International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES)[1], based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly analyzes developments in the Middle East, the Balkans, and other regions worldwide. In his analysis titled “Governance Under Siege: Corruption and the Zelensky Presidency – How Internal Vulnerabilities Are Testing Ukraine’s Political Resilience at a Critical Moment of the War,” General (Retd.) Corneliu Pivariu offers a comprehensive assessment of how wartime governance, corruption scandals, and institutional fragility have increasingly challenged the presidency of Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukraine’s democratic resilience during the ongoing conflict. The analysis argues that although Ukraine continues to demonstrate military resilience and retains strong strategic support from the West, systemic corruption and growing pressure on anti-corruption institutions risk eroding public trust, weakening international backing, and undermining the country’s long-term prospects for European integration.
“States do not falter first on the front line, but within their own institutions.”—
As Ukraine wages the most important war in its modern history, the integrity of its governance system has become a decisive factor for the survival of the state. President Volodymyr Zelensky—once the uncontested symbol of national resistance—now faces mounting pressure not only from the battlefield but also from within his own institutions. Major corruption scandals in the energy sector, defense procurement and public administration are revealing structural vulnerabilities that risk undermining both domestic credibility and Western support.
The convergence of wartime governance, institutional fatigue and challenges to constitutional legitimacy places the Ukrainian presidency under unprecedented tension. Understanding these dynamics is essential for assessing the evolution of Ukraine’s political resilience in 2025 and beyond.
During more than six years in office, Zelensky’s presidency has undergone a paradoxical transformation: from the promise of a reformist project centered on anti-corruption, to the reality of a state forced to operate under the pressure of total war. The administration’s initial anti-corruption measures—strengthening NABU[2], reinforcing the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office, and the wave of dismissals in 2020–2021—seemed to mark the beginning of a new phase of public accountability.
The war, however, has radically reshaped Ukraine’s power architecture. Under martial law, presidential prerogatives expanded, control over Parliament tightened, and the activity of oversight institutions became far more dependent on the executive center. In parallel, the political environment homogenized, the opposition was reduced to a marginal role, and the media was integrated into a unified strategic-communication framework justified by security imperatives.
This context generated two major consequences:
In the absence of a Parliament able to exercise effective oversight and a fully autonomous press, decision-making responsibility increasingly concentrated at the presidential level. This transformed Zelensky’s mandate into both a pillar of political stability and a potential “single point of failure” should things spiral out of control.
The overlap between the necessity of strong presidential leadership in wartime and the weakening of institutional counterweights became one of the key factors behind the major corruption scandals that erupted between 2023 and 2025.
Since the start of the Russian invasion, Ukraine has sought to demonstrate to Western partners that it remains committed to reforms despite the military pressure. Yet between 2023 and 2025, a series of scandals revealed deep structural fragilities. These were not isolated incidents but simultaneous dysfunctions across three critical sectors: energy, defense procurement[3] and military recruitment.
The scandal in the energy sector—described by Western media as possibly “the largest Ukrainian political scandal of the wartime period”—targeted contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars managed by Energoatom[4], the national nuclear energy company. Investigators uncovered an extensive scheme involving illegal commissions, inflated contracts and intermediary firms, some reportedly connected to government-adjacent circles.
The sensitivity of the case stems from three factors:
For the first time during the war, anti-corruption institutions opened a case of this magnitude, with the potential to directly affect President Zelensky’s public standing.
In 2023, a scandal erupted over massive overpricing of food supplies for the army—price differences two or three times above market value. Although initially labeled “administrative errors,” NABU investigations and public pressure confirmed the existence of large-scale fraud.
This was followed by additional cases involving the procurement of uniforms, fuel and non-lethal equipment. The political consequence was significant: the Minister of Defence resigned and was replaced by a figure perceived as a technocrat, in an effort to restore Western confidence.
That such abuses occurred while the Ukrainian army was fighting for survival triggered a strong public reaction and turned defense-sector corruption into a national moral test.
In the summer of 2023, Zelensky ordered the dismissal of all regional military recruitment chiefs after journalistic investigations and official inquiries revealed a nationwide system of bribery for obtaining medical exemptions or illegal exit from the country.
The decision had strong symbolic impact: the presidency acknowledged the problem and took radical action. At the same time, it exposed a deeper issue—Ukraine’s mobilization system, a cornerstone of wartime resilience, was severely penetrated by corruption.
In a war of attrition where the ability to mobilize manpower is decisive, the weakening of the recruitment system is not just an administrative problem but a strategic vulnerability.
Paradoxically, even as major corruption cases advanced, signs emerged of political attempts to limit the autonomy of anti-corruption institutions—particularly NABU and SAPO. Certain legislative proposals and controversial appointments were interpreted as efforts to control or curb the momentum of these bodies.
The European Union reacted swiftly: some financial tranches were temporarily delayed or conditioned on guarantees regarding institutional independence. Brussels’ message was explicit: Ukraine cannot pursue EU integration without strong safeguards for anti-corruption mechanisms.
The three affected sectors—energy, defense and military recruitment—are not peripheral areas but fundamental pillars of the wartime state. The fact that corruption scandals concentrated exactly here signals structural vulnerability with direct impact on:
These scandals have become integral to how the Zelensky presidency is assessed both inside Ukraine and in Western capitals. They are not merely administrative episodes; they call into question the very architecture of state power, affecting the centrality of the presidency at a critical moment.
The corruption crisis is not limited to financial losses or administrative dysfunctions; it has direct effects on the president’s political legitimacy and on the architecture of power in Ukraine.
During the first 12 months of the war, Zelensky accumulated exceptional moral capital, becoming—both domestically and internationally—the symbolic figure of resistance against Russian aggression. Internally, this translated into high levels of trust and the temporary suspension of political disputes.
As the war dragged on and corruption scandals surfaced, this aura gradually eroded. Zelensky remains the most popular leader, but he is no longer the uncontested, near-unanimous figure of the war’s initial phase[7]. In some regions and social segments, early enthusiasm has shifted toward fatigue, skepticism and suspicion.
One of the most sensitive issues concerns the presidential mandate[8]. The Constitution of Ukraine stipulates a fixed term and the regular organization of elections, but martial law suspends the electoral process. Zelensky therefore remains in office through constitutional continuity, not through democratic revalidation.
This situation creates tension between:
This ambiguity is exploited both by domestic opposition and by Russian propaganda, which promotes narratives about an “illegitimate regime” and “usurped power.”
The succession of reshuffles, dismissals and reorganizations—although inevitable during a crisis—contributes to the perception of administrative instability. Zelensky has reacted to scandals by replacing ministers and agency heads and by initiating investigations, seeking to demonstrate zero tolerance for abuses.
These measures have conveyed two contradictory signals:
In wartime, the public prefers stability and predictability; frequent changes at the top can fuel the impression of improvisation.
Zelensky faces a difficult trilemma:
This structural tension explains why presidential responses sometimes appear oscillating: firm in rhetoric, cautious or delayed at the institutional level.
At present, Zelensky holds the largest volume of executive power in Ukraine’s recent history. This concentration is simultaneously:
Corruption scandals not only affect Zelensky’s personal image; they call into question the effectiveness of Ukraine’s governance mechanisms precisely at a moment when the country needs maximum coherence.
Ukraine’s corruption crisis has direct external reverberations, shaping Western perceptions and the calibration of support provided to Kyiv. In this context, a notable development was President Zelensky’s visit to Paris and the signing, on 17 November 2025, together with President Macron, of a letter of intent for Ukraine’s potential acquisition of up to 100 French-made Rafale fighter aircraft, SAMP/T air-defense systems, drones, radars and associated munitions[9].
The document is a political commitment, not a binding sales contract. France states that the first delivery could take place within the next three years, with full implementation over roughly a decade. Financing remains uncertain: EU mechanisms (such as the SAFE defense investment instrument) and the possible use of frozen Russian assets are mentioned as potential sources.
The EU has adopted a dual approach:
On several occasions, Brussels has conditioned or postponed financial tranches, sending a clear signal: European integration cannot be detached from internal performance in fighting corruption.
The United States remains Ukraine’s principal provider of military assistance, but the tone in Washington has become more nuanced. Congress has demanded additional audits, and the administration has insisted on transparency in the use of funds, precisely to avoid parallels with the Afghan precedent.
In the context of U.S. domestic politics, any perception that resources are being wasted in a corrupt state can fuel isolationist currents and complicate approval of new support packages.
Although NATO does not directly fund civilian budgets, the Alliance constantly evaluates the ability of partner states to manage military assistance effectively.
Corruption in logistics, procurement and recruitment is considered a major military vulnerability. It affects:
The Russian Federation aggressively exploits Ukraine’s corruption scandals to promote three key narratives:
These narratives are disseminated in the European information space, the Global South and euroskeptic political circles, with varied but tangible impact.
Corruption increases the risk of strategic fatigue among Western partners. In a context of economic pressures, domestic budgetary debates and the rise of populist forces, scandals in Kyiv can become arguments for reducing support.
Even if Western backing is unlikely to be withdrawn abruptly, its pace and volume may be adjusted—potentially complicating Ukraine’s ability to sustain a prolonged conflict.
Paradoxically, the corruption crisis could also act as a catalyst for reforms. EU pressure, combined with the necessity of post-war reconstruction, may force Kyiv to adopt measures such as:
Without such steps—taken much more decisively—Ukraine’s European path risks being blocked or postponed indefinitely, a scenario that appears increasingly plausible[10].
President Zelensky remains the central figure of Ukrainian resistance[11], but the concentration of power around him comes at a cost. As long as Ukraine functions under an emergency regime, democratic mechanisms are partially suspended and the space for abuse and error expands.
Zelensky cannot be separated from the effectiveness of the state he leads: any institutional failure is automatically perceived as a weakness of the presidency.
Corruption impacts much more than governance efficiency; it erodes:
Western partners have reached a shared conclusion: without clear and demonstrable progress in anti-corruption efforts, Ukraine risks losing the moral advantage it held in 2022.
The continuity of the presidential mandate under martial law is perfectly legal, yet it is not perceived as equally legitimate by all political and social actors.
The ambiguity between legal continuity and democratic legitimacy constitutes an institutional fissure which, combined with corruption scandals, may generate medium-term internal tensions.
The EU and the United States understand that an internal collapse in Ukraine would have dramatic consequences for European security and for the credibility of the West. At the same time, their support is no longer unconditional.
Transparency, auditing, limiting oligarchic influence and protecting anti-corruption institutions have become baseline parameters of their relationship with Kyiv.
Without credible reforms, possible scenarios include:
If, on the contrary, Zelensky succeeds in strengthening NABU and SAPO, cleaning up the vulnerable sectors (energy, defense, recruitment) and ensuring high levels of wartime expenditure transparency, Ukraine could regain its reputation as a reforming state[12] and accelerate its path toward the EU — although this is unlikely during wartime and with only limited chances after the conflict ends.
Ukraine stands at a critical juncture: between military resilience and political vulnerability, between Western support and growing skepticism, between the need for unity and the pressure for reforms.
The Zelensky presidency remains an anchor of stability[13], but it is increasingly exposed. Without a firm and transparent response to internal corruption, the moral advantage accumulated in 2022 risks further erosion.
Ukraine’s resistance is not defined solely on the battlefield, but also in the strength of its own institutions. The political future of the president and the country’s strategic positioning depend on how effectively these vulnerabilities are contained and corrected.
About the author:
Corneliu Pivariu is a highly decorated two-star general of the Romanian army (Rtd). He has founded and led one of the most influential magazines on geopolitics and international relations in Eastern Europe, the bilingual journal Geostrategic Pulse, for two decades. General Pivariu is a member of IFIMES Advisory Board.
The article presents the stance of the author and does not necessarily reflect the stance of IFIMES.
Ljubljana/Brașov, 25 July 2026
[1] IFIMES - International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has a special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council ECOSOC/UN in New York since 2018, and it is the publisher of the international scientific journal "European Perspectives." Available at: https://www.europeanperspectives.org/en
[2] NABU (National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine) is Ukraine’s specialized investigative agency for high-level corruption cases, established in 2014–2015 as part of structural reforms requested by the EU and the United States. SAPO (Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office) is the prosecutorial body with a special status of independence that oversees NABU investigations and decides whether cases proceed to trial. Together, the two institutions constitute the central mechanism of Ukraine’s anti-corruption architecture, regarded as an essential criterion in the country’s path toward European integration.
[3] In 2022, Ukraine allocated approximately USD 42 billion to defense and security, equivalent to 32.5% of GDP. In 2023, expenditures rose to around USD 68 billion, representing 37.5% of GDP. In 2024, the level remained very high, reaching approximately USD 70 billion, or 36.4% of GDP. For 2025, the initially adopted budget foresaw roughly USD 54 billion (≈26% of GDP), but successive budget revisions increased the total to around USD 71 billion, placing the estimated final share at approximately 30% of GDP.
[4] Energoatom, Ukraine’s national nuclear energy company, reported revenues of approximately USD 900 million in 2022, around USD 1.85 billion in the first half of 2023 (with full-year estimates of USD 3.5–3.7 billion), and roughly USD 6.9 billion according to budget projections for 2024.
[5] Public data on Ukraine’s annual military procurement levels remain fragmented. The only consolidated estimate cited in the specialist literature concerns 2023, when government spending on weapons and dual-use goods reached approximately USD 30.8 billion—over twenty times the 2021 level. For 2022, 2024 and 2025, although overall wartime expenditures consistently exceeded one-third of GDP, no official year-by-year breakdown of actual military procurement has yet been published.
[6] In 2022, general mobilization increased Ukraine’s defense personnel to roughly one million through a massive surge of volunteers and reservists. In 2023, recruitment continued at a steady pace, with an estimated 200,000–300,000 new conscripts, though marred by the corruption scandal in regional enlistment centers. In 2024, authorities conscripted approximately 200,000 individuals, despite the adoption of a new mobilization law that lowered the recruitment age to 25. By autumn 2024, Kyiv reported a cumulative total of over one million people conscripted since the beginning of the invasion. In 2025, amid social fatigue and the need to renew personnel, Ukraine shifted to a system of short-term, paid military contracts aimed at attracting younger volunteers, although no annualized data have yet been published on overall mobilization for the year.
[7] There is no public evidence that President Zelensky is personally involved in acts of corruption; however, his main vulnerability stems from his close entourage and from institutional weakness under wartime conditions. Personal relationships, political dependencies and appointments based on loyalty have fueled the perception that abuses committed by some members of the administration and inner circle reflect directly on the presidency. In the absence of strong institutional counterbalances, any major scandal occurring in his proximity automatically becomes a political vulnerability for the head of state.
[8] Volodymyr Zelenskyy was elected in April 2019 for a five-year term scheduled to end on 20 May 2024. Since 24 February 2022, however, Ukraine has been under martial law, and Ukrainian legislation explicitly prohibits the holding of presidential, parliamentary or local elections during its application. The Constitution stipulates that the president continues to exercise his duties until a successor elected under normal conditions is sworn in, which in practice has resulted in the de facto extension of Zelenskyy’s mandate beyond its initial term.
In February 2025, the Verkhovna Rada reaffirmed that elections could not be held during wartime, confirming the legitimacy of presidential continuity until hostilities cease and constitutional conditions for a free vote are restored. At the same time, this situation has fueled both domestic and international debates regarding the tension between the legality of mandate extension under an exceptional regime and the democratic legitimacy of governing a state engaged in a prolonged conflict. Some voices have suggested organizing early elections as soon as security permits, either during a cease-fire or after the stabilization of the military situation.
[9] The signed document (a “letter of intent”) has no contractual value and does not include financial, industrial or operational obligations. Such diplomatic instruments are used to convey strategic signals to different audiences: for Ukraine, it underscores the continuity of Western support and offers Zelensky an image gain at a politically fragile moment; for France, it projects its role as a European security leader and supports its defense industry; for the West, it reinforces the message of unity and long-term commitment to Ukraine; for Russia, it creates the perception of a planned long-term rearmament of Kyiv, even if actual deliveries remain uncertain. In essence, the value of the agreement is primarily narrative and geopolitical rather than technical-military, serving the political image of both signatories, each facing difficult domestic circumstances.
[10] Despite their declared political support for Ukraine’s European perspective, both Germany and France view Kyiv’s effective accession with caution, as it would profoundly alter the EU’s internal balance. Ukraine’s demographic weight would reshape the double-majority voting system, significantly redistribute seats in the European Parliament and reduce the traditional influence of Paris and Berlin in shaping the European Commission. Moreover, Ukraine would become the largest net recipient of the EU budget, with major implications for Western contributions and for the Common Agricultural Policy. Overall, Ukraine’s accession risks generating a new center of power in Central and Eastern Europe, which explains the structural reluctance of the two major European capitals to accelerate the integration process.
[11] Legally, Zelensky may remain in office for the entire duration of martial law, since elections are suspended and the mandate extends until a successor is inaugurated. Politically, however, this continuity depends on maintaining sufficient public support, on developments at the front and on the management of internal vulnerabilities, with the current approval rating of approximately 65% being neither automatically stable nor guaranteed.
[12] Although the Zelensky administration maintains a strong declarative commitment to the independence of NABU and SAPO, the real possibilities for institutional consolidation during wartime are limited. Martial law concentrates decision-making within the executive, and the most vulnerable sectors—energy, defense procurement and recruitment—remain deeply penetrated by long-standing networks of interests that are difficult to dismantle under crisis conditions. In these circumstances, Kyiv can implement selective purges and procedural transparency measures meant to meet EU and U.S. expectations, but profound and effective reforms are unlikely until the conflict ends. Success is therefore probable only in specific areas, not structurally.
[13] The support currently enjoyed by Zelensky, at around 65%, remains significant but far from guaranteed. It evolves constantly under the pressure of wartime dynamics, social costs and public reactions to institutional vulnerabilities, and cannot be regarded as either stable or immune to rapid shifts.
