BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA NOW= NO FUTURE NO PAST

dr. Zlatko Hadžidedić

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA:

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA NOW= NO FUTURE NO PAST

Since the end of the war, Bosnia-Herzegovina has been living in a state of permanent present, with no future and no past. The past, which could serve as the key reference in construction of its own, B-H identity, was forcefully expelled from the public discourse in B-H by the logic of the ‘peace process’ (as promoted i.e. imposed by the international community), claiming that any reference to the past inevitably leads to a new war. This kind of mechanicist reasoning starts from the (false) assumption that the outbreak of the 1992-1995 war was the result of perpetuation of ‘ancient hatreds’, of ‘continuous repetition of the past in the Balkans’, of ‘revenge for WW II’ and ‘revenge for Kosovo’, etc., rather than the result of efforts undertaken by international mediators and their Balkan partners to impose the model of ethnically pure nation-states across the Balkans (1). This kind of logic creates a fundamental practical problem – it eliminates any potentially constructive analysis of the past,(2) for the purpose of maintaining an absolutely unproductive status quo, whereby the (artificially constructed) present remains totally conserved, thus overshadowing any vision of the future. The logic of the ‘peace process’, which imposes a taboo not only on any reference to the past but also on consideration of any legal, political, social, or economic changes which could transform this (preset) present into a different future (with an equally false assumption that any change in the Dayton set-up of B-H society inevitably leads to a renewed conflict), eliminates the very idea of the future that might in any way be different from this set present. Therefore, the fundamental problem of B-H society is not an attempt to perpetuate the past, but rather an attempt to eliminate the future by conserving the present, under a threat that any change in relation to this conserved present leads directly to a new war. In order to consider this problem, one needs to identify political, social, and economic forces which articulate and realise their own interests through such conservation of the present.

Besides the international bureaucracy – which tries to present itself as an advocate of the interests of the international community(3) and, quite logically, finds justification for its own existence in the Dayton model of a divided B-H,(4) identifying its very survival with the survival of this model – the political forces interested in conserving the present and eliminating the future are the very same ones which at the Lisbon Conference in 1992 accepted, either implicitly or explicitly, the idea of ethnically pure territories and the partition of B-H.

At the very root of the concept of ethnically pure territories and ethnoterritorialization(5) lies the idea of ‘ownership’ over a particular territory and the resources therein.(6) Although this ‘ownership’ is commonly presented as collective ‘ownership’ of an entire ethnic group over a territory and its resources,(7) this, of course, practically means that ownership and control are established by individual, physical entities (i.e. political forces) which legitimize their position of the de facto owners of territory and resources by presenting themselves as the sole, monopolistic representatives of ‘national (i.e. ethnic) interests’, at the same time excluding all other potential contenders for this form of ownership over territory and resources.

In the case of B-H, all the political forces which accepted the principle of ethnic partition, be it implicitly or explicitly (starting from the Lisbon Conference and ending with the Dayton Peace Accords), demonstrated at the same time their ambitions towards individual ownership over such ethnically constituted (i.e. brutally ‘cleansed’) territories and their resources. Given the actual effects of war, ‘ethnic cleansing’ and (Washington and Dayton) peace agreements on the implementation of the concept of ethnoterritorialization of B-H, a logical conclusion may be drawn that the realization of these forces’ ambitions was in effect strongly supported by these military and political processes. In practical terms, this means that during this period, ownership was redistributed: until 1992, the territory of B-H and its resources were de jure owned by the citizens of B-H(8); they were then partitioned and de jure transferred into the property of ethnic collectivities, which led to the establishment to the de facto ownership over partitioned territories and resources by individual political forces which asserted themselves as the representatives of these ethnic collectivities. On one hand, this process led to the establishment of these political forces as ethnonationalist owner-oligarchies.(9) On the other hand, the process of ethnoterritorialization and the subsequent transformation of ownership led to the dissolution of the B-H demos (i.e. the citizenry of B&H), thus replacing representative democracy with oligarchic ethnocracy. Throughout this process of ethnoterritorialization, these political forces worked on the establishment of an exclusive oligarchic ethnocracy, i.e. an oligarchic ownership over ethnically constituted (that is, partitioned and ‘cleansed’) territories and their resources. It is thus logical that they resist any attempt to reconstitute the B&H demos and civic democracy, as they naturally strive to conserve the system of oligarchic ethnocracy and their own ethnonationalistic oligarchic position. Accordingly, both in form and in essence, these political forces are conservative: publicly, their conservatism is formally manifested in their reference to the protection of their ‘national (i.e. ethnic) interests’, ‘religion’, and ‘tradition’; practically, it is an effort to conserve the existing system of ownership, which includes these publicly declared categories as the code for oligarchic ownership.

Naturally, oligarchic ownership as a system is a capitalist one; accordingly, transition towards capitalism is a conditio sine qua non for the establishment of this type of ownership. However, this is a case of a specific form of proto-capitalism, and these political forces are trying to promote it as the only possible form of capitalism. In this form of capitalism, to goal is to establish monopolistic control over resources and their distribution.(10) Hence, monopoly over the distribution of the existing resources is the basic constitutive principle of this form of production-distribution relationship, which theory defines as rentier capitalism. Production of new goods, their free-market distribution, competition, initiative, entrepreneurship, economic growth, industrial and social development, job creation, and all that theory links with the notion of entrepreneurial capitalism is thus the antipode to the system of monopolistic, distributive, rentier capitalism: in its essence is the principle of distribution of the existing resources (and the extraction of capital from them) rather than the principle of creation of new resources; the principle of monopolistic control rather than free-market competition; the principle of stagnation rather than new initiative, growth, and development; the principle of reduction of options rather than the principle of creation of new ones.(11)

Of course, it does not take an expert in economics to understand that in the long run, this system has no real future.(12) Yet, this is exactly the point: rentier capitalism is the kind of system that strives to eliminate the very idea of the future and the very idea of social and economic dynamism. In its essence is the concept of static conservation of the present, which means an elimination of the idea of the future as a principally dynamic one, as well as an elimination of any related ideas of movement, initiative, change, growth or development. This framework has been imposed on the post-Dayton Bosnia. It a priori denies the possibility of any fundamental change and promotes only the conserved present, whereas any consideration of either the past or the future remains prohibited under the threat of a new war. It is thus easy to conclude that this environment is the least favourable for the ideas of reform, initiative, competition, free market, development, or anything else related to the notion of entrepreneurial capitalism. However, the domestic ethno nationalist oligarchies are not the only conservers of such an environment – they are joined by those parts of the international bureaucracy which see their role in B-H as ‘partition-management’: from the very onset, the process of ethno territorialisation, or rather the process of ethnic partition, implied the establishment of ethno nationalist oligarchic ownership over the territory and resources; its management also implied a control over its course and a conservation of its principles as the only governing principles of the target society (B-H).

This environment engendered an entire rentier culture, which identifies the ideal of individual prosperity with the idea of individual ownership over the resources and the idea of their rentier-type exploitation. In that context, a prosperity generated by expansion in production, sales, trade or initiative is not even considered desirable: the ideal is the self-perpetuating capital generated by inactivity, rather than a capital created by production or trade. The specific problem in B-H society is the wide presence of this ideal, even in the social strata most affected by the consequences of this type of socio-economic system: paradoxically, even in the widest social strata, the ideal of social and economic success is identified with the ideal of rentier inactivity. At the same time, anger and frustration over these strata’s social position in relation to those forces that imposed their own control over the resources, denying access and charging rent for their use, are, paradoxically, usually directed against examples of successful capitalist entrepreneurship (the so-called ‘tycoons’), although the latter are rarely involved in direct exploitation of the wider population.

This double paradox escapes an explanation based on any kind of rational-choice theory. Still, it can be explained by considering the aforementioned culture as part of the general culture in B-H, where the specifically modern, civic values failed to assert domination over the pre-modern, non-capitalist and proto-capitalist values. One cannot really argue that this culture is totally pre-modern and that it contains no elements of civic values. However, the presence of various non-modern elements, such as the neo-feudalist ideal of rentier exploitation of the resources (and the subsequent respect for its agents), the neo-tribalist ideal of ethnic territories, or the neo-medievalist ideal of bringing religious and political powers together, indicates that the transition towards a modern, civic society in B-H has never been completed. While the former Yugoslavia’s socialism did have ambitions towards modernity, insisting on rapid modernization, it nevertheless proclaimed its struggle against typically civic values. This practically meant an inconsistent modernization policy and a selective promotion of civic values, while maintaining many of the pre-modern elements. B-H was thus a relatively fertile ground for the revival of these non-modern i.e. non-civic values. Therefore, the elements of civic values – which include capitalist entrepreneurship, private initiative, and, above all, interest-driven association – do not have the kind of prominent status they normally enjoy in mature civic societies, constituted on the principle of the social contract.(13)

From the point of view of transition towards a civic society, a particular problem in B-H is its underdeveloped culture of interest-driven association,(14) as opposed to the inflated culture of association driven by the assumed affinity – either space-based (neighbourhood) or kinship-based (real – family, or imagined – ethnic, religious or regional). In the process of decomposition of B-H society from 1990 onwards, there has also been a shift of focus within the culture of the assumed affinity-driven association, from a relative domination of association driven by the space-based affinity to an almost absolute domination of association driven by the imagined kinship-based affinity. This shift coincides with the physical decomposition of the population: in addition to the ethnic cleansing and brutal expulsion, there is also an intensified migration of the rural population to urban centres. This leads to the strengthening of rural values in relation to the urban ones – this process includes the strengthening of the principle of association driven by the assumed affinity of imagined (and real) kinship, in relation to the principle of association driven by the space-based assumed affinity. Containing the elements of individual choice along with the elements of automatic, assumed affinity, the principle of association driven by the space-based assumed affinity (neighbourhood) normally serves (and may have served) as a proto-model for the inception and development of the civic principle of association driven by rationally calculated, individual interests. It is therefore logical that, as the principle of association driven by the assumed affinity of imagined kinship (ethnicity and religion) becomes stronger and strengthens the presence of other rural values, B-H society is further alienated from the desired civic model of interest-driven association.

In addition to the above elaborated strengthening of other non-modern elements (or rather, neo-feudalist, neo-tribalist, and neo-medievalist elements) – such as rentier proto-capitalism accompanied by the processes of original capital accumulation, ethno-territorialisation and a renewed conflation of political and religious power – it is quite clear that the principles of entrepreneurial and industrial capitalism, the principles of constituting a civic nation, and the principles of secularism, are indeed far less present in B-H today than they were before 1990. Particularly devastating for the civic values is the merger of these (seemingly divergent) processes into a single flow of ‘the original accumulation’ of (rentier) capital in the hands of the three ethno religious oligarchies – whose constitutive principle is, in fact, a perverse synthesis of the interest-driven association and the assumed affinity-driven one, thus creating a single principle of association founded on the assumed interest-driven affinity.(15) Of course, these oligarchies are principally interest-driven groups, though constituted on the basis of assumed affinity. In them, the existence of the absolute identity between the assumed ethno religious affinity and the assumed oligarchic interests is equally assumed. And this very identity, assumed to exist between the oligarchic interests and the ethno religious affinity, creates a conceptual framework which, in turn, assumes that any deviation from automatic following of the oligarchic interests is seen as betrayal of the constitutive principles of the ethno religious affinity. Or, to use the rhetoric common in B-H, it is seen as a ‘betrayal of one’s own kin’ or a ‘betrayal of national interests’.

In a society where the possibility of individual choice and individual articulation of one’s own interests is reduced to the lowest level, under the threat of sanction for ‘treason’, and where this state of affairs is ‘carved in stone’ by a factual elimination of any notion of the (different) past and present, the individual is deprived of any free margin as well as of any possibility to change this position. The result of this is a sense of apathy and hopelessness, i.e. a sense of impossibility of any influence over one’s own fate or the fate of the society the individual lives in. All this leads to totally passive individuals, and that, following the logic of the relationship of the individual and the society he or she lives in, leads to a total paralysis of the society in question.(16) In a paralyzed society, the individual and the society reach the point when the most basic survival instinct begins to weaken and when giving in to fate looks like the only available option.(17)

Since this state of affairs acts as a mechanism for perpetuation of the existing relations, maintained by the systematic, interest-driven activity by both the external (international bureaucracy) and the internal factors (ethno nationalist rentier oligarchies), there is no possibility of changing the basic function of the mechanism without deconstructing it and, by that, without jeopardising these factors’ vital interests. Since this mechanism also acts as a mechanism for protection of those vital interests, it is highly unlikely that these factors would voluntarily forego the mechanism and deconstruct it themselves. In this situation and in view of the fact that these very factors have, in the meantime, marginalized all other potentially relevant social, economic and political forces, an effective change of the existing relations would only be possible through a systematic, strategically planned organization of the latter into a kind of interest-driven network for mutual assistance and promotion of alternative models of socio-economic relations; a less effective and less probable change would be through the latter’s spontaneous organization. As the former (including both the internal and the external factors) also functions as an informal, interest-driven network for mutual assistance and promotion of the rentier-oligarchic model, an alternative model of socio-economic relations can only be promoted though an analogous interest-driven organization.(18) This, however, is a separate issue requiring special elaboration.

Ljubljana, 5 February 2010