The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)[1], based in Ljubljana, regularly monitors and analyses developments in the Middle East, the Balkans and across the world. Entitled "Serbia 2026: Early parliamentary elections – a test of political legitimacy and Serbia's future direction", this analysis offers a comprehensive and balanced overview of the forthcoming parliamentary elections set for 25 October 2026. It brings together political, social, economic and geopolitical factors and examines three possible scenarios for Serbia’s future political trajectory.
On 9 September 2026, President of the Republic of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić called early parliamentary elections for 25 October 2026, and dissolved the National Assembly. The election campaign will run for the statutory minimum of 45 days.
The early parliamentary elections constitute one of the most significant political tests Serbia has faced in recent years. They are taking place against a backdrop of deep political polarisation, months of student protests and mounting demands for changes in the way the country is governed. Meanwhile, the authorities present the elections as an institutional mechanism through which citizens can determine the country’s future direction.
The key question of these elections is not simply who will secure a majority in the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, but whether the electoral process can generate fresh political legitimacy and help reduce Serbia’s deep social divisions.
On 14 September, Vučić announced[2] that he would step down as President of the Republic of Serbia on 27 September. The parliamentary elections therefore pave the way for his potential transition from head of state to head of government—a move that, should he secure the premiership following the elections, would allow him to retain his central political role. The Serbian Progressive Party-led bloc is contesting the elections under the banner “Aleksandar Vučić – United Serbia”, with Vučić as its candidate for Prime Minister. Consequently, the election has largely assumed the character of a personalised vote on both his policies and his future political status. This personalisation is both an advantage and a potential vulnerability: while the ruling bloc benefits from substantial institutional and organisational capacity, strong name recognition and extensive political experience, for a segment of the electorate the choice is becoming as much about Vučić himself as about the policies he represents.
The student movement adds a distinct dimension to the elections. Over the course of months of protests, it has moved beyond its initial demand for accountability over the tragedy at Novi Sad railway station to a broader call for political change.
In November 2024, 16 people were killed when the canopy at Novi Sad railway station collapsed. The event became a catalyst for mass protests that gradually acquired a broader political character. By May 2025, the student movement had made the calling of snap parliamentary elections its central demand.
This has created a new political reality: the student movement is no longer simply a social movement, but a potential political force capable of exerting significant influence on the electoral outcome. The Student Movement electoral list is led by Professor Ilija Srdanović.
The published final list, “Student List – Students Win”, comprises 250 candidates, among whom, according to the available information, there are virtually no active students.[3]
Consequently, extra caution is required when assessing the student movement, especially when considering the make-up of the so-called “student list”. Despite its name, the list is not composed primarily of students—an important point for understanding its actual political and social composition, rather than a minor detail.
Its candidates include professors, doctors, artists, entrepreneurs and other publicly engaged individuals, including individuals previously associated with a range of political groupings. Some have also been involved with the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) in the past or maintained various forms of cooperation with it. There is therefore a notable gap between the list’s name and its actual composition, suggesting that it has, to a considerable extent, moved beyond the confines of the original student movement.
Research also indicates that a segment of the public finds it difficult to identify clearly with a particular political position or feels that its views are not adequately represented. This is especially evident in relation to Kosovo, the European Union, the United States, Russia, Belarus and China. Ambiguous or insufficiently articulated stances on these issues are an important factor in understanding the political diversity of the electorate supporting the student movement.
On 15 September, the Student Movement unveiled its 11-point ‘Student Plan’. However, questions remain over the extent to which the plan has been developed, its feasibility and capacity to serve as a comprehensive framework for governing the country. The process of drawing up the candidate list has likewise sparked numerous questions concerning the criteria, methodology and transparency applied in selecting candidates. It is particularly telling that several individuals previously touted as "guaranteed candidates" were omitted from the list without a convincing public explanation and using a methodology lacking sufficient transparency. They include the Rector of the University of Belgrade, Vladan Đokić, Professor at the Faculty of Philology in Belgrade Milo Lompar, and others. The way in which the list was compiled therefore leaves open questions about the political coherence of the student movement, its internal decision-making criteria and its capacity to turn the social mobilisation of one segment of the population into a clearly structured political platform.
Its distinguishing feature is that it is neither organised as a conventional political party nor formally aligned with traditional party divisions. Yet this non-partisan nature of the student movement may also prove to be a potential weakness—particularly given the presence of individuals with past political involvement within its broader political orbit, alongside reports of ties to and support from foreign actors. Heterogeneous protest potential, however, does not automatically translate into the organisational capability needed to gain power.
Traditional opposition parties are confronted with a paradox: public dissatisfaction with the authorities has not translated into a corresponding rise in their political credibility. The entry of the student movement into the electoral race is reshaping the opposition landscape and may further alter the distribution of votes within the opposition electorate.
This opens the way for a new political configuration in which students, experts, academics, civic initiatives and sections of the existing opposition might attempt to forge a broader political bloc. The student movement brings together an ideologically diverse spectrum, extending from nationally oriented and pro-Russian right-wing groups to liberals, left-wing forces and advocates of Serbia's NATO membership and the recognition of Kosovo.
At the same time, there is a risk of further fragmenting the opposition voter base. If a significant number of electoral lists fall below the threshold of just 3% (barring statutory exemptions for minority lists), a portion of the vote will remain without parliamentary representation, thereby boosting the relative strength of the largest list. Consolidation is therefore likely to be one of the central issues of the election campaign.
The opposition faces the key challenge of establishing political credibility and demonstrating that it can offer a viable and sustainable alternative to the current authorities. Much of its activity to date has centred on opposing Aleksandar Vučić, while a comprehensive and persuasive alternative to the ruling bloc has yet to be clearly articulated.
In the interests of the public and voters, it would be vital to facilitate a televised debate between the leaders of the two front-running slates — "Aleksandar Vučić – United Serbia" and "Student List – Students Win" — namely Aleksandar Vučić and Ilija Srdanović. Such a debate would afford citizens the opportunity to hear their political programmes, positions on key issues and proposed solutions directly, enabling them to independently assess the available political options on the upcoming ballot based on relevant information. While Aleksandar Vučić has called for a televised debate, the Student List and its leader Ilija Srdanović have not accepted the invitation, thereby precluding a direct public exchange of views between the two key political actors ahead of the elections.
Vučić enters the campaign with a strong economic message, highlighting economic growth, foreign direct investment and infrastructure development as key priorities for Serbia. According to the National Bank of Serbia (NBS), real GDP growth in the first half of 2026 stood at 3.5% year-on-year, while the NBS raised its full-year growth projection to 3.2% in August. The Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia reported real GDP growth of 3.8% in the second quarter.
Regarding foreign direct investment, the NBS notes that inflows amounted to EUR 3.48 billion in 2025, following a record EUR 5.23 billion in 2024. For 2026, it expects inflows equivalent to around 4–4.5% of GDP, provided geopolitical tensions ease. In September 2026, Vučić stated that Serbia attracts between 61% and 62% of all foreign direct investment in the Western Balkans.
Vučić has placed particular emphasis on the need for Serbia to adapt to shifts in the global economy, technological competition, artificial intelligence and robotics. He has also warned of the fallout from the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, high energy prices and the increasing fragmentation of global trade. This forms an important component of the ruling coalition's electoral strategy: to link political stability to economic growth, foreign investment and infrastructure projects.
For some voters, economic security and the safeguarding of peace and stability may outweigh political polarisation as an electoral consideration.
/erbia is simultaneously seeking to make progress towards European Union membership, has launched a formal strategic dialogue with the United States, maintains its traditional ties with Russia, is deepening economic relations with China and is expanding its engagement with the countries of Central Asia and the wider Global South.
Vučić's statement that Asian economies are increasingly catching up with and overtaking European ones is particularly telling. He cited Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Georgia as examples, pointing to their high rates of economic growth.
This indicates that Serbia’s future policy will need to rest on strategic redundancy – the capacity to pursue several political, economic, energy and transport options in parallel, without becoming fully tied to any single centre of power.
Serbia initiated a strategic dialogue with the United States in July this year, while the specialised international exhibition EXPO 2027 is due to take place next year. According to International Monetary Fund (IMF) projections, Serbia is expected to match Croatia in nominal GDP in 2026 and is forecast to overtake it in 2027 to become the largest economy in the region by this metric. Serbia is also set to gain greater international visibility as host of the 2029 UEFA Europa League final[4], a major international sporting event offering a further opportunity to bolster the country’s profile on the European and wider international stage.
The EU remains Serbia’s principal economic partner, accounting for 58.3% of its total foreign trade in 2025 and 37.6% of foreign direct investment inflows in 2024.[5] For Serbia, preserving its European perspective and commitment to EU membership therefore remains a key priority, alongside maintaining scope for cooperation with other global actors.
A particularly sensitive issue ahead of the elections concerns the legacy of the wars of the 1990s.
Reactions to the funeral of Ratko Mladić and the verdict against Hashim Thaçi have reignited questions regarding Serbia's reckoning with its wartime past, its stance on international court rulings and Belgrade's relations with Sarajevo, Pristina and Zagreb.
Vučić said that Serbia had paid a political price as a result, while also calling for peace to be preserved and further regional conflicts avoided. He stressed in particular that Serbia does not need a ‘replay of the 1990s’.
This message suggests that the authorities are aware that renewed instability in the region would carry serious political and economic consequences for Serbia.
The International Institute IFIMES considers peace and stability to be a strategic interest of Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo and all countries of the Western Balkans. Questions relating to the wartime past cannot simply be pushed aside, but must be addressed appropriately through institutions, the rule of law and political dialogue, rather than through inflammatory rhetoric, threats and the mobilisation of national sentiment.
The election campaign in Serbia could have direct repercussions for Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in terms of relations between Belgrade and Sarajevo and the future of Republika Srpska.
In his recent statements, Vučić has emphasised the need to de-escalate tensions and avoid provocations, saying that Serbia would refrain from responding in kind and that preserving peace and stability is of paramount importance. Relations between Serbs and Bosniaks remain strained by low levels of mutual trust and differing perceptions of the wartime past, although there are some indications of improvement. While election campaigns in both Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina could intensify political tensions further, the post-election period will require efforts to create room for the normalisation of relations and the rebuilding of mutual trust.
Such an approach is important in preventing nationalist escalation. Serbia wields considerable political influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina and across the region, but that influence also entails responsibility. From the standpoint of regional stability, the manner in which Belgrade exercises its political clout in Bosnia and Herzegovina will be of critical importance.
First scenario – continuation of Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) rule.
The SNS enters the election campaign with the highest voter support according to the currently available Faktor Plus poll. Under this scenario, Aleksandar Vučić would take over as Prime Minister after the elections. This would preserve continuity of government in Serbia, but would not necessarily bring the country’s political crisis to an end.
A Faktor Plus poll[6], conducted from 16 to 20 September among 986 respondents, found that if elections were held on Sunday, the “Aleksandar Vučić – United Serbia” list would secure 48.6% of the vote, compared with 37.1% for the Student List. Two other lists would also cross the 3% electoral threshold: the Socialist Party of Serbia on 4.9% and the “European Serbia” coalition on 3.6%. Meanwhile, 16% of respondents remained undecided as to whether they would vote, indicating that voter support may still change over the course of the campaign.
Second scenario – the SNS remains the leading electoral force, but without a stable majority.
The SNS emerges as the winner of the election, but falls short of securing sufficient seats to form a stable parliamentary majority. Such an outcome would pave the way for negotiations with smaller parties and potentially with factions within the opposition.
Forming a government would require a higher degree of political compromise and could result in more complex and delicate relations within the parliamentary majority, increasing the risk of political instability.
Third scenario – a hypothetical strong electoral performance by the student and opposition bloc.
Should the students succeed in mobilising a large cohort of new voters and uniting disparate opposition groups, the elections could significantly reshape the existing balance of political power. Any change of government, however, would be only the first step. The principal challenges would lie in forming a functional government, reforming institutions and assuming responsibility for running the country. A Faktor Plus poll conducted from 16 to 20 September among 986 respondents found that, if elections were held on Sunday, the Student List would receive the support of 37.1% of respondents who had expressed a preference for one of the electoral lists.
At the same time, the current composition of the candidate lists does not yet reflect the level of political and professional experience previously announced. The public offices previously held by the candidates, their managerial experience and professional backgrounds will be important in assessing whether they are capable of addressing the complex challenges facing Serbia, particularly in an increasingly unpredictable regional and international environment.
The central question in the elections will not merely be who secures the largest number of seats, but to what extent the electoral process yields an outcome widely accepted as legitimate.
For the authorities, winning a parliamentary majority will not in itself be sufficient. They will also need to ensure an inclusive and transparent electoral process whose result is accepted by the political actors that are defeated. For the opposition, a strong electoral showing will likewise not be enough; it will need to demonstrate that it can put forward a viable programme for governing the country, rather than an alternative defined primarily by opposition to Aleksandar Vučić. The principal challenge for the student movement will be to convert its social support into electoral gains while preserving its credibility and non-partisan character — a formidable challenge indeed.
Whatever the outcome, the elections on 25 October will not automatically resolve Serbia's political crisis. Rather, they may mark the beginning of a new political phase whose direction will depend on the balance of political forces, institutional capacity and a willingness to engage in dialogue. Should the ruling coalition retain its parliamentary majority, its key challenge will be to normalise relations with the section of society that participated in the protests. If the opposition performs strongly, it will need to demonstrate that it can offer a functional and stable alternative. Should no political option be able to form a stable majority, a period of intensive negotiations and political uncertainty is likely to follow.
Consequently, it will be essential for Serbia to emerge from the electoral process with better functioning institutions, a lower degree of political polarisation and a clearer political course.
Ahead of the elections, Vučić said that Serbia must preserve peace and stability, avoid provocations and not return to a “replay of the 1990s”. Following 25 October, it will be possible to gauge whether this message will become a foundation for Serbia’s future political strategy or was just part of the election campaign. At the same time, while Vučić has publicly stressed the need to preserve peace, stability and effective institutions, representatives of the Student List have called on citizens to take to the streets once polling stations close on 25 October to defend—according to their public statements— an electoral outcome they have pre-emptively proclaimed both a victory and said is under threat.
This stark contrast between calls to act through institutions and announcements of post-election street mobilisation is both significant and concerning when assessing how events may unfold after the elections. It signals the risk of further political polarisation, disruption of the post-election environment and possible street unrest, particularly if the result is challenged or rejected by any of the key political actors.
The elections therefore amount to far more than a contest for parliamentary seats. Their democratic importance will hinge upon the conditions of the campaign, the level of political competition, the participation of new political actors, the transparency of the electoral process and the readiness of all relevant political forces to accept the result. After the elections, it will be vital for Serbia to preserve its regional role and continue to function as one of the key economic and political centres of the Western Balkans, while maintaining the accelerated pace of its European integration process.
Ljubljana/Washington/Brussels/Belgrade, 24 September 2026
[1] IFIMES - International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has held special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council ECOSOC/UN in New York since 2018, and it is the publisher of the international scientific journal "European Perspectives." Available at: https://www.europeanperspectives.org/en
[2] Tanjug: Vucic: I will resign as president on September 27; I have served Serbia faithfully. Available at: https://www.tanjug.rs/srbija/politika/281144/vucic-podnecu-ostavku-na-mesto-predsednika-27-septembra-verno-sam-sluzio-srbiji/vest?utm_source
[3] N1 TV: Students publish a list of 250 candidates for the National Assembly: Bodiroga, Šoškić, Dudaš, Feđa Dimović among the names. Available at: https://n1info.rs/vesti/studentska-lista-kandidati-izbori-2026/?utm_source
[4] 2028 and 2029 Europa League final venues confirmed. Available at: https://www.uefa.com/uefaeuropaleague/news/02a9-2198b03fc010-c1064b80f68e-1000--2028-and-2029-europa-league-final-venues-confirmed/?utm_source
[5] Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, External trade, final data, 2025, for data on the EU’s share of Serbia’s total foreign trade; European Commission, Serbia 2025 Report, Brussels, 4 November 2025, p. 64, for data showing that the EU accounted for 37.6% of foreign direct investment inflows into Serbia in 2024.
[6] Blic: Exclusive! Latest Faktor Plus poll: Vučić moves closer to an absolute majority; here is the level of support for the Student List. Only two other lists cross the electoral threshold. Available at: https://www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/najnovije-istrazivanje-faktor-plusa-vucic-na-486-evo-koliko-imaju-studenti/trlmfkj
