more clearly.
Fourth, whether months of social mobilisation will create space for institutional dialogue between the authorities, students, the opposition and civil society.
In September 2026, the European Union continued to engage with Serbia as a candidate country through its annual rule-of-law dialogue, focusing on the judiciary, anti-corruption efforts, media freedom and pluralism, and institutional checks and balances. The European Commission’s findings should, however, be viewed in the broader context of Serbia’s European integration process, including the lack of significant progress in negotiations on Chapter 23 for more than four years, a situation for which responsibility cannot be attributed solely to Serbia.
Aleksandar Vučić leaves the presidency after his second term with a record combining considerable political achievements with deep social polarisation. His supporters point to economic and infrastructure modernisation, political stability and Serbia’s stronger international standing – including the launch of the strategic dialogue with the United States – as defining achievements of his time in office. In his farewell address, Vučić himself highlighted infrastructure development, the economy, relations with the major powers and the preservation of peace.
By contrast, critics of his rule, including parts of civil society, the opposition and international organisations, highlight concerns relating to the quality of institutions, media pluralism, the electoral framework, corruption and political pressure on institutions. Several of these concerns have been explicitly flagged by the European Commission in its assessments.
A definitive judgment on the Vučić era will therefore require the perspective that only time can provide. It is likely to remain the subject of long-term societal and historiographical analysis, as it unfolded against a complex and shifting domestic, regional and international backdrop.
The end of Aleksandar Vučić’s second presidential term closes an institutional chapter in which he played a central role in Serbia’s political system, but it does not necessarily mark the end of his political involvement or influence. The defining question of the next phase will be whether, following over a decade characterised by a heavy concentration of political power around a single centre, Serbia can build stronger, more autonomous institutions whose authority carries greater weight than that of any individual. Vučić himself could continue to play a prominent political role in that process.
Serbia is seeking to maintain an important role across European, regional and global affairs alike. Yet its long-term stability will depend not only on its relations with Washington, Brussels, Moscow and Beijing, but above all on the quality of its domestic institutions, public trust in the electoral process, the rule of law and the ability of political and social actors to resolve their differences through institutions rather than through perpetual confrontation.
Serbia therefore stands on the threshold of a new political chapter. The central challenge will not simply be who takes over the presidency, but whether the political system continues to revolve around a single dominant centre of power or gives way to institutions with greater strength and autonomy.
The forthcoming electoral cycle, the approach adopted towards the student movement and civil society, institutional reform, the European integration process, the Belgrade-Priština dialogue and relations with global powers will rank among the decisive factors shaping this next stage of Serbia's development.
The International Institute IFIMES considers it essential to ensure that, following the early parliamentary elections, a new Government of the Republic of Serbia is formed peacefully and democratically, with full respect for the election results and constitutional institutions, regardless of who holds the country’s highest offices in this new political phase.
Ljubljana/Washington/Brussels/Belgrade, 2 October 2026
[1] IFIMES - International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has held special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council ECOSOC/UN in New York since 2018, and it is the publisher of the international scientific journal "European Perspectives." Available at: https://www.europeanperspectives.org/en
